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ABSTRACT 
Provision of public goods often requires sufficient contributions from group 
members, and improper contributions are likely to produce feelings of injustice. Building 
on previous research, I develop a justice theory that explains how framing social 
comparisons in particular ways will make actors more or less sensitive and reactive to 
departures from fair contributions. In turn, this is predicted to impact justice-restoring 
behaviors such as reducing subsequent contributions to a public good, punishing group 
members, or exiting the group. This integrated theory shows how varying the way key 
pieces of information are framed affects fairness perceptions and subsequent behaviors in 
social dilemma settings as well as a broader contribution and/or reward settings. By 
integrating theories of distributive justice and literature on framing the following 
dissertation aims to better understand the perceptual, emotional, and behavioral effects of 
socially constructed frames on behavior public goods dilemma situations. 
The proposed theory is mathematically formalized and utilized to generate logically 
connected assumptions and derivations. The key terms, assumptions, and derivations are 
operationalized through the testable hypotheses aiming to measure variations in justice 
evaluations and justice restoring behaviors across different theoretical conditions. The 
hypotheses are tested in a hypothetical vignette and a standard laboratory-based public 
goods setting. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iv 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................................... x 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND THEORIES AND RESEARCH ................................................... 6 
2. 1 SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND CONTRIBUTION PROBLEMS ........................................... 6 
2. 2 PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE ............................................................................................. 11 
2. 3 FRAMING EFFECT .......................................................................................................... 22 
2. 4 SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION (SVO) ....................................................................... 24 
CHAPTER 3 A THEORY OF FRAMING JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS ....................................... 27 
3. 1 FRAMING JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS .............................................................................. 27 
3. 2 FORMAL THEORY .......................................................................................................... 33 
CHAPTER 4 PILOT VIGNETTE STUDY .................................................................................. 38 
4.1 METHODS .......................................................................................................................... 38 
4.2 FINDINGS .......................................................................................................................... 41 
CHAPTER 5 VIGNETTE STUDY: METHODS ......................................................................... 45 
5.1 VARIABLES ....................................................................................................................... 45 
5.2 VIGNETTE PROCEDURES .............................................................................................. 48 
5.3 HYPOTHESES ................................................................................................................... 50 
CHAPTER 6 VIGNETTE STUDY: ANALYSES ........................................................................ 54 
6.1. DATA AND PARTICIPANTS .......................................................................................... 54 
6.2 FIRST CONTRIBUTION ................................................................................................... 55 
6.3 FAIRNESS EVALUATION ............................................................................................... 58 
6.4 CHANGES IN THE SECOND CONTRIBUTION ............................................................ 63
vii 
6.5 TENDENCY TO CHANGE PARTNER ............................................................................ 71 
6.6 DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................................... 77 
CHAPTER 7 LABORATORY EXPERIMENT: METHODS ...................................................... 85 
7.1 VARIABLES ....................................................................................................................... 86 
7.2 EXPERIMENT .................................................................................................................... 90 
7.3 HYPOTHESES ................................................................................................................... 97 
CHAPTER 8 LABORATORY EXPERIMENT: ANALYSES .................................................. 105 
8.1. DATA AND PARTICIPANTS ........................................................................................ 105 
8.2 FIRST CONTRIBUTION ................................................................................................. 107 
8.3 FAIRNESS EVALUATION ............................................................................................. 112 
8.4 CHANGES IN THE SECOND CONTRIBUTION .......................................................... 122 
8.5 TENDENCY TO CHANGE PARTNER .......................................................................... 132 
8.6 WILLINGNESS TO SHARE GROUP BONUS ............................................................... 138 
8.7 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................... 146 
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 158 
9.1 FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS .................................................................................. 160 
9.2 FUTURE RESEARCH ...................................................................................................... 162 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 163 
APPENDIX A PILOT VIGNETTE STUDY SURVEY ............................................................. 175 
APPENDIX B VIGNETTE STUDY SURVEY .......................................................................... 179 
APPENDIX C SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION TEST ......................................................... 184 
APPENDIX D CONSENT FORM .............................................................................................. 187 
APPENDIX E PROGRAM SCRIPT FOR LABORATORY EXPERIMENT ........................... 191 
APPENDIX F DEBRIEFING STATEMENT ............................................................................. 209 
 
viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1: IE with activation of self vs. other vs. high standard (C*=15) comparisons ... 30 
Table 3.2: IE with activation of self vs. high standard (C*=15) and deactivation of self vs. 
other and deactivation of high standard vs. other comparisons ........................................ 31 
Table 3.3: IE with activation of self vs. other vs. low standard (C*=5) comparisons ...... 31 
Table 3.4: IE with activation of self vs. low standard (C*=5) and deactivation of self vs. 
other and deactivation of low standard vs. other comparisons ......................................... 32 
Table 4.1: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models for Changes in the Second 
Contribution ...................................................................................................................... 42 
Table 6.1: Distribution of Participants in Vignette Study (Ntotal = 145) ........................... 55 
Table 6.2: Two-Factorial ANOVA Test Results for the First Contribution ..................... 57 
Table 6.3: Two-factorial ANCOVA Results for Fairness Evaluation .............................. 59 
Table 6.4: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models for Fairness Evaluation ................. 60 
Table 6.5: Two-factorial ANOVA Results for Fairness Evaluation ................................. 62 
Table 6.6: Two-factorial ANCOVA Results for Changes in the Second Contribution .... 66 
Table 6.7: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models for Changes in the Second 
Contribution ...................................................................................................................... 66 
Table 6.8: Two-Factorial ANCOVA Results for Changes in the Second Contribution ... 68 
Table 6.9: Two-factorial ANCOVA Results for Tendency to Change Partner ................ 73 
Table 6.10: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models for Tendency to Change Partner . 74 
Table 6.11: Two-factorial ANCOVA Results for Tendency to Change Partner .............. 75
ix 
Table 7.1: Experimental Design ....................................................................................... 86 
Table 8.1: Two-Factorial ANOVA Test Results for the First Contribution ................... 108 
Table 8.2: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models of Fairness Evaluation ................ 116 
Table 8.3: Two-factorial ANCOVA Results for Changes in the Second Contribution .. 126 
Table 8.4: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models for Changes in the Second 
Contribution .................................................................................................................... 128 
Table 8.5: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models for the Changes in the Second 
Contribution .................................................................................................................... 129 
Table 8.6: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models for the Tendency to Change 
Partner…….…………………………………………………………………………….136 
Table 8.7: Two-factorial ANCOVA Results for Shared Bonus with Partner ................. 141 
Table 8.8: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models for Shared Bonus with Partner ... 143 
Table 8.9: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models for Shared Bonus with Partner ... 145 
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 3.1: Core Theory Causal Relationship Diagram .................................................... 35 
Figure 6.1: Estimated Marginal Means of Fairness Evaluation ........................................ 63 
Figure 6.2: Estimated Marginal Means of Changes in the Second Contribution ............. 69 
Figure 6.3: Estimated Marginal Means of Tendency to Change Partner .......................... 75 
Figure 6.4: Vignette Study Findings (Note: Indirect relationships illustrated with dotted 
arrows. Mixed colors refer to interactions.) ...................................................................... 78 
Figure 7.1: Heading Displayed for the Stock Market Study ............................................. 91 
Figure 7.2: Heading Displayed for the Community Study ............................................... 92 
Figure 8.1: Estimated Marginal Means of the First Contribution ................................... 109 
Figure 8.2: Mediating Effect of Motivation on SVO in Predicting the First  
Contribution .................................................................................................................... 111 
Figure 8.3: Comparison of Mean Fairness Evaluations When Partner Contributed More 
and Less than Participants ............................................................................................... 120 
Figure 8.4: Estimated Marginal Means for Changes in the Second Contribution .......... 124 
Figure 8.5: Estimated Marginal Means of Changes in the Second Contribution ........... 126 
Figure 8.6: Estimated Marginal Means for Tendency to Change Partner ...................... 133 
Figure 8.7: Means Plot for Shared Bonus with Partner .................................................. 139 
Figure 8.8: Estimated Marginal Means of Shared Bonus with Partner .......................... 142 
Figure 8.9: Experiment Findings (Note: Indirect relationships illustrated with dotted 
arrows. Mixed colors refer to interactions.) .................................................................... 146 
1 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
In a public goods dilemma, people have to decide to follow either their selfish or 
collective interest (Dawes 1980; Kollock 1998). The big question is what factors affect 
people’s decisions. I assume that one of those factors is surely how fair people feel the 
contributions are that they make and other people make relative to one another and/or some 
other standards for a given situation. This dissertation proposes an integrated distributive 
justice theory regarding socially constructed frames in order to expand our understanding 
of the perception of contribution and reward behaviors as just or unjust in small groups. 
This theory explains how individuals’ justice evaluations are shaped by their surrounding 
social contexts which may have been shaped by the way key pieces of information on 
contribution and/or reward are introduced (i.e. social frame). This dissertation also extends 
distributive justice theory to the realm of social dilemmas, more specifically public goods 
settings.  
Public goods (or collective goods) can be defined as goods that are supported by 
public contributions, but are available to any group member regardless of his/her personal 
contributions (Dawes 1980; Kollock 1998; Komorita and Parks 1996; Yamagishi 1995). 
Many public services (e.g. public parks, street lights, public radio, light houses, etc.) are 
examples of public goods and rely on taxes and donations from the general public. 
Decisions on whether to contribute to a public good are complex. Individuals can maximize 
their personal benefits by using a public good while not contributing to its maintenance
2 
 (i.e. free-riding), but if too many people choose to maximize personal benefits, then the 
public good will collapse and no one will benefit.  
Public goods involve contribution and reward behaviors and thus will involve 
justice evaluations and subsequent behaviors. When looking at what others are contributing 
to a public good relative to oneself, each other, and/or a reference points, it is very likely 
that fairness perceptions come into play. In turn, it is very likely that people adjust their 
contributions accordingly—responding more generously when observing the cooperative 
actions of others or less generously when observing fewer contributions from others or 
free-riding behaviors. Consequently, how people decide whether to contribute public goods 
is one the most critical questions in the social sciences. How fair one perceives contribution 
behaviors has been well-documented as an important factor influencing contributive 
behavior (e.g., Diekmann et al. 1997; van Dijk, De Cremer, and Handgraaf 2004; 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Van Lange and Messick 1996; Stouten, De Cremer, 
and Van Dijk 2005). This dissertation wishes to provide a theoretical framework regarding 
justice consideration in order to better understand public goods dilemma situations.  
When individuals encounter situations that require contribution and produce 
rewards to share, they make interpersonal comparisons of those contributions and/or 
rewards. When making these comparisons, it is likely that people adjust their contributions 
accordingly. Distributive justice theories (DJTs) commonly model these social 
comparisons as ratios, and they can accommodate comparisons of self-to-other, self-to-
standard, self-to-past, self-to-group, other-to-other, other-to-group, etc. If a comparison 
ratio deviates from precise proportionality (i.e., greater or less than one), individuals 
evaluate the situation as unfair (Jasso 1978, 1980; Markovsky 1985b).  
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While many interpersonal comparisons are available, which comparison is most 
salient at a given time depends on contextual information that, in turn, may be determined 
through socially constructed frames. The framing effect in cognitive psychology refers to 
judgment biases induced by the way information about a situation is presented, rather than 
by changing the substantive content of that situation (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 1986). For instance, a public goods setting can be 
characterized by emphasizing either negative or positive aspects, such as the risks and costs 
of participation or the potential for individual and collective benefits. The way 
contributions or rewards are framed may play a critical role in the formation of justice 
perceptions because the value of contribution and the desirability of reward can shift with 
changes in the social context.  
Theories of justice and judgment heuristics lead us to predict that different frames 
will have predictable effects on a participant’s perceived fairness of outcomes, and his or 
her subsequent behavioral responses toward injustice. I propose that if contextual 
information emphasizes and activates particular social comparisons, those comparisons 
will become more salient and impactful, and color the actor’s overall justice evaluation.  
In addition to the contextual information, an individual’s characteristics may have 
an important role in making justice judgments. Therefore, I examine the relationship 
between justice evaluations and social value orientation (SVO), which indicates 
individual’s general tendency in distributing a resource between self and others (Balliet, 
Parks, and Joireman 2009; Van Lange 1999; Simpson 2004). If these theoretical claims are 
applied to the realm of public goods dilemma, contribution behaviors can be better 
predicted and thus controlled. 
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The proposed theoretical arguments are tested through a standardized laboratory 
setting and a hypothetical vignette study. The vignette study is a three-condition study 
including three levels of different frames (own to a high-standard, own to a low-standard, 
own to a neutral-standard). Standardized laboratory settings provide controlled situations 
to test anticipated theoretical conditions. The lab experiment tests for predicted variations 
in participant’s justice evaluations and subsequent behaviors, measured by whether a 
participant alters subsequent contributions to the group account, gives less or more bonus 
rewards to the partner, or changes partner for future interactions. This experiment has a 2 
x 2 x 2 factorial design including two levels of comparisons for contribution (own to a 
high-standard, own to a low-standard), SVO categories (individualistic, prosocial), and 
partner’s contribution level (low, high). The vignette and experimental tests demonstrate 
how a socially constructed title may lead individuals to give different weight to 
comparisons and thus alter justice judgments, even when actual rewards and investments 
have remained unchanged.  
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I discuss 
background theories and research in support of an integrated theory of distributive justice 
and the idea of framing effects in order to formalize over-contribution and low-contribution 
problems in public goods dilemmas. Based on this background, in Chapter 3, I propose 
components of the integrated theory in order to explain the process underlying the causal 
relationships between the perceptions of contribution and reward as just or unjust regarding 
framing effects. From Chapter 4 to Chapter 9, I explain methodologies used in this 
dissertation and introduce gathered data. Chapter 4 is comprised of the pilot study’s 
methods and findings. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 explain the vignette methods and data 
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analysis for vignette study. Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 comprise the experimental methods 
and data analysis for experimental study. In Chapter 9, I provide a conclusion addressing 
the implications of this research for academic areas and its applicability to practical areas, 
limitations of the study, and suggestions for possible future research. Finally, all detailed 
experimental and vignette protocols, paper works, questionnaires, etc. that were used are 
provided in an Appendix section. 
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CHAPTER 2  
BACKGROUND THEORIES AND RESEARCH 
This dissertation explains how justice evaluations can play a critical role in public 
goods dilemmas and utilizes DJTs and framing effects. In this chapter, I describe social 
dilemmas and how under- or over-contribution in public goods dilemmas can create 
feelings of injustice. I also examine the processes of justice evaluations, including how 
DJTs focus on the process through which individuals make justice evaluations based on 
contribution and/or reward distributions and on the consequences of justice evaluations. I 
review the related research and pull together the theoretical background in order to develop 
an integrated justice theory. 
2. 1 SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND CONTRIBUTION PROBLEMS 
In many aspects of cooperative human behaviors, an individual’s self- and social-
interests are at odds, and the individual should decide to pursue either selfish or collective 
benefits. This mixed-motive situation known as social dilemma. In general, research 
focuses on two main types of dilemmas. The first type is the public goods dilemma, which 
refers to a mixed-motive situation where group members contribute individually to a public 
good from which all members can benefit. In typical public goods dilemma settings, each 
member of a group of actors makes decisions about contributing to a collective good that, 
in turn, accrues value and becomes equally available or apportioned to all. For instance, 
many public services (e.g. public parks, street lights, public radios, light houses, etc.) that 
we use daily are supported by taxes and donations. 
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The second type is the resource management dilemma in which a scarce public 
resource is presented for all individual group members’ usage, but the excessive use of 
which may result in depletion of the resource completely (Dawes 1980; Van Dijk et al. 
1999; Van Dijk and Wilke 1995; Kollock 1998; Komorita and Parks 1996; Van Lange et 
al. 2013; Messick and Brewer 1983; Olson 2009; Yamagishi 1995). The theoretical 
framework proposed here can be applied to both types of social dilemmas, but the present 
study explicitly focuses on contribution problems in public goods dilemma. 
A great body of research focuses on how to encourage group members to contribute 
and eliminate low contributions and free-riding. Free-riding occurs because it is generally 
the most beneficial choice for actors; but if everyone free-rides, collective goods cannot 
exist. For instance, individuals may enjoy using public services and goods, such as public 
parks, while not paying municipal taxes. By doing so, they maximize their rewards and 
minimize costs. However, these public goods rely on taxes and if more and more people 
stop paying taxes and choose to free-ride, the state will not be able to provide these services 
for anyone. When some members receive undeserved rewards by free-riding, the exploited 
members evaluate the situation as unfair (Markovsky and Berigan 2012) and perceptions 
of injustice weakens group ties, cooperation, and productivity (Adams 1963, 1965; 
Markovsky 1985b; Walster, Walster, and Berscheid 1978). Moreover, previous research 
shows that people evaluate under-contributors poorly and tend to punish them (i.e. 
altruistic punishment) (Fehr and Gächter 2002; Shinada and Yamagishi 2007; Yamagishi 
1986, 1995). 
Even though free-riding is often the most beneficial choice for a self-interested 
individual, people tend to cooperate to some extent. One of the possible explanations for 
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cooperation over free-riding is ideas of fairness and the contributive norms develop during 
social interactions. A considerable amount of research in social dilemmas examines 
fairness in relation to cooperation in mixed-motive situations (e.g. Allison, McQueen, and 
Schaerfl 1992; Allison and Messick 1990; Camerer and Fehr 2002; van Dijk and Vermunt 
2000; van Dijk and Wilke 1995; Van Dijk et al. 1999; Kerr 1995; de Kwaadsteniet et al. 
2010; Van Lange and Messick 1996; Messick 1995; Stouten, De Cremer, and Van Dijk 
2006; Stouten, De Cremer, and van Dijk 2009).  Research has consistently confirmed that 
collectively-oriented groups do not allow individual group members to maximize their 
personal interest by penalizing those that free-ride (De Cremer and Dijk 2009; Fehr and 
Gächter 2002; Shinada and Yamagishi 2007; Yamagishi 1986, 1995).  
Despite the necessity of group contribution, high contributions may be problematic 
and high contributors may bother other group members and also receive sanctions (i.e. anti-
social punishment) (Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter 2008; Irwin and Horne 2013; Parks and 
Stone 2010; Sylwester, Herrmann, and Bryson 2013). Parks and Stone (2010) and Irwin 
and Horne (2013) find that high contributing members are sometimes expelled from the 
group because their over contributions are perceived as atypical and their norm violating 
behaviors are punished. When some individuals contribute a lot more than others, other 
group members may feel offended because their appropriate contributions may now be 
seen as under-contributions when compared to the over-contributors. Thus, high 
contributions may change normative standards to the dismay of other group members. For 
instance, if an employee works longer hours than his or her coworkers, other employees 
may feel resentful because they may now be seen as not working hard enough. His/her high 
performance may violate the notion of the normal, typical effort for an average employee 
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even if his/her effort is beneficial to completing the group task successfully (Herrmann et 
al. 2008; Irwin and Horne 2013; Kuběna et al. 2014; Parks and Stone 2010).  
Researchers have considered various factors that may cause these antisocial 
punishments, such as differences in social background (Henrich et al. 2001; Herrmann et 
al. 2008), violation of norms, and creation of undesired standards (Irwin and Horne 2013; 
Parks and Stone 2010), and socioecological competitions (Sylwester et al. 2013). 
Conversely, a body of research suggests that high contributions may be associated 
with positive outcomes (e.g., De Cremer 2002; R. Willer 2009). For instance, Willer (2009) 
and De Cremer (2002) found that high contributors received more respect and deference 
from other group members. These different findings may result from various contexts of 
social relations (i.e. group structure, task features, interactions, etc.). Contributions may 
provide socio-emotional rewards to individuals, such as respect from others (De Cremer 
2002; Willer 2009). However, group members may feel that high contributors diminish 
their opportunities to receive these socio-emotional rewards and/or that high contributors 
are competing for a higher standing in the group. High contributors may be seen as 
manipulative, strategic, uppity, and suspicious (Berger et al. 1986, 1998; Lovaglia et al. 
1998; Ridgeway et al. 2009; Ridgeway and Berger 1986, 1988). 1 
In relations to fairness evaluations, non-cooperative behaviors may create injustice. 
Some individuals may follow their selfish interests, but receive the same benefit as the 
group-interested members, or those who choose to contribute to the collective goods. As 
                                                          
1 In this research, group members are assumed equal in task competence and thus equal in status. However, 
when group members’ statuses are differentiated, the expectations are likely to be in line with their statuses 
(e.g. low contributions from those of low status). The behaviors violating status expectations are likely to be 
evaluated negatively compared to status-confirming behaviors. For more discussions on status, see Berger, 
Wagner, and Webster 2014; Ridgeway and Berger 1986; Shackelford, Wood, and Worchel 1996; Wagner 
1988. 
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discussed above both low and high contribution may cause problems in groups. This 
implies that individuals may coordinate their contribution to collective goods and their 
share from collective goods in a fair way. Also, the decision to cooperate or free-ride is a 
personal choice, but the decision-making process is social and affected by social and 
structural factors and ultimately affecting contribution decisions from other members.  
Decisions on whether an individual free-rides or gives low (or high) contributions 
indicate that contributions to collective goods have different meanings and functions for 
group members. Contribution and contributors may be evaluated differently in accordance 
with the structural features of the social interactions. A structural feature in one setting may 
encourage group members to maximize personal profits, whereas another one encourages 
cooperative behaviors and/or promotes group wellness by offering socio-emotional 
rewards.  
This dissertation adds that fairness judgments may be influenced through structural 
differences. For instance, individuals in a situation that encourages maximizing group-
interests may evaluate a low contribution as very unfair. Individuals in another situation 
that encourages maximizing self-interests may evaluate the same contribution as fair. Even 
though non-cooperative behaviors can increase perceptions of injustice or fairness among 
the group in both situations, their evaluations may vary by depending on which situation 
they are in. Such as, group-interested members may be more sensitive towards a low 
contribution to the group compared to self-interested members. I claim that a well-
structured justice model may help better understand this process and help better understand 
contribution decisions within social groups. 
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2. 2 PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE 
In general, justice theories in sociology aim to understand how and to what extent 
social factors can determine individuals’ perceptions of justice. When individuals make a 
judgment about a rule, procedure, treatment, contribution, reward, etc., they may be 
influenced by various personal and contextual factors. People may perceive an allocation 
of reward to be just for one situation but unjust for another because their perceptions are 
formed by different distribution (or allocation) rules, such as need, equality, or equity 
(Deutsch 1985; Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry 1980). Different distribution rules lead people 
to evaluate situations differently and act in varying emotional, cognitive, and behavioral 
ways. Although there are numerous justice perspectives explaining individual’s justice 
evaluations for distributions of contribution and/or reward, this research focuses on 
distributive justice theories (DJTs). Most DJTs seek to explain why and how people 
perceive a distribution of contribution and reward as just or unjust and take into account 
the relationship between expected depending expected vs. actual amounts of contributions 
and rewards. However, each theoretical program focuses on different contributions (e.g. 
effort for equity theory or status attributes for status characteristics theory), comparison 
units (e.g. local or referential), rewards (e.g. pay or social influence), and comparison 
functions (e.g., ratios vs. differences). 
In addition to DJTs, procedural justice theories claim that people perceive an 
allocation as just or unjust based on the processes and procedures by which allocation 
decisions are made (Leventhal et al. 1980; Lind and Tyler 1988; Thibaut and Walker 1975; 
Tyler 1989). While perception of distributive justice implies differentiation between 
expected distributions and actual distributions, perception of procedural justice refers to 
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the appropriateness of the procedures for just allocation decisions. From a procedural 
justice perspective, people seek to be valued members within their groups and a just 
allocation system and procedure matches this sentiment (Lind and Tyler 1988). Research 
shows that when people perceive that they are treated fairly during the decision-making 
processes and that the ruling system followed to achieve the given outcomes is fair, they 
are likely to comply and cooperate (Lind and Tyler 1988).  Some research on procedural 
justice claims that fair procedures determine perceived fairness (e.g. Barrett-Howard and 
Tyler 1986; Folger 1986),  but other research shows that these effects are often moderated 
by the extent to which individuals are rewarded for their contributions. For instance, over-
rewarded or equally-rewarded people are likely to focus on fair procedures while under-
rewarded people are likely to focus on fair distributions (Clay-Warner, Hegtvedt, and 
Roman 2005; Greenberg 1987). 
Indeed, fair procedures are also taken into account by DJTs. Most DJTs consider 
socio-emotional and other instrumental contributions and rewards as inputs and outputs 
respectively. Most  DJTs address the question of how we get an outcome and evaluate the 
rules and procedures that bring about a legitimate outcome (Cropanzano and Ambrose 
2001; Hegtvedt 1993; Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995). Therefore, DJTs cover the literature 
on procedural justice theories and it is assumed that procedural justice is included in DJTs. 
Early Distributive Justice Research and Proportionality Rules  
DJTs mainly focus on a socially just distribution of rewards in society. In social 
psychology, distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of rewards allocated among 
group members. DJTs have investigated the antecedents and the consequences of 
individual’s justice evaluations in contribution and/or reward situations. One of DJTs’ most 
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critical aims is explaining the formation of individuals’ judgments about the distribution of 
contribution and reward. Justice judgments are typically considered to be based on social 
comparisons across individuals, groups, standards, expectations, etc. 
Most DJTs in social psychology stem from relative deprivation theory, a theory that 
emphasizes the importance of the social comparison process in making justice evaluations 
(Stouffer et al. 1949). From the basis of relative deprivation theory, Homans’ (1961) and 
Blau’s (1964) studies on fair exchange between actors provide a social psychological 
perspective for DJTs. These studies conceptualize justice not as it should be, but as it is 
perceived by individuals within a given context. For example, Homans proposed that 
distributive justice becomes a concern when the actors’ benefits are not proportional to 
their contributions. Individuals determine their just rewards by making comparisons 
between rewards (R) and contribution (C) and evaluate the situation as just if the ratio of 
reward and contribution is equal to one (i.e. proportionality rule).  
Adams (1963, 1965) developed these ideas of distributive justice and 
proportionality more fully by integrating it with Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance 
theory. Adam’s DJT, also known as equity theory, is a ratio model of justice that proposes 
a proportional mathematical formula to explain how a focal actor (x) evaluates the 
differences between his/her ratio of contribution to reward and the referent actor (y)’s ratio 
in the same exchange. If the actor’s ratio and the referent’s ratio are equal or the difference 
is zero, then the result is equitable (or just in accordance with equity theory). If inequity 
occurs, actors will seek to restore justice by using different strategies. They may alter their 
own or others’ inputs and/or outcomes or change their perceptions of inputs and/or 
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outcomes. If those strategies do not work, actors may leave the situation completely 
(Adams 1963, 1965). 
After Adams, a number of different equity models appeared in the literature. 
Walster et al.’s (1978) model addresses people’s tendency to seek profitable outcomes in 
addition to equitable outcomes. This model argues that people are self-interested and may 
follow outcomes that are in their favor instead of equitable outcomes. However, if they 
think that favorable outcomes are too costly, they may follow equitable outcomes instead. 
People may also restore justice by using the least costly means such as changing the 
perceptions instead of compensating for their exploitation by decreasing their rewards or 
increasing their contributions.  
While the above models work to explain the influence of social comparisons on 
perceptions of justice, none of these equity models are consistently superior to others. Thus, 
in this dissertation, I use Markovsky’s (1985b) mathematical model to investigate social 











      (1) 
If the actor’s ratio and the referent’s ratio are unequal or the difference is not zero, 
then the outcome is inequitable.  Positive injustice occurs when the result favors the actor 
(i.e. 𝐶𝑈𝑥𝑦  is more than one) and negative injustice occurs when the result disfavors the 
actor (i.e. 𝐶𝑈𝑥𝑦 is less than one).  If the outcome is inequitable, the actor experiences 
cognitive dissonance and are likely to be motivated to regain balance or reduce the inequity 
(i.e. a justice-restoring attempt).  
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Extension of DJTs and Multilevel Approaches   
DJTs have been elaborated on through various extensions and criticisms. One of 
the critical elaborations on DJT comes from the status value literature. DJTs emphasized 
only local referents in making social comparisons but a status value theory of distributive 
justice adds a broader social environment to social comparison processes.  While past DJTs 
focused on the economic value of rewards and contributions, status value theory shows that 
individuals form reward and contribution expectations by taking into account symbolic 
values (e.g. status) as well as economic values (Berger et al. 1985; Berger, Fisek, et al. 
1972; Markovsky 1985b; Thye 2000).  
Actors in a group make social comparisons regarding their broader social 
environment through the activation of referential structures. Consequently, what is 
believed to be fair in a society for a given social position is likely to become the expectation 
for individuals who fulfill the social position. For instance, according to the distributive 
justice principles, a factory worker will compare his/her payment to other workers in the 
factory, or similar workers elsewhere. However, if a worker believes that male workers are 
generally paid more than females, then s/he will expect male workers to be paid more 
compared to females. In another culture, race might have similar effects in forming 
expectations for high or low rewards. As a result of these expectations, even though the 
ratio of effort and payment is not proportional (i.e. unequitable), the worker will not 
experience injustice when a female or a black worker is paid less than males or whites. 
This happens because symbolic values (i.e. status) in reward and contribution may be 
perceived as contributions and thus alter the justice evaluation. In other words, social 
structural differentiation (e.g. a status hierarchy) has impacts on justice perceptions (Berger 
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et al. 1985; Berger, Fisek, et al. 1972; Berger, Zelditch Jr., et al. 1972). Status research also 
consistently confirms that differences in status characteristics can create different reward 
expectations which in turn determine reward-related behaviors as just or unjust (Berger et 
al. 1985; Berger and Zelditch Jr. 1997; Ridgeway et al. 1998; Wagner and Berger 1993).  
A second elaboration of DJTs focuses on a multilevel approach to justice. Some 
research on DJTs suggest that individuals’ perceptions of fairness should be evaluated at 
the collective level as well as the individual level (Berger, Fisek, et al. 1972; Hegtvedt 
2005; Hegtvedt and Johnson 2000; Jasso 1980, 1983; Markovsky 1985b). Some 
researchers suggest dividing individual justice evaluations into individual assessments, 
which consider personal merits and responsibility for outcomes and group level 
assessments, which consider others and social norms (Feather 1994; Hegtvedt 2005). This 
perspective maintains that what is fair for an individual is dependent on his/her 
expectations for other group members’ justice evaluations as well as his or her personal 
expectations. These expectations are formed through personal referential structures, which 
consist of socially-validated beliefs about what is fair or not, and these beliefs are learned 
through socialization (Berger, Fisek, et al. 1972; Berger, Ridgeway, and Zelditch 2002; 
Markovsky 1985b). Since referential structures are based on socially validated beliefs, 
behavioral expectations formed via referential structures are believed to be normative. 
Individuals believe that information provided by referential structures frames the way 
things ought to be and what is fair for not only the individual, but also other group 
members. 
In line with this perspective, Markovsky’s (1985b) multilevel justice theory (MJT) 
demonstrates that if group identification increases, individuals’ justice evaluations shift 
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toward being on behalf of their group instead of on behalf of their individual interest. Clay-
Warner (2001) and Tyler et al. (1997) also illustrate that individuals’ subgroup 
memberships and their orientation to the group (i.e. group or self-oriented) affect their 
perceptions of justice. Considered together, these findings suggest that a multilevel justice 
evaluation is necessary to understand individuals’ perceptions of justice properly.  
Justice Evaluation Processes 
Justice evaluations refer to a particular individual’s comparison between expected 
outcomes (based on normative standards) and actual outcomes. An individual’s justice 
evaluation involves objective and subjective components which may influence each other. 
First, a justice evaluation is an objective comparison between observed rewards and what 
is expected. At the same time, what is expected in a justice evaluation can be determined 
by the individual’s interest in particular comparisons. This means that a justice evaluation 
is a specific individual’s subjective evaluation for a given comparison (Hegtvedt 2006; 
Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Markovsky 1985b). The subjective components may be 
influenced by personal and situational factors. For instance, an evaluator’s gender, age 
(Hegtvedt and Cook 2002), personal identity (Clayton and Opotow 2003; Skitka 2003), 
power  position (Cook and Hegtvedt 1983, 1986; Hegtvedt and Johnson 2009; Hegtvedt, 
Thompson, and Cook 1993), social status (Berger et al. 1985; Berger, Zelditch Jr., et al. 
1972), or relational bond to the group (Hegtvedt, Clay-Warner, and Johnson 2003; 
Hegtvedt and Cook 2002) may influence his/her justice evaluations. DJTs are concerned 
about these components and their interactions in assessing individual’s justice evaluation 
and consequences. 
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DJTs assume that individuals form fairness judgments about actual behaviors (such 
as contributions, rewards, events, treatments, rules, etc.) by comparing them to reference 
conditions (such as expectations, a standard, past experiences, another person, or groups) 
(Adams 1963, 1965; Hegtvedt and Johnson 2000; Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Jasso 
1980; Markovsky 1985a, 1985b). Markovsky claims (1985b) that when the comparison of 
an actual behavior and a given reference condition do not match (incongruence), the 
comparison yields emotional distress (injustice experience). More concretely, when an 
actor evaluates his/her own contribution as too large or another actor’s contribution as too 
small, or his/her own reward as too small or another actor’s reward as too large, s/he will 
evaluate the situation as negatively incongruent. When an actor evaluates his/her own 
contribution as too small or another actor’s contribution as too large, or his/her own reward 
as too large or another actor’s reward as too small, s/he will evaluate the situation as 
positively incongruent.  Positive or negative injustice experiences follow respectively from 
positive and negative incongruence.  
Social contexts, however, have impacts on individual’s evaluations and complicate 
fairness judgments for several reasons. First, when individuals are given different 
information about a situation, their evaluations are likely to be different. For instance, if a 
focal actor, x, is given information only on her/his own contribution and reward and those 
of another actor, y, DJTs assume that x will make two kinds of comparisons (presented as 
ratios): reward-to-contribution (𝑅/𝐶), and self-to-other (𝑥/𝑦). The interpersonal 
comparisons of rewards and contributions can be modelled as (𝑅𝑥/𝐶𝑥) / (𝑅𝑦/𝐶𝑦). This 
ratio is called a comparison unit (CU) (Markovsky 1985b). If CU has a value between 0 
and 1, x is disadvantaged and the ratio describes negative incongruence. Congruence exists 
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when CU equals 1. If the ratio is greater than 1, x is advantaged and the ratio describes 
positive incongruence. For example, if x contributes 15 units and y contributes 5 units for 
the same reward, then the CUxy= (10/15) / (10/5) =.33. This means that x will experience 
negative incongruence. If x and y contributes the same amount for the same reward, then 
the CUxy= (10/10) / (10/10) =1 (congruence). If x contributes 5 units and y contributes 15 
units for the same reward, then the CUxy= (10/5) / (10/15) =3. In this situation, x will 
experience positive incongruence. However, when x is informed differently, s/he is 
expected to make different comparisons. For instance, if x receives information about some 
other actors in the group or about a different standard for contribution and reward levels, 
this will alter the resulting congruence evaluation and experience of injustice relative to the 
previous example.  
If people experience injustice, either positive or negative, they will tend to restore 
justice by altering their behaviors, distorting perceptions, leaving the situation, or 
punishing others’ unjust behaviors (Adams 1963, 1965, Jasso 1980, 1983; Markovsky 
1985b; Sweeney 1990). However, research consistently confirms that negative injustice 
yields stronger emotional distress than that of comparable positive injustice (Adams 1963, 
1965; Austin and Walster 1974; Jasso 1978, 1980, 1983; Markovsky 1985b). Prospect 
theory2 explains this situation through the loss aversion concept. A gain that falls below 
expectations (i.e. negative incongruence) is more likely to create emotional distress than 
that of a comparable gain that exceeds expectations (i.e. positive incongruence) because 
people tend to prefer avoiding losses to making equivalent gains (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). People also find it more fair when they receive a 
                                                          
2 Prospect theory is explained in the next section. 
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favorable outcome they do not deserve than when another individual experiences the same 
situation (Diekmann et al. 1997). 
Secondly, a specific comparison’s importance may vary for different individuals. 
This subjective component of justice evaluation is reflected in Markovsky (1985b)’s justice 
model through the term of justice indifference. Justice indifference is a key factor to address 
individual variations in social comparisons and engagement with different allocation rules. 
Justice indifference is the inverse of justice importance, which refers to the degree to which 
justice is valued by individuals for a given comparison situation. Depending on its specific 
value, justice importance (or justice indifference) amplifies or dampens the emotional 
responses to incongruences. If an individual’s justice indifference is sufficiently high for a 
given social comparison, the individual feels very little emotional distress no matter how 
great the incongruence, and is less likely to attempt to restore justice. Conversely, if justice 
indifference is sufficiently low, even a small departure from congruence is likely to 
produce injustice experiences, and the individual will tend to react toward the injustice. 
Individual’s justice indifference is determined by the extent to which the evaluator 
identifies with other actor(s), the extent which s/he sees the other(s) as a valid referent, and 
the validity of the contribution and reward information (Markovsky 1985b).  
By following Jasso (1980) and Markovsky (1985b)’s justice models, which 
organize comparisons as symmetric ranges around 0 by taking the logarithm of CU, 
injustice evaluation is calculated as follows (when justice indifference, i.e. JI, ranges from 
1 to ∞), 
𝐼𝐸 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐽𝐼𝐶𝑈     (2) 
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As can be seen in equation (2), the focal actor’s injustice evaluation (IE) may vary 
depending on how much subjective importance is given to that comparison by the focal 
actor. When the focal actor puts a lot of importance to a comparison, then JI will be closer 
to 1, with less importance JI will be further from 1 and may approach infinity. In this 
equation, 0 = justice, negative numbers refer to negative injustice, positive numbers refer 
to positive injustice, and the larger the number, the stronger the experienced injustice. For 
instance, when JI = e (natural log base) for the given example, IE would be -1.1 for a .33 
negative incongruence, 0 for congruence, and 1.1 for 3 positive incongruence situations. If 
the focal actor gives less importance for the same situations, such as JI = 10, IE for the 
same given examples would be -.48, 0, and .48 respectively. Additionally, individuals 
experience stronger feelings of injustice when they encounter negative injustice compared 
to positive injustice. This difference can be reflected through the JI factor as well. This is, 
the JI value for a negative incongruence is likely to be lower than that of a comparable 
positive incongruence; therefore, negative incongruence produces stronger emotional 
distress than positive incongruence in general.  
When individuals experience injustice, they attempt to eliminate or reduce 
incongruence to achieve justice, when IE equals 0. An individual may change their own or 
others’ actual contribution and/or reward to achieve actual justice. S/he may also relieve 
the distress psychologically by altering perceptions about the incongruent situations to 
achieve perceived justice. S/he may distort the information about contribution and/or 
reward or change the actual value of the unjust contributor’s status (Adams 1963, 1965; 
Hegtvedt 2006; Walster et al. 1978). 
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2. 3 FRAMING EFFECT 
When individuals engage in social interactions, their perceptual, emotional, and 
behavioral outcomes are influenced by social structures, which, in turn, may be determined 
through socially constructed frames. The framing effect refers to variations in perceptions 
that results from differences in how information about a choice is presented. Prospect 
theory utilizes the framing effect to explain how people’s decision making depends on the 
way a situation is introduced. For instance, if people are given two equivalent choices, one 
expressed in terms of possible gains and the other expressed in terms of possible losses, 
people tend to prefer the former. This happens because people value gains and equivalent 
losses differently, and their decisions may change based on how they perceive gains and/or 
losses. When people make judgments, they are susceptible to bias induced by how the 
information is framed, and their decisions can be altered by different frames (Ganegoda 
and Folger 2015; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Rabin 1998; Simonson and Tversky 1992; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1981, 1986).  
The framing effect has been replicated and confirmed by many studies. One of the 
most relevant findings for the present research is that if a public goods dilemma is 
introduced as either a personal loss (negatively framed) or a collective gain (positively 
framed), contribution levels will differ dramatically (Bernold et al. 2014; Van Dijk et al. 
1999; Messick, Allison, and Samuelson 1988; Sonnemans, Schram, and Offerman 1998; 
Willinger and Ziegelmeyer 1999). For instance, participants cooperate more when a public 
goods game is called “Community Game” compared to when the same game is called 
“Wall Street Game” (Bernold et al. 2014; Kay and Ross 2003; Liberman, Samuels, and 
Ross 2004). Participants cooperate more when a prisoner’s dilemma game is called a 
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“Community Game” compared to “Stock Market Game” (Batson and Moran 1999; Eiser 
and Bhavnani 1974; Ellingsen et al. 2012). Research shows that the “Community Game” 
title encourages group members to contribute collective goods more because the word 
“community” frames contribution behaviors more positively than the words “Wall Street”.  
Different presentations of contributions to collective tasks may change individuals’ 
behavior by changing individuals’ understanding of what is just. Framing effects explain 
why, in one situation, people may compete to contribute the most, but in another situation, 
they may compete to free-ride. In one case, people may be happy to enjoy other members’ 
high contributions, but in another case, other members’ high contributions may be 
bothersome. If following the collective-interest is framed as a more valued behavior than 
following self-interest, willingness to contribute collective goods may be increased. 
Contribution to public goods can be framed as an attractive behavior by emphasizing 
“collective gain”. On the other hand, contribution to public goods can be framed as an 
unattractive behavior by emphasizing “personal loss”. By being framed as a “personal 
loss”, individuals receive the highest reward by not contributing and may be seen as the 
strongest and most talented ones in the group. Individuals in these situations may be 
motivated to engage in a group task to maximize his/her own benefit, and a successful 
exchange is one where others are convinced to give up their personal goods while the 
individual maximizes his/her benefits. Thus, high or low contributions in differently 
framed settings can be judged differently because people have different motives in each 
situation and these motives affect their overall judgments.  
Due to different frames, group members may develop different contribution 
expectations for themselves and their group members, and when members behave 
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unexpectedly, feelings of injustice are more likely to emerge. Clearly, framing can change 
behavioral patterns, even by changing just the title of a game. These findings indicate that 
a frame which encourages group members to maximize the collective benefit for a group 
may serve as an effective and low cost means for promoting contributions in task settings. 
Instead of using punishment for low contributions or promotions for high contributions, 
framing may be used to increase cooperative behaviors.  
2. 4 SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION (SVO) 
The equity principle states that either over-reward or under-reward leads to feelings 
of emotional distress, but some research disconfirms challenges this claim. Notably, 
research has found that some people experience fairness when they are over-rewarded, 
while others  experience fairness when they are under-rewarded (Blakely, Andrews, and 
Moorman 2005; Huseman, Hatfield, and Miles 1987). Additionally, some people tend to 
evaluate their own favorable outcomes more fair than that of a comparable outcomes for 
others (Diekmann et al. 1997), while others prefer equal distribution. It is very clear that 
people assign different weights to their own and others’ outcomes and this general 
preference may play a critical role in making justice judgments.  
Research finds that individual differences, such as SVO, are important factors in 
predicting behaviors in social dilemmas (Anderson and Patterson 2008; Balliet et al. 2009; 
De Dreu and Van Lange 1995; Van Lange 1999; Van Lange et al. 2014; Messick and 
McClintock 1968; Simpson 2004; Simpson and Willer 2008, 2014). SVO can be defined 
as one’s personal preference in making a decision to distribute a resource between oneself 
and others in interdependent situations. SVO is a stable preference for how outcomes are 
distributed between self and others. SVO typically categorizes people as prosocial or 
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individualistic. Prosocial people tend to maximize both their own outcome and the 
outcomes of other people. Individualistic people tend to maximize their own outcome 
without considering others’ outcomes. Researchers also sometimes distinguish competitors 
who tend to maximize their own outcome at other people’s expense, and altruists who tend 
to maximize other people’s outcome at their own expense (Van Lange 1999). 
Anderson and Patterson (2008) claim that justice evaluations are influenced by an 
individual’s SVO as well as situational factors. Prosocial people prefer to maximize both 
their own and others’ benefits and thus value the equity principle more than individualistic 
people (Joireman et al. 2003). Some research shows that prosocial people prefer to allocate 
resources equally and are less likely to take advantage of others compared to individualistic 
people (Van Dijk et al. 2004). On the other side, individualistic people prefer to maximize 
only their own benefits and view cooperation as a sign of a lack of intelligence (Smeesters 
et al. 2003) and see cooperative people as those who can be potentially exploited (Van 
Lange and Kuhlman 1994). Therefore, it is very likely that individualistic people prefer 
being over-rewarded rather than being rewarded equitably. Overall, research shows that 
justice evaluations and related behaviors are likely to be impacted by SVO. 
SVO researchers also have been interested in understanding how SVO interacts 
with other factors. Subsequent studies have shown that the perceived honesty of one’s 
partner (Van Lange and Kuhlman 1994), group identity (De Cremer and Van Vugt 1999), 
paying or not paying participants for their decisions, and so on may influence SVO. One 
of the important factors that may affect predictive power of SVO is framing the social 
dilemma as loss or gain (De Dreu and McCusker 1997). Some researchers (Van Dijk and 
Wilke 1995; De Dreu and McCusker 1997) suggest that SVO can be more predictive when 
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dilemmas were framed as loss (e.g. public goods dilemma), relative to gain (e.g. resource 
dilemma). One important explanation for this difference is the equality norm is more salient 
in resource dilemma compared to the public goods dilemma (Van Dijk and Wilke 1995). 
Therefore, framing may moderate the effects of SVO in predicting cooperative behaviors. 
In this dissertation, I consider whether title framing interacts with SVO in predicting first 
contribution, justice evaluations, and other subsequent behaviors. 
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CHAPTER 3  
A THEORY OF FRAMING JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS 
This chapter presents a theory that draws upon and integrates the literature reviewed 
in Chapter 2. Previous research shows that justice evaluations can mediate contribution 
behaviors in social dilemma situations. This literature also suggests that a framing effect 
as a theoretical mechanism causes changes in justice evaluations and related behaviors. A 
theory of framing justice perceptions will explain the impact of socially constructed frames 
on justice processes. The central argument in the theory predicts that socially constructed 
frames alter justice perceptions and thus lead to certain behaviors within the group. I 
represent these arguments in a formal way. The components of the theory consisting of a 
list of defined terms, scope conditions, theoretical assumptions, and derivations are 
presented. 
3. 1 FRAMING JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS 
This dissertation considers how socially constructed frames may alter individuals’ 
justice evaluations. Distributive justice theories provide models that organize interpersonal 
comparisons of contribution and reward between an actual value and a referent. Individuals 
may use many comparisons for one situation and which comparison unit is the most 
influential in making justice evaluations significantly depends on social context. This 
research claims that different social frames may (de)activate different social comparisons 
and thus influence overall justice evaluations. The framing effect can be introduced through
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 a referential structure or referential rules. That frame can serve as a heuristic for the people 
making the comparison. 
I assume that the different titles activate different frames: the community frame 
suggests something more cooperative, whereas the stock market frame implies profiting 
personally. My integrated theory provides an explanation for this. The framing determines 
expectations for contribution which in turns determine referent unit for social comparisons. 
The community frame induces a higher standard of contribution to the group, while the 
stock market encourages a lower standard of contribution to the group account. As a result, 
participants will assess their own and other’s contributions accordingly.  
A frame can increase (or decrease) one or more comparison units’ effects on total 
congruence evaluation by leading people to give more (or less) importance to a specific 
social comparison unit(s) in making justice judgments. This (de)activation process can be 
called congruence evaluation (de)activation. For instance, a frame can make a comparison 
between a person and a standard more salient, or a comparison between a person and 
another person more prominent than other comparison units in determining incongruence. 
By giving different importance to comparison units, a frame can change a fair comparison 
to unfair or an unfair comparison to fair. The activation process is reflected through the 
justice indifference factor in equation (2). In order to reflect the plurality of comparison 
units, I formulate the following equation, 
𝐼𝐸𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐽𝐼1𝐶𝑈1) + (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐽𝐼2𝐶𝑈3) + ⋯ (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐽𝐼𝑛𝐶𝑈𝑛)   (3) 
(De)Activation of comparison units simply means adjusting JI values in the 
equation 3.  When a comparison unit is activated, the JI value for the comparison unit is 
decreased and when a comparison unit is deactivated, the JI value for the comparison unit 
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is increased. For example, when a focal actor (x) interacts with another actor (y) and the 
comparison between x and y is activated, x is likely to focus on comparison of x and y 
(𝐶𝑈𝑥𝑦). This means 𝐶𝑈𝑥𝑦 in the equation will have more weight than other comparisons 
and thus x will use lower JI (e.g. JI=e) for 𝐶𝑈𝑥𝑦compared to the other comparisons (e.g. 
JI=10). In another activation situation, x may be told not to worry about y (i.e. 𝐶𝑈𝑥𝑦 and 
𝐶𝑈∗𝑦 deactivated) but focus on own behavior relative to a given standard (*), then x is 
more likely to give lower JI (e.g. JI=e) for 𝐶𝑈𝑥∗ but higher JI (e.g. JI=10) for 𝐶𝑈𝑥𝑦 and 
𝐶𝑈∗𝑦. As a result of the framing effect, x will evaluate the same contribution and reward 
situation differently due to differential attention to the available comparison units. 
The following tables for differently framed situations illustrate a variety of 
theoretical applications. In the following tables, reward (R) and contribution (C) 
information for x, y and * (standard) is provided. As can be seen from the tables, rewards 
remain constant (10 units) across conditions. Actual contributions (Cx and Cy) are changed 
to create negatively and positively incongruent situations. These differentiated actual 
contributions are identical in all tables which make a comparison between different 
activations possible in the same contribution and reward situation. To demonstrate low and 
high frame effects, a standard for contribution (C*) is introduced either as 5 units or 15 
units respectively. The possible comparisons of 𝐶𝑈𝑥𝑦, 𝐶𝑈𝑥∗, and 𝐶𝑈∗𝑦 which can be made 
by x are provided. 
Table 3.1 below shows the calculations when comparisons among self, other, and 
a high standard are activated. IEs for negatively and positively incongruent situations 
become stronger compared to the no frame situation. This happens because in addition to 
the injustice resulting from negative (or positive) incongruence between x and y, x also has 
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information about a high standard in this situation. Therefore, x will evaluate his/her own 
and other’s actual contributions relative to the given standard. Although new information 
leads x to make more comparisons, the marginal effect of each incongruence in a situation 
of multiple incongruences diminishes when the number of incongruences increases 
(Markovsky 1985b). Therefore, I used “5” as my logarithmic base for this situation. 
Table 3.1: IE with activation of self vs. other vs. high standard (C*=15) comparisons 






log5 𝐶𝑈∗𝑦  
Total  
IE 
Cx = 15, Rx = 10 
Cy = 5,   Ry = 10 





.33 -.69 0 -.69 -1.38 
Cx = 10, Rx = 10 
Cy = 10, Ry = 10 
C* = 15, R* = 10 
1.00 1.5 .66 0 .26 -.26 0 
Cx = 5,   Rx = 10 
Cy = 15, Ry = 10 
C* = 15, R* = 10 
3.00 3.00 1.00 .69 .69 0 1.38 
 
Table 3.2 below shows the calculations when the comparison of self to a high 
standard is activated while the comparison of self to other and comparison of a high 
standard to other are deactivated. As can be seen from the tables, although actual 
contributions are same, IEs are significantly changed through different activation and 
deactivation processes. For instance, although incongruences are CUxy =.33, CUx* =1.00, 
and CU*y=.33 in the first row in both tables, Total IE is -1.38 in Table 3.1 while -.96 in 
Table 3.2 due to different JI values. Similarly, although incongruences are same in the last 
row in both tables, Total IE is 1.38 in Table3.1 while 1.58 in Table 3.2. From this 
calculation, the theory predicts that negative injustice will decrease, and positive injustice 
will increase, by activation and deactivation processes in the Table 3.2 situation relative to 
Table 3.1 situation. 
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Table 3.2: IE with activation of self vs. high standard (C*=15) and deactivation of 
self vs. other and deactivation of high standard vs. other comparisons 






log10 𝐶𝑈∗𝑦  
Total  
IE 
Cx = 15, Rx = 10 
Cy = 5,   Ry = 10 





.33 -.48 0 -.48 -.96 
Cx = 10, Rx = 10 
Cy = 10, Ry = 10 
C* = 15, R* = 10 
1.00 1.5 .66 0 .41 -.18 .23 
Cx = 5,   Rx = 10 
Cy = 15, Ry = 10 
C* = 15, R* = 10 
3.00 3.00 1.00 .48 1.1 0 1.58 
 
In the same way, Table 3.3 shows the calculation when activating comparisons 
among self, other, and a low standard. IEs for negatively and positively incongruent 
situations become stronger compared to the no frame situations.  
Table 3.3: IE with activation of self vs. other vs. low standard (C*=5) comparisons 






log5 𝐶𝑈∗𝑦  
Total  
IE 
Cx = 15, Rx = 10 
Cy = 5,   Ry = 10 





1.00 -.69 -.69 0 -1.38 
Cx = 10, Rx = 10 
Cy = 10, Ry = 10 
C* = 5,   R* = 10 
1.00 .66 1.5 0 -.26 .26 0 
Cx = 5,   Rx = 10 
Cy = 15, Ry = 10 
C* = 5,   R* = 10 
3.00 1.00 3.00 .69 0 .69 1.38 
 
Table 3.4 below shows the calculation when the comparison of self to a low 
standard is activated while the comparison of self to other and comparison of a low standard 
to other are deactivated. As can be seen from the tables, although actual contributions are 
same, IEs are significantly changed through different activation and deactivation processes. 
For instance, although incongruences are CUxy =.33, CUx* =1.00, and CU*y=.33 in the first 
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row in both tables, Total IE is -1.38 in Table 3.3 while -1.58 in Table 3.4 due to different 
JI values. Likewise, although incongruences are same in the last row in both tables, Total 
IE is 1.38 in Table 3.3 while .96 in Table 3.4.  From this calculation, I predict that negative 
injustice is likely to be increased and positive injustice is likely to be decreased through 
activation and deactivation processes in the Table 3.4 situation. 
Table 3.4: IE with activation of self vs. low standard (C*=5) and deactivation of self 
vs. other and deactivation of low standard vs. other comparisons 






log10 𝐶𝑈∗𝑦  
Total  
IE 
Cx = 15, Rx = 10 
Cy = 5,   Ry = 10 





1.00 -.48 -1.1 0 -1.58 
Cx = 10, Rx = 10 
Cy = 10, Ry = 10 
C* = 5,   R* = 10 
1.00 .66 1.5 0 -.41 .18 -.23 
Cx = 5,   Rx = 10 
Cy = 15, Ry = 10 
C* = 5,   R* = 10 
3.00 1.00 3.00 .48 0 .48 .96 
 
Additionally, IEs in Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 are the same, but as results of different 
calculations. For instance, x gives 15 units while y gives 5 units in the first row in both 
tables. From x’s point of view, the situation is negatively incongruent (.33) and IE is 
calculated -.69 in both tables. However, in Table 3.1, what x gives (Cx=15) equals the 
standard (C*=15), while what y gives (Cy=5) is less than that standard. In Table 3.3, what 
x gives (Cx=15) exceeds the standard (C*=5) while what y gives (Cy=5) equals that 
standard. In the former situation (Table 3.1), y’s low contribution relative to self and 
relative to a high standard causes negative injustice while in the latter situations (Table 3.3) 
x’s high contribution, relative to other and relative to a low standard, causes negative 
injustice.  
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These illustrations demonstrate how framing is predicted to influence injustice 
evaluations. The severity of injustice can be increased or decreased for x because of a high 
or a low contribution standard and (de)activation processes. If the standard is settled as 
lower (e.g. C*=3 or 0) or higher (C*=18 or 20) than in the previous examples, the results in 
the tables would change even more dramatically. 
3. 2 FORMAL THEORY 
To be able to introduce a powerful theory, I formally organize the components of 
my theory consisting of a list of defined terms, scope conditions, theoretical propositions, 
and derivations.   
Defined Terms 
Rewards (R): Valued objects obtained in a social exchange system. 
Contribution (C): R given to produce either more or different rewards.  
Referential Structure: A finite set of C and R linkages existing in a social exchange system. 
Referential Rule: Formula for a Referential Structure. 
Reference R' (or C'): Focal R' (or C') given by a referential rule or referential structure. 
Actual RA (or CA): RA (or CA) perceived to exist in a local setting.    
Comparison Unit (CU): Ratio-based comparison (e.g. R'/C' and RA/CA). 
(In)Congruence: (Dis)Agreement between a Reference and corresponding an Actual 
Comparison Units. 
Congruence Evaluation (CE): Use of a Reference Comparison Unit to determine 
(In)Congruence. 
Negative Incongruence: Incongruence that disfavors the focal actor in a CE.  
Positive Incongruence: Incongruence that favors the focal actor in a CE. 
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(In)Justice: (Presence) Absence of Incongruence in a CE. 
Injustice Evaluation (IE): Formula assigning value to an Incongruence. 
Injustice Experience: Emotional response to an IE.  
Justice Importance: Degree to which Justice is valued in a given IE. 
Justice Indifference: Inverse of Justice Importance.  
Justice-restoring attempt: Altering an R or C to change Injustice to Justice.  
Punishment: Purposefully applied Justice-restoring attempt that reduces an other’s R 
and/or increase the other’s C.  
CE (De)Activation: Purposefully increase (decrease) a given CE’s Justice Importance.  
Frame: Information used for CE (De)Activation. 
Scope Conditions 
The phenomena predicted by the current theory do not manifest in every context of 
social reality. Rather, like other scientific theories, the current theory can be applied to a 
limited set of conditions. For each testable theory, scope conditions define when the theory 
is applicable (Walker and Cohen 1985).  
This integrated theory significantly relies on Markovsky’s multilevel justice model 
(Markovsky 1985b); therefore, its scope domain overlaps with his theory and includes a 
social frame condition. This theory aims to explain social determinants of a focal actor’s 
(i.e. evaluator’s) justice evaluation and relevant behaviors in contribution and/or reward 
situations. The proposed theory can only operate within the following conditions: 
SC.1: Actors exhibit levels of contributions and receive amounts of rewards 
SC.2: There exists a legitimate referential relationship between contributions and rewards 
in making social comparisons.  
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SC.3: There exists a legitimate method for attempting to restore justice  
SC.4: Actors recognize socially constructed frames 
 Public good dilemmas satisfy those conditions. First, a public good setting is a 
situation that requires contributions from group members and produces rewards to share. 
An actor’s rewards depend on others’ contribution while other’ rewards depend on the 
actor’s contribution. Each actor can infer a referential relationship between contribution 
and rewards. For a certain level of contribution, actors expect a certain level of rewards. 
Public goods dilemma settings allow group members to restore justice such adjusting 
subsequent contributions. Finally, actors should recognize socially constructed frames and 
use them as heuristics in making social comparisons.  
Propositions and Derivations 
This dissertation develops an integrated theory; therefore, I organize theories in a 
modular approach which facilitates and promotes integrations and formulates propositions 
(P) and derivations (D) efficiently (Markovsky 2010; Markovsky et al. 2008). The core of 
the theory is a causal model that suggests the impact of framing on justice evaluations and 
accompanying subsequent cognitive and behavioral responses (see Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1: Core Theory Causal Relationship Diagram 
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Module 1: Perceptions of Justice 
As stated in the Justice Evaluation Process section, Equation two (See page 28) 
allow us to derive the following propositions and derivations. 
P.1: If there exists a Reward (R) and/or Contribution (C) situation, actors will make a 
comparison between the actual comparison unit (RA/CA) and a reference comparison unit 
(R'/C'). 
P.1.2: The further the value of CUA' from 1(or the greater the difference between RA/CA 
and R'/C'), the greater will be the incongruence. 
P.1.2 (a): If the value of CUA' greater than 1 (goes to ∞), the situation will be positive 
incongruence. 
P.1.2 (b): If the value of CUA' less than 1 (goes to 0), the situation will be negative 
incongruence. 
P.1.2 (c): If the value of CUA' equals 1, the situation will be congruence. 
P.1.3:  The greater the incongruence, the less will be the evaluator’s justice indifference. 
P.1.4: The justice indifference for a negative incongruence is less than that of a 
comparable positive incongruence.  
P.1.5: The less the justice indifference, the greater will be the injustice experience. 
D.1: The further the value of CUA' from 1, the greater will be the injustice experience. (Or 
the greater the difference between RA /R' and CA/C', the greater will be the injustice 
experience). 
D.2: The injustice experience is greater for a given degree of negative incongruence than 
for the same degree of positive incongruence.  
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Module 2: Framing Perceptions of Justice 
As discussed before, this dissertation tests how framing comparison units affects 
justice perceptions. The following propositions derive these effects from the Equation 3, 
which stated in the Framing Justice Perceptions section (See page 35).  
P.2.1: The greater the activation of Congruence Evaluation (CE) for a given CU, the less 
will be the evaluator’s justice indifference (JI) for the CU. 
P.2.2: The less will be the evaluator’s justice indifference (JI) for a CU, the greater will be 
the CU’s impact in total injustice evaluation (IE).  
D.3: If a Congruence Evaluation (CE) for a specific Comparison Unit (CU) is 
(de)activated, the CU’s impacts in total injustice evaluation will be (small) great.  
Module 3: Eliminating Incongruence (Achieving CU=1) 
Finally, I examine the means to restore justice: changing own and/or referent’s reward 
and/or contribution and exiting the relationship. Therefore, I formalize the following 
prepositions and derivation:  
P.3.1: If actors experience injustice, they feel emotional distress. 
P.3.2: If actors feel emotional distress, they will attempt to eliminate emotional distress, 
and thus the incongruence. 
P.3.2 (a): If actors attempt to eliminate incongruence, they will alter their own (or 
referent’s) C and/or R to achieve congruence.  
P.3.2 (b): If actors cannot restore justice, they tend to exit the situation. 
D.4: The greater the injustice experience, the greater the tendency to punish the unjust 
actor and/or quit the relationships with the unjust actor. 
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CHAPTER 4  
PILOT VIGNETTE STUDY 
In the previous chapters, I reviewed the theoretical background and presented the 
basic components of the theory developed in this dissertation. To test the present theory, 
its key terms, assumptions, and derivations were operationalized through the testable 
hypotheses, and the hypotheses were tested empirically. The main empirical tests in this 
dissertation are a vignette survey and a standardized laboratory experiment. Although I 
generally relied on well-tried methods and measures, I pre-tested novel measures and 
manipulations. A detailed pilot study procedure and findings are provided in this chapter.  
4.1 METHODS 
Vignette studies use a constructed description of a situation that is shown to 
respondents within a survey in order to collect their judgments, beliefs, or attitudes about 
this situation (Alexander and Becker 1978; Atzmüller and Steiner 2010). In this chapter, I 
present methods and findings for the pilot study. As explained below, the vignette aims to 
isolate the effects of framing in a negatively unjust, hypothetical situation. 
Variables 
The vignette study examines how title framing affects justice perceptions and 
related behaviors in a hypothetical public goods setting. In the pilot test, the independent 
variable is the social frame. I created three different social frames through different game 
titles: The Community Game, The Wall Street Game, and The Decision-Making Game for
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 the same scenario. I used the community frame to create a high standard of contribution, 
the Wall Street frame for a low standard of contribution, and the decision-making frame 
for a neutral standard of contribution. Participants were told to imagine interacting with a 
low-contributor partner in the pilot study.  
The dependent variables were the participants’ initial contribution (from $0.00 to 
$5.00) to the group account, justice evaluations, and justice-restoring attempts. First, I 
tested whether or not reading different game titles leads participants to contribute different 
amount to the group account. Second, I examined the participants’ justice evaluations when 
their partner contributed less than what the participant gave to the group account. Third, I 
examined whether or not different social frames create different behavioral responses to 
injustice experiences. Therefore, I asked them if they would give less, more or the same 
amount of money to the group account for the second round. I also asked the participants’ 
preference to switch partner for future as my second measure of justice-restoring attempts. 
Vignette Procedures3 
Undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina’s Main Library were 
asked to help a PhD student to complete an IRB approved sociological research survey. 
The volunteer students were given a two-paged vignette survey to complete.  
On the first page of the survey, participants were exposed to framing variables 
through different game names (The Community Game, The Wall Street Game, or The 
Decision-Making Game) and each participant saw only one of these names. All other 
context was identical in each survey except the game names. Then, they read the following 
hypothetical situation: 
                                                          
3 The complete protocol for the pilot study is provided in Appendix A. 
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“The Community / Wall Street / Decision-Making game consists of several joint 
decision-making tasks that involve decision-making by a two-person group. In 
The Community / Wall Street / Decision-Making game, each group member must 
decide how to spend a pool of money that he or she has (in his or her “personal 
account”).  
The basic directions are as follows: each group member will be given $5.00 which 
can be kept in their personal account or contributed to the group account. Any 
amount that is contributed to the group account will be multiplied by 1.5. Then, 
the group money will be divided equally between two group members, regardless 
of their individual contributions to the group account.  
Each group member’s total earning per round will be his/her half of the earnings 
from the group account, plus whatever he or she did not invest (i.e., whatever is 
left in his or her personal account).”  
Next, participants read four examples. Afterward, they read that compensation for 
the task was based on the amount of money that each member had earned at the end of the 
task. Then, they were asked to imagine themselves as one of the group members, and 
answer some related questions accordingly.  
First, each participant was required to decide how much of their hypothetical $5.00 
to give to the group account (from 0 to $5.00). Next, participants were informed about their 
partner’s low contribution, and they evaluated their partner’s low contribution to the group 
account. After experiencing negative injustice, participants were asked how they would 
change their second contribution to the group account and to what extent they would prefer 
to change their partner for future rounds.  
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The completed surveys were collected and each participant was thanked for their 




A total of 48 cases were used in the analysis: 16 assigned to the decision-making 
game, 16 to the community game, and 16 to the Wall Street game. The data are slightly 
non-normal but satisfy the assumptions of homoscedasticity and multicollinearity.  
Findings 
First, I checked whether or not different titles created any variation in the first 
contribution behavior. I ran a one-way ANOVA test to detect the effect of the framing. The 
test result was statistically significant for the three conditions [F (2, 45) = 3.514, p = .038]. 
The mean contributed amount out of $5.00 was $3.56 (SD= 1.67) for the decision-making 
game condition, $3.28 (SD= 1.54) for the community game condition, and 2.22 (SD= 1.30) 
for the Wall Street game condition. The Tukey post-hoc test shows that comparison 
between the Wall Street game and the decision-making game was significant [p = .041] 
The LSD post-hoc test also shows that the comparison between the Wall Street game and 
the decision-making game was significant [p = .016] and the comparison between the Wall 
Street game and the community game was marginally significant [p = .053].  
Second, I checked whether or not participants’ justice evaluations vary across 
differently named conditions. I predicted that fairness evaluation would be determined 
through different game titles. A one-way between-subject ANOVA test results were 
insignificant for the three different conditions [F (2, 45) = .307, p = .737]. Although the 
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result from the ANOVA test does not support my predictions significantly, the direction of 
the result partially supports my predictions. This is, participants in the community game 
evaluated the situation as slightly more unfair than the other groups. The mean fairness was 
3.125 (SD= 1.59) for the decision-making group, 2.81 (SD= 1.52) for the community 
group, and 3.19 (SD= 1.22) for the Wall Street group. 
Third, I checked whether the participants’ justice evaluations led them to increase 
or decrease their second contributions. Since my justice evaluation measure is not a 
categorical variable in this study, I ran a linear regression analysis and the result was 
insignificant [t= 1.250, p = .218]. Fourth, I checked whether or not participants’ justice 
evaluations led them to change their partner for future rounds. A linear regression analysis 
was insignificant [t= -1.392, p = .171]. Finally, I ran a hierarchical multiple regression to 
create a better prediction model for changes in the second contribution variable. The results 
are summarized in Table 4.1 below.  






 B (SE) 
Intercept -.659 (.242) *** -1.334 (.409) *** 
Independent Variables:   
- Decision1 -.121 (.208) .596 (.521) 
- Community1 -.161 (.209) .862 (.512) * 
- Fairness  .069 (.060) .281 (.120) ** 
- Decision*Fairness  -.225 (.152) 
- Community*Fairness  -.336 (.155) ** 
Omnibus F Tests .722 .1.411 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
1 The Wall Street group is the reference category. 
 
43 
As can be seen from the multiple regression Model 1, neither framing nor fairness 
evaluation predicted the changes in the second contribution. However, Model 2 indicates 
there was a clear interaction between fairness and the community frame. When interaction 
is significant, simply examining their main effects can lead to incorrect conclusions (Baron 
and Kenny 1986; Hayes 2013). The interaction shows that participants who evaluated the 
situation as fair in the community group were more likely to decrease their second 
contribution compared to those who evaluated the situation as fair in the decision and Wall 
Street groups. I expected that the community group would decrease their second 
contribution because of their stronger injustice experience. Contrary to my expectation, 
participants in the community study who evaluated the situation as fair decreased their 
second contribution. I will discuss possible explanations for this result in the following 
section. 
Discussion 
The pilot study results show that the title framing had a significant effect on first 
contribution and a moderator effect on the second contribution. The significant result from 
the ANOVA test clearly shows that title framing created different contribution expectation 
across groups; thus, people contributed differently to the group account. This means that 
participants in the community and decision-making games were likely to contribute more 
than participants in the Wall Street game. This also indicates that the community and 
decision-making frames created a higher contribution expectation while the Wall Street 
frame created a lower contribution expectation.  
Framing also moderated fairness evaluation in predicting the changes in the second 
contribution. Participants in the community study who evaluated the situation as fair 
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decreased their second contribution more than participants in other groups who evaluated 
the situation as fair. This unpredicted interaction may have happened due to collectiveness 
created by the community title. This may indicate that participants in the community group 
may not express their negative feeling of injustice towards another group member, but still 
restored justice by reducing their second contribution. Additionally, the number of people 
in the pilot study was very small to reach out a proper conclusion.  
In conclusion, the results from the pilot study led me to design a vignette study to 
test my theory with more participants. I also refined my questions and title names for the 
vignette study. 
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CHAPTER 5  
VIGNETTE STUDY: METHODS 
In this chapter, I present the vignette methods used in testing basic components of 
the theory presented in this dissertation. As explained in the previous chapter, the vignette 
aims to isolate the effects of framing in a negatively unjust-hypothetical situation. After 
the pilot study, I revised the vignette survey and added SVO measure as a control variable.  
5.1 VARIABLES 
As detailed below, the vignette study examines how title framing affects justice 
perceptions and related behaviors in a hypothetical public good setting. In this section, 
variables are introduced, and how they are operationalized and measured empirically is 
explained in detail. 
Independent Variable and Manipulation 
The social frame is the independent variable in this study. I created three different 
social frames through different task titles: The Community Task, The Wall Street Task, 
and The Decision Task for the same scenario. I used the community frame in order to create 
a high standard of contribution, the Wall Street frame for a low standard of contribution, 
and the decision frame for a neutral standard of contribution. Since negative injustice is 
experienced more strongly than positive injustice, I only operationalized negative injustice 
in the vignette study. Also, I added a short SVO survey at the beginning of the study and 
used this as a control variable. 
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Dependent Variables  
First, I measured participants’ initial contribution (from $0.00 to $10.00) to the 
group account to test whether or not framing creates variations in first contributions. Since 
participants were not informed about their partner’s contribution level yet, their initial 
contribution measure would test whether only reading differently named task titles leads 
participants to contribute different amount to the group account (Hypotheses 1.a and 1.b).  
Second, I examined whether framing creates variation in participants’ justice 
evaluations when their partner contributed less than what the participant gave to the group 
account (Hypotheses 2.a and 2.b). In order to create a negatively unjust situation, 
participants were told that their partner gave only half of what the participant gave to the 
group account for the first round. Participants expressed their feeling of justice or injustice 
through a 7-point Likert scale. Fairness evaluation for the first round was scaled as 1= very 
unfair, 2= unfair, 3= somewhat unfair, 4= indifferent, 5= somewhat fair, 6= fair, and 7= 
very fair.  
Third, I examined two means to restore justice: changes in the second contribution 
to the group account (Hypotheses 3.b and 3.c) and switching the unfair partner (Hypotheses 
4.b and 4.c). I tested whether or not different social frames create different behavioral 
responses to injustice experiences.  I took the difference between the first and second 
contribution amounts as my first measure of a justice-restoring attempt. Next, participants 
were asked to rank their preference to end the relationship with their unjust partner (7-point 
Likert scale). The scale ranged from 1= no preference to switch partner, 4= moderate 
preference to switch partner, and 7= strong preference to switch partner. This item was 
treated as my second measure of a justice-restoring attempt. 
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In addition to these primary dependent variables, I measured participants’ 
expectations for other people’s contributions to the group account in order to check whether 
or not framing creates different contribution expectations. I created two items. The first 
question asked whether participants thought that people would contribute as much of their 
$10.00 as they could to the group account while the second question asked whether 
participants thought that people would keep as much of their $10.00 as they could in their 
personal account.  Participants expressed their expectations for other people’s contribution 
behaviors through a 7-point Likert scale. Both motivation to contribute and motivation to 
keep money were scaled as 1= unlikely, 2= unlikely, 3= somewhat unlikely, 4= unsure, 5= 
somewhat likely, 6= likely, and 7= very likely.  
I also measured how much participants felt the first round’s outcome influenced 
their behavior on the second contribution. Participants were asked to express their 
judgment about the first round’s influence on the second round through a 7-point Likert 
scale. The scale ranged from 1= not at all influential, 4= moderately influential, and 7= 
strongly influential. 
Finally, I looked at participants’ accounts of a partner’s unjust behavior. I created 
two items. The first item explained the partner’s low contribution through the partner’s 
selfish personality while the second item explained the partner’s low contribution through 
the nature of the task. Both items were scaled on a 7-point Likert scale that included 1= 
very unlikely, 2= unlikely, 3= somewhat unlikely, 4= unsure, 5= somewhat likely, 6= 




5.2 VIGNETTE PROCEDURES4 
Undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina were asked to 
participate in this study. At the end of some class periods for several different class 
sections, I asked students to help a PhD student to complete an IRB approved sociological 
research survey. Students were also told their participation was completely voluntary and 
not required for their class.  
The volunteer students were given a three-paged vignette survey to complete. The 
first page started with instructions and an example for a standard SVO measure. The 
measure of SVO presented members with a series of four decomposed games. Each game 
included three different distributions of points for themselves and another, unknown, 
person. The results classified participants as prosocial (those who maximize the outcomes 
for both self and others) or as individualistic (those who maximize the outcomes for only 
self). Based on previous studies, I classified participants as prosocial or individualistic only 
if they made at least three out of four choices consistent with a given SVO. Otherwise, they 
were classified as undetermined (Van Lange 1999; Simpson and Willer 2008). 
On the second page of the survey, respondents were exposed to framing variables 
through different task names (The Community Task, The Wall Street Task, or The Decision 
Task) and each participant saw only one of the names. Then, they read the following 
hypothetical situation: 
“The Community / Wall Street / Decision Task involves a set of tasks in a two-
person group. In the Community / Wall Street / Decision Task, you get to decide 
how to spend $10 which has been placed into your “personal account.” You may 
                                                          
4 The complete vignette protocol is provided in Appendix B. 
49 
choose to keep this money in your account, or to contribute some or all of it to a 
“group account.” Any amount you and the Other contribute to the group account 
will be multiplied by 1.5 and then divided equally between the two of you, 
regardless of your individual contributions to the group account. Your total 
earnings per round will be your half of the earnings from the group account, plus 
whatever amount you didn’t contribute to the group account.”  
Next, participants were shown a pay-off table with four examples. Afterward, they 
were told that compensation for the task was based on the amount of money that each 
member had earned at the end of the task. Then, they were asked to imagine themselves as 
one of the group members, and answer some related questions accordingly.  
First, each participant was required to decide how much of their hypothetical 
$10.00 to give to the group account (from 0 to $10.00). After completing the first 
contribution, participants were asked two questions that measured their predictions about 
other people’s motivations to contribute their money to the group account and to keep their 
money in their personal account. Next, participants were informed about their partner’s 
low contribution, and they evaluated their partner’s negatively unjust contribution to the 
group account. After experiencing negative injustice, participants were given the 
opportunity to restore justice through two different means. The first justice restoring 
opportunity was changing their subsequent contribution to the group account. The second 
justice restoring opportunity was ending the relationship with their unfair partner.   
Additionally, participants were asked how much the first round experience 
influenced their second contribution to the group account. They were also asked what 
might explain the partner’s unfair contribution (a personal factor or situational factor).  
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The completed surveys were collected and each participant was thanked for their 
participation. The collected data were organized, coded, and entered into the computer 
system.  
5.3 HYPOTHESES 
I operationalized my theoretical arguments through testable hypotheses. These 
hypotheses were tested through the data collected from a vignette study, which explained 
in detail in the previous sections.  In this section, I provide each dependent variable as a 
subsection and listed related hypotheses.  
First Contribution 
 The first dependent variable in this study is the participants’ initial contribution to 
the group account (i.e. first contribution). Based on my theory, I assume that the community 
title creates a higher contribution expectation while the Wall Street title creates a lower 
contribution expectation to the group account. Additionally, I expect that the decision title 
creates a neutral contribution expectation.  The personal endowment was $10.00, and 
participants were free to contribute any amount from $0.00 to $10.00 to the group account. 
Since the expectation for contribution is higher in the community task, I assume that the 
first contribution amount will be higher in the community group compared to the decision 
group and higher in the decision group compared to the Wall Street group. Therefore, I 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H.1.a: Participants in the community group will give more money to the group account 
than participants in the decision group. 
H.1.b: Participants in the decision group will give more money to the group account 
than participants in the Wall Street group. 
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Fairness Evaluation 
The second dependent variable is the participants’ fairness evaluations for their 
hypothetical interaction with a low-contributor partner. When an actor makes fairness 
evaluations, s/he may take into account all available information. Very common factors 
can be how much s/he contributed and how much his/her partner contributed to the group 
account. My theory adds how information created by a social frame can have effects on 
fairness evaluations. The information created by frames leads actors to make different 
social comparisons. Since the community title creates a higher contribution expectation, 
the Wall Street tittle creates a lower contribution expectation, and the decision title creates 
a neutral contribution expectation to the group account, I assume that each social 
comparison will be different and consequently, fairness evaluations will vary across 
groups. I expect that participants who have a high expectation for contribution (e.g. the 
community group) will be more disappointed with others’ low contributions. In other 
words, injustice evaluation will be stronger in the community group relative to the decision 
group, and stronger in the decision group relative to the Wall Street group. Thus,  
H.2.a: Injustice will be stronger in the community group than the decision group.  
H.2.b: Injustice will be stronger in the decision group than the Wall Street group. 
Changes in the Second Contribution 
The third dependent variable I analyzed is one of the subsequent behaviors: 
difference between the first contribution and the second contribution, in other words, 
changes in the second contribution. When participants experience justice or injustice, I 
assume that their second contribution will be a response to their justice or injustice 
experience. Therefore, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
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 H.3.a: Participants who experience stronger injustice will decrease their second 
contribution more than participants who experience justice. 
  However, my theory specifically focuses on how framing influences justice 
evaluations by creating different standards for contribution. As discussed earlier, the 
community frame is assumed to create a high contribution expectation, the decision frame 
is assumed to create a neutral contribution expectation, and the Wall Street frame is 
assumed to create a low contribution expectation. When participants encounter a low-
contributor partner, I expect that the community group will experience stronger injustice 
than the decision group, and that the decision group will experience stronger injustice than 
the Wall Street group. This variation among groups is likely to happen due to different 
contribution standards created through different frames. Having a high or low contribution 
expectation leads people to make different social comparisons. For instance, comparing 
one’s own contribution to a high standard and comparing one’s own contribution to a low 
standard could result in completely different justice evaluations. Consequently, I formulate 
the following hypotheses: 
H.3.b: Participants in the community group will decrease their second contribution 
more than the decision group. 
H.3.c: Participants in the decision group will decrease their second contribution more 
than the Wall Street group. 
Tendency to Change Partner 
The fourth dependent variable is another means to restore justice: participants’ 
willingness to switch partners for future rounds. I assume that changing partner, in other 
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words ending the relationship, is another response to the fairness evaluation. Therefore, I 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
 H.4.a: Participants who experience stronger injustice will be more willing to change 
partners than participants who experience justice. 
However, as discussed in the previous subsection, my theory predicts that framing 
affects justice evaluations and thus, I expect that the community group will experience 
stronger injustice than the decision group, and that the decision group will experience 
stronger injustice than the Wall Street group. Thus, 
H.4.b: Participants in the community group will be more willing to change partners 
than the decision group. 
H.4.c: Participants in the decision group will be more willing to change partners than 
the Wall Street group. 
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CHAPTER 6  
VIGNETTE STUDY: ANALYSES 
To organize my analyses, I created a section for each dependent variable and a 
subsection for each independent variable, interaction term, and additional analysis.  In each 
section, I provide information about my data and report my findings. Finally, I discuss my 
findings in the last section.  
6.1. DATA AND PARTICIPANTS 
The collected data for each dependent variable were analyzed in SPSS. Before 
conducting statistical tests, I checked if the data satisfied assumptions of normality, 
homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity for linear regression, ANOVA, and ANCOVA 
analyses.  
A total of 145 cases were used in the analysis: 49 assigned to the decision task, 46 
to the community task, and 50 to the Wall Street task. Although I planned to obtain 50 
cases for each condition, one participant from the decision group and 4 participants from 
the community group did not complete the survey. Additionally, I classified participants in 
accordance with their answers on the SVO scale in the vignette survey. 57 participants 
were classified as individualistic, 64 participants as prosocial, and 24 as undetermined. The 
distribution of participants by SVO classification and task names are introduced in Table 




Table 6.1: Distribution of Participants in Vignette Study (Ntotal = 145) 
                          TASK NAME… 
  Decision Community Wall Street Total  
 
SVO… 
Individualistic 15 18  24  57  
Prosocial 25  19  20  64  
Undetermined 9  9  6  24  
Total 49  46  50   
 
6.2 FIRST CONTRIBUTION 
First, I measured the participants’ first contribution ($0.00 to $10.00) to the group 
account. The average first contribution to the group account was $5.76 (SD = 3.17, N=145) 
out of $10.00 across all conditions.  
Data 
Before testing the framing effect on the first contribution, I checked whether or not 
the data satisfy the required assumptions. The data are slightly non-normal in accordance 
with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests. The value of skewness is = -.038 
(SE = .201) and the value of kurtosis is = -.901 (SE = .400). When the values are divided 
by their standard errors, the skewness is = -.19 and the kurtosis is = -2.25. Since these 
values are between -2.00 and +2.00, the departure from normality is not too extreme 
(George and Mallery 2003; Joanes and Gill 1998). Therefore, I conclude that my data 
display no skewness but some kurtosis issues. This indicates that the distribution is quite 
symmetric but a bit flat or platykurtic.  
Second, I checked whether or not the data satisfied the assumption of 
homoscedasticity. The data satisfied the assumption of homoscedasticity in both the 
Breusch-Pagan [LM= .033, p = .856] and Konker [LM= .060, p= .806] tests (Breusch and 
Pagan 1979; Konker and Bassett 1982). Finally, I checked my data for multicollinearity. I 
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used SPSS multicollinearity diagnostics and found that the VIF5 values are small. This 
means that the data do not violate the multicollinearity assumption. Therefore, I conducted 
parametric tests to analyze my data.  
Findings 
Framing Effect. The mean contributed amount was $5.88 (SD = 3.36) for the 
decision group, $5.66 (SD = 2.92) for the community group, and 5.71 (SD = 3.27) for the 
Wall Street group. A one-way between-subject ANOVA was conducted to test the effect 
of task name (The Decision Task, The Community Task, The Wall Street Task) on the first 
contribution. There was no significant effect at the p < .05 level for the three conditions [F 
(2, 142) = .066, p = 0.936]. To control for SVO, I ran an ANCOVA test [F (2,142) = .083, 
p = .920]. The results reveal that task name had no significant effect in predicting the first 
contribution when statistically controlling for SVO. However, the main effect of SVO was 
significant. 
 Consequently, the results do not support hypothesis 1.a: “Participants in the 
community group will give more money to the group account than participants in the 
decision group” and hypothesis 1.b: “Participants in the decision group will give more 
money to the group account than participants in the Wall Street group.” 
SVO Effect. The previous ANCOVA test showed that framing had no effect, but 
that SVO had a strong effect on the first contribution. Therefore, although SVO is not in 
my hypotheses, I did an additional test for SVO as an independent variable. I ran a one-
way between-subject ANOVA and found a strong effect for SVO6 [F (1, 119) = 11.865, p 
                                                          
5 VIF= (1/(1-R2)) 
6 Undetermined cases (24) are eliminated from this analysis. The result including those cases was very similar 
[F (2,142) = 7.538, p = .001).  
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= .001]. The mean contributed amount was $4.54 (SD = 3.10) for the individualistic group 
and $6.46 (SD = 3.01) for the prosocial group. Overall, the result shows that prosocial 
participants were more likely to give money to the group account in the first round than 
individualistic participants. 
Framing-SVO Interaction Effect. Next, I checked whether or not SVO moderates 
the effect of task name, but did not find any interaction effect. The results from a two-
factorial ANOVA test are summarized in Table 6.2 below. As a result, I conclude that 
SVO, but not task name, predicted the first contribution.  
Table 6.2: Two-Factorial ANOVA Test Results for the First Contribution 
 F P-value 
Independent Variables:  




- Task Name*SVO .361 .836 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
Motivations. After completing the first contribution, participants answered two 
questions that measured their predictions about other people’s motivations to contribute 
their money to the group account and to keep their money in their personal account. 
However, these two items were not significantly correlated or reliable (Cronbach’s 
Alpha=.37).  Consequently, I did not do any test with these items.  
I suspect these items were unreliable for several possible reasons. First, respondents 
were asked to evaluate other people’s motivation, instead of their own, to give to the group 
account and to keep money in their personal account in general. Another possible 
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explanation for unreliable items is that participants did not understand these items due to 
poor wording.7 
6.3 FAIRNESS EVALUATION 
In this section, I analyzed the second dependent variable: the participants’ fairness 
evaluations. After submitting their first contribution, participants were told that their 
partner contributed only half of what the participant gave to the group account. Then, they 
were required to evaluate the fairness of the situation (scaled as 1= very unfair, 2= unfair, 
3= somewhat unfair, 4= indifferent, 5= somewhat fair, 6= fair, and 7= very fair).  
Data 
The data are slightly non-normal in accordance with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests. However, the skewness is = 1.82 and kurtosis is = -1.63. Therefore, I 
conclude that my data display no skewness or kurtosis issues. The data satisfied the 
assumption of homoscedasticity in both the Breusch-Pagan [LM= .809, p = .369] and 
Konker [LM= 1.221, p = .269] tests. Also, the data satisfy the assumption of 
multicollinearity. Consequently, I conducted parametric tests to analyze my data.  
Findings 
 Framing Effect. An ANCOVA test was conducted to determine if there was a 
statistically significant difference between differently named tasks on fairness evaluations 
when statistically controlling for the participants’ initial contribution (i.e. first 
contribution). The test reveals the effect was in significant [F (2,142) = .231, p = .794]. 
This means that holding the initial contribution constant, task name did not predict fairness 
                                                          
7 These items were refined for the experimental study and the results were reliable.  
59 
evaluation. The mean fairness value was 3.39 for the decision group (SD = 1.38), 3.39 for 
the community group (SD = 1.45), and 3.22 for the Wall Street group (SD = 1.57).  
The result indicates that hypothesis 2.a: “Injustice will be stronger in the community 
group than the decision group” and hypothesis 2.b: “Injustice will be stronger in the 
decision group than the Wall Street group” are not supported by the data. 
SVO Effect. I also checked for an effect of SVO, but I did not detect any significant 
effect of SVO on fairness evaluation when statistically controlling for the initial 
contribution. An ANCOVA test shows the effect was insignificant [F (1,119) = 1.306, p = 
.255] which means that holding the initial contribution constant, SVO did not predict 
fairness evaluation. The mean fairness value was 3.09 (SD= 1.28) for prosocial participants 
and 3.47 (SD = 1.58) for individualistic participants. Although prosocial participants 
showed slightly more anger towards unfair partner than individualistic participants, the 
difference was not statistically significant.  
SVO-Framing Interaction Effect. I also did not find any interaction effect between 
task name and SVO when statistically controlling for initial contribution. The results from 
a two-factorial ANCOVA test are summarized in Table 6.3 below.  
Table 6.3: Two-factorial ANCOVA Results for Fairness Evaluation  
 F P-Value 
Control Variable:   
- First Contribution .666 .416 
Independent Variables:   
- Task Name .014 .986 
- SVO  1.317 .254 
- Task Name*SVO .706 .496 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
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First Contribution Effect. Since I could not find any significant effect for framing 
and SVO on fairness evaluation, I checked whether the participant’s own first contribution 
influenced their fairness evaluation. In other words, I checked whether or not participants 
who gave more money to the group account in the first round evaluated the situation as 
more unfair than participants who gave less money. A linear regression shows this effect 
was insignificant [t = -1.546, p = .124] which means that participants’ initial contribution 
did not predict fairness evaluations.  
First Contribution-Framing Interaction Effect. Framing and participants’ first 
contribution were insignificant in predicting fairness evaluation as single factors. I also 
checked whether or not how much participants gave to the group account in the first round 
and which task they were assigned to had any interaction effect on fairness evaluation. To 
see the interaction effect, I conducted a hierarchical linear regression and incorporated 
multiple predictors. The models are summarized in Table 6.4 below. 





 B (SE) 
Model 3 
 B (SE) 
Intercept 3.220 (.208) **** 3.559 (.302) **** 4.354 (.411) **** 
Independent Variables:    
- Decision1 .168 (.296) .178 (.294) -1.219 (.585) **  
- Community1 .171 (.300) .169 (.299) -.890 (.620) 
- First Contribution   -.059 (.038) -.199 (.063) *** 
- Decision*FirstCont   .241 (.088) *** 
- Community*FirstCont   .186 (.096) * 
Omnibus F Tests .218 .942  2.213* 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
1 The Wall Street task is the reference category. 
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As can be seen from Model 1 and Model 2, when task name and first contribution 
were in the model as predictors, their main effects were insignificant. However, task name 
and initial contribution interacted significantly, as seen in Model 3. This means that initial 
contribution was moderated by the task name variable in predicting fairness evaluation. 
Because these factors interacted, simply examining their main effects can lead to incorrect 
conclusions (Baron and Kenny 1986; Hayes 2013). Although I expected that people who 
contributed more money to the group account in the first round would experience stronger 
injustice, statistical tests show that this effect was insignificant. However, the interaction 
effect leads me to check whether this relationship varies across differently named tasks and 
is more complicated than the interpretation of the main effects would suggest.  
Partitioned Data Analysis. After finding a significant interaction effect between 
framing and first contribution (See Table 6.4), I partitioned my data by task name, and 
looked closer at the data. Compared to the other tasks, the Wall Street group was the only 
task where people who gave more money in the first round evaluated the situation as more 
unfair than people who gave less money [t= -3.156, p = .003]. Low-givers and high-givers 
evaluated the situation very similarly in the community and decision groups. The 
regression test results were statistically insignificant for the community group [t= -.171, p 
=.865] and the decision group [t= .716, p = .477].  
Overall, the partitioned data and interaction analyses show that task name and first 
contribution were important factors in predicting fairness evaluation. Framing did predict 
fairness evaluation only if initial contribution was taken into account in a model. However, 
these results do not support hypothesis 2.a: “Injustice will be stronger in the community 
group than the decision group” and hypothesis 2.b: “Injustice will be stronger in the 
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decision group than the Wall Street group”. Actually, the results indicate that participants 
in the Wall Street task were more likely to be more sensitive to unfair partner than 
participants in the community and decision tasks when their own initial contribution was 
taken into account. In other words, the results determine that participants who gave more 
money to the group account and were assigned to the Wall Street task evaluated the 
situation as more unfair than others.  
Additional ANOVA Tests. Additionally, I transformed the first contribution variable 
into a categorical variable which is coded as “low-giver” if the contributed amount is less 
than $5.00, “moderate-giver” if the contributed amount is equal to $5.00, or “high-giver” 
if the contributed amount is more than $5.00. Then, I ran a two-factorial ANOVA test to 
analyze the interaction effect of the task name and first contribution variables. The results 
are summarized in Table 6.5 below.  
Table 6.5: Two-factorial ANOVA Results for Fairness Evaluation  
 F P-Value 
Independent Variables:   
- Task Name .053 .948 
- (Categorical) First Contribution .912 .404 
- Task Name*(Categorical) FirstCont 1.498 .206 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
I obtained the estimated marginal means from the previous ANOVA test and 
generated Figure 6.1 to show the marginal means of fairness evaluations by study name 
and the participants’ contribution level in the first round.   
Figure 6.1 shows that fairness evaluations vary significantly by giving-level only 
in the Wall Street group. The difference between low-givers and high-givers within the 
Wall Street group is 1.32, but only .25 in the community group and -.44 in the decision 
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group.  This indicates that the Wall Street group evaluated fairness according to how much 
they gave to the group account.  
 
Figure 6.1: Estimated Marginal Means of Fairness Evaluation 
6.4 CHANGES IN THE SECOND CONTRIBUTION 
In this section, I analyzed one of the subsequent behaviors: changes in the second 
contribution. After reporting their justice or injustice evaluation, participants were given 
another hypothetical $10.00 endowment and told that they could either keep it for their 
own personal account or contribute it to the group account (any amount from $0.00 to 
$10.00). The difference between their first contribution and their second represents their 
response to their experience of justice or injustice in the first interaction8.  
                                                          
8 I subtracted their first contribution amount from their second contribution amount. If the difference was less 
than zero (i.e. negative), the change was a decrease; if the difference was more than zero (i.e. positive), the 
change was an increment; and if the difference was zero, there was no change. 
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Data 
The data are slightly non-normal in accordance with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests. However, the skewness is = 1.17 and kurtosis is = 5.55, indicates that 
the data have no skewness, but do have some kurtosis issues (i.e. platykurtic). The data 
satisfied the assumption of homoscedasticity in both the Breusch-Pagan [LM= 1.998, p = 
.158] and Konker [LM= .974, p= .324] tests. Also, the data satisfy the assumption of 
multicollinearity. Consequently, I conducted parametric tests to analyze my data.  
Findings 
Fairness Evaluation Effect. I checked whether the participants’ fairness evaluation 
after the first round predicted the difference between the first and second contributions. A 
linear regression analysis reveals the effect was significant [t = -2.486, p = .014] and shows 
that participants who experienced stronger injustice decreased their second contribution 
more than others when their first contribution was statistically controlled. The hypothesis 
3.a: “Participants who experience stronger injustice will decrease their second 
contribution more than participants who experience justice” is supported by the data. 
Framing Effect. Next, I did a one-way ANCOVA test for differently named studies 
when controlling for the first contribution. The test was significant for the three conditions 
[F (2, 142) = 13.321, p = .039]. The mean decreased amount was $2.45 (SD= 2.80) for the 
decision group, $2.02 (SD= 2.97) for the community group, and $3.25 (SD= 2.59) for the 
Wall Street group.  
Since the mean difference between the community group and the Wall Street group 
was large, I also ran the LCD and Bonferroni post-hoc tests. The results from the LCD test 
indicate that the comparison between the Wall Street and the community groups was 
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significant [p = .015] and the comparison between the Wall Street and the decision groups 
was marginally significant [p = .061]. The results from the Bonferroni test indicate that the 
comparison between the Wall Street and the community was significantly associated with 
the changes in the second contribution [p = .046].  
However, the results do not support hypothesis 3.b: “Participants in the community 
group will decrease their second contribution more than the decision group” and 
hypothesis 3.c: “Participants in the decision group will decrease their second contribution 
more than the Wall Street group”. The results reveal that participants in the Wall Street 
group were more likely to decrease their second contribution compared to participants in 
the community group.  
SVO Effect. I also checked for an SVO effect when controlling for the first 
contribution variable. I found that the one-way ANCOVA test result was insignificant [F 
(1, 119) = 1.499, p = .223]. Although the result was not statistically significant, prosocial 
participants (M = 2.63, SD = 3.00) decreased their second contribution slightly more than 
individualistic participants (M = 1.99, SD = 3.19). However, the difference was not 
statistically significant.  
SVO9-Framing Interaction Effect.  I also checked whether SVO has a moderating 
effect on framing in predicting changes in the second contribution.  I did not find any 
significant interaction between the SVO and framing variables in predicting the difference 
between the first contribution and the second contribution when holding the first 
contribution constant. The results from two-way ANCOVA test are summarized in Table 
6.6 below. 
                                                          
9 To avoid losing cases, I coded SVO as follows: 0=undetermined, 1= prosocial, and 2=individualistic. 
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Table 6.6: Two-factorial ANCOVA Results for Changes in the Second Contribution 
 F P-Value 
Control Variable:   
- First Contribution 83.833 <.001 
Independent Variables:   
- Task Name 3.375 .037 
- SVO  2.374 .097 
- Task Name*SVO .350 .843 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
First Contribution Effect. I also checked if the participants’ own first contribution 
influenced their second contribution. The result from a linear regression was significant [t= 
9.615, p < .001]. This shows that participants who gave a lot to the group account decreased 
their second contribution more than participants who gave little to the group account in the 
first round. This also means that those who contributed more money to the group account 
in the first round may have had more room to decrease their second contribution.  
SVO, Framing, First Contribution, Fairness Effects. Finally, I ran a hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis to create better prediction models (See Table 6.7 below). 
Table 6.7: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models for Changes in the Second 
Contribution  
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 





 B (SE) 
Model 3 
 B (SE) 
Intercept 4.591 (.643) **** .138 (.706) 1.320 (.851) 
Independent Variables:    
- SVO  -.990 (.354) *** .226 (.294) -.242 (.289)  
- Decision1 -1.031 (.610) *  -.956 (.485) * -.902 (.477) *  
- Community1 -1.386 (.617) ** -1.232(.490) ** -1.180 (.483) ** 
- First Contribution   .598 (.065) **** .578 (.065) **** 
- Fairness    -.324 (.135) ** 
Omnibus F Tests 3.977*** 25.596****  22.323**** 
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As can be seen from Model 1, prosocial and undetermined participants decreased 
their second contribution more than the individualistic participants, and the Wall Street 
group decreased their second contribution more than the community group. However, the 
direct effect of SVO disappeared when I added the first contribution variable into other 
models (See Model 2 and 3). As can be recalled from the First Contribution Section, SVO 
had an effect on the first contribution variable as well as on the second contribution variable 
as a predictor. The first contribution also had an effect on the second contribution as a 
predictor. When these variables were all modeled together, the SVO’s direct effect 
disappeared. This shows that SVO was mediated by the first contribution, and thus the 
indirect effect should be considered. This means that prosocial and undetermined 
participants contributed the most in the first round and thus they were able to decrease their 
second contribution by a large amount as well, compared to individualistic participants.  
To investigate this relationship, I ran a mediation analysis and found that SVO had 
direct and indirect effects (through the first contribution) on the second contribution. 
Mediation analysis confirmed that when the first contribution was accounted for in a 
model, SVO lost its direct effect on the second contribution. The indirect effect size was -
.76 with a 95% CI between -1.26 and -.36 which does not include “0” and thus indicates 
that an indirect effect exists and is different than “0”. Also, the Sobel test showed that the 
indirect effect was significant. 
As can be seen from Model 3, I conclude that those who gave more in the first 
round, those who evaluated the situation as more unfair, and those who were in the Wall 
Street task decreased their second contribution more than others. However, initial 
contribution was not controlled in Model 3. Therefore, I did the following analysis. 
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 An Additional ANCOVA Analysis10. I controlled for the first contribution and ran a 
two-factorial ANCOVA test to see the effect of fairness evaluation (which was coded as a 
categorical variable: 1= unfair, 2= unsure, and 3= fair) and the effects of task name on 
difference in the second contribution compared to the first contribution. Fairness evaluation 
and task name were significant (which supports the regression Model 3 in Table 6.7), and 
their interaction was marginally significant. The results are summarized in Table 6.8 below. 
Table 6.8: Two-Factorial ANCOVA Results for Changes in the Second Contribution  
 F P-Value 
Control Variable:   
- First Contribution 86.566 <.0001 
Independent Variables:   
- Task Name 3.407 .036 
- Fairness  6.051 .003 
- Task Name*Fairness .2.346 .058 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
From this ANCOVA test, I generated a figure (See Figure 6.2 below) showing the 
marginal means of the changes across differently named tasks and fairness evaluations 
when controlling for the first contribution variable. The figure specifies that participants in 
the Wall Street task made slightly larger changes in their second contribution compared to 
the decision and the community groups. This implies that participants in the Wall Street 
group who did express strong feelings of injustice consistently decreased their second 
contribution. However, participants in the decision group and especially the community 
group did not change their second contribution in accordance with their justice evaluations.  
                                                          
10 To control the first contribution variable, I added this additional test.  
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Figure 6.2: Estimated Marginal Means of Changes in the Second Contribution11 
Furthermore, participants in the community group who evaluated the situation as 
fair decreased their second contribution more than those who evaluated the situation as 
unfair and unsure. This unpredicted interaction may have happened due to collectiveness 
created by the community title. This may indicate that participants in the community group 
may not express their negative feeling of injustice towards another group member, but still 
restore justice by reducing their second contribution. Also, participants who evaluated the 
situation as unsure increased their second contribution. However, only 6 participants were 
in the unsure group and one of them gave 0 in the first round and increased the second 
                                                          
11 Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: first contribution= 5.755. 
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contribution to 10 points. Therefore, it is difficult to confidently conclude anything from 
this result. 
As can be remembered from the regression analysis (See Table 6.7, Model 3), the 
Wall Street group decreased their second contribution significantly more than the 
community group, and the difference was marginally significant for the decision group. 
This result is confirmed by the marginal means outcomes as well. In other words, the figure 
specifies that the Wall Street group decreased their second contribution more than both 
groups in general.  
Partitioned Data Analysis. In addition to the overall analyses, I also partitioned my 
data by task name and ran a linear regression. I found that only in the Wall Street group 
did participants who evaluated the situation as unfair significantly decreased their second 
contribution more than participants who evaluated the situation as unsure and fair [t= -
3.632, p = .001]. However, low-givers and high-givers evaluated the situation very 
similarly in the community and decision groups and the results were statistically 
insignificant {[t= .072, p = .943] and [t= 1.125, p = .266] respectively}.    
Overall, the results from the complete and partitioned data analyses do not support 
hypotheses 3.b or 3.c. This means that participants in the community task did not decrease 
their second contribution more than participants in the decision task, and that participants 
in the decision task did not decrease their second contribution more than participants in the 
Wall Street task. In contrast to my prediction, the Wall Street group did decrease their 
second contribution more than the community group.  
Additionally, only within the Wall Street group did justice evaluation lead 
participants to decreased their second contribution significantly. In other words, the Wall 
71 
Street group decreased their second contribution significantly more if they evaluated the 
situation as unfair.   
6.5 TENDENCY TO CHANGE PARTNER 
The second justice-restoring attempt measure is the participants’ preference to 
change partners for future rounds. After submitting their second contribution, participants 
were asked to what extent they would prefer to switch their partner and work with a different 
person for future rounds. Participants ranked their preference to end the relationship with 
their unjust partner (7-point Likert scale). The scale ranged from 1= no preference to switch 
partner, 4= moderate preference to switch partner, and 7= strong preference to switch 
partner.  
 Data 
The data are slightly non-normal in accordance with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests. However, the skewness is = -2.56 and kurtosis is = .71, indicating that 
my data have some skewness issues, but do not have kurtosis issues. The data satisfied the 
assumption of homoscedasticity in both the Breusch-Pagan [LM= .047, p = .829] and 
Konker [LM= .043, p= .836] tests. The data also satisfy the assumption of multicollinearity. 
Consequently, I conducted parametric tests to analyze my data.  
Findings 
Fairness Evaluation Effect. First, I checked whether or not the participants’ fairness 
evaluation for the first round predicted the participants’ willingness to change partners for 
future rounds when statistically controlling for the participants’ initial contribution. The 
result from a linear regression analysis was highly significant [t = -3.618, at the p < .001 
level] and shows that participants who experienced stronger injustice were more willing to 
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work with a different partner for future rounds while participants who experienced justice 
were less willing to change their partner when their initial contribution was held constant. 
The result strongly supports hypothesis 4.a: “Participants who experience stronger 
injustice will be more willing to change partners than participants who experience justice.” 
 Framing Effect.  Next, I checked whether or not framing had an effect on the 
tendency to change partner. A one-way between-subject ANCOVA test result was 
marginally significant for the three differently named conditions [F (2, 142) = 2.591, p = 
.079] when statistically controlling for the first contribution variable. The mean value for 
willingness to change partners was 5.08 (SD= 1.21) for the decision group, 5.07 (SD= 1.37) 
for the community group, and 5.58 (SD= 1.25) for the Wall Street group.  
Since the result from the ANCOVA test was marginally significant and the means 
were different, I did an LSD post-hoc test. The comparison between the Wall Street and 
the community groups [ p = .051] and the comparison between the Wall Street and the 
decision groups [ p =. 52] were marginally significant. This indicates that difference 
between means was statistically significant.  
Finally, I ran a linear regression analysis. When my reference group was the Wall 
Street group, the community group [t = -1.977, p = .050] was significantly associated with 
the tendency to change partners, and the result for the decision group [t = -1.945, p = .054] 
was marginally significant.  
However, these results do not support hypothesis 4.b: “Participants in the 
community group will be more willing to change partners than the decision group” and 
hypothesis 4.c: “Participants in the decision group will be more willing to change partners 
than the Wall Street group.” Participants in the community group were not more willing to 
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change partners than the decision group, and participants in the decision group were not 
more willing to change partners than the Wall Street group. However, the results from these 
analyses reveal that participants in the Wall Street group were more willing to change their 
partners than participants in the community and decision groups.  
SVO Effect. I checked for an SVO effect when statistically controlling for the first 
contribution variable. A one-way ANCOVA test shows that SVO was marginally 
significant on the tendency to change partners [F (1, 119) = 2.867, p = .093]. The mean 
tendency to change partners was 5.48 (SD= 1.17) for prosocial participants and 5.05 (SD= 
1.47) for individualistic participants. Additionally, I ran a planned contrast test and the 
result was marginally significant as well.    
SVO-Framing Interaction Effect. I also checked whether SVO has a moderating 
effect on framing when controlling for the initial contribution. I could not find any 
significant moderating effect for SVO in predicting the tendency to change partners. The 
results from two-way ANCOVA test are summarized in Table 6.9 below. 
Table 6.9: Two-factorial ANCOVA Results for Tendency to Change Partner  
 F P-Value 
Control Variable:   
- First Contribution .015 .903 
Independent Variables:   
- Task Name 2.166 .119 
- SVO  2.039 .134 
- Task Name*SVO .340 .850 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
First Contribution Effect. I also checked whether or not the participants’ own first 
contribution influenced their willingness to change their partners. The result from a linear 
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regression was insignificant [t= .626, p = .532]. This implies that participants who gave a 
lot and who gave little to the group did not have different tendencies to change partners. 
SVO, Framing, and Fairness Evaluation Main Effects and Framing-Fairness 
Evaluation Interaction Effect. I did a hierarchical multiple regression to see sequential 
effects of predictors on the tendency to change partners. (See Table 6.10 below). 
Table 6.10: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models for Tendency to Change 
Partner 
 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
1 The Wall Street group is the reference category. 
As can be seen from Table 6.10, Model 2 shows that the Wall Street group and 
people who evaluated other’s contribution as more unfair were more willing to change their 
partners than others. As seen from Model 3, the interaction terms were not significant and 
the model became less predictive when interaction terms were added into the model.   
Framing-(Categorical) Fairness Interaction Effects. Furthermore, I also ran a two-
factorial ANCOVA test the effects of framing and (categorical) fairness variables when 






 B (SE) 
Model 3 
 B (SE) 
Intercept 5.779 (.272) **** 6.573 (.343) **** 6.420 (.433) **** 
Independent Variables:    
- Decision1 -.533 (.259) ** -.489 (.249) * -.387 (.618) 
- Community1 -.539 (.262) ** -.495 (.252) * -.060 (.614) 
- SVO  -.146 (.150)  -.138 (.144)  -.145(146) 
- Fairness   -.250 (.070) **** -.200 (.113) * 
- Fairness*Decision   -.033 (.172) 
- Fairness*Community   -.131 (.169)  
Omnibus F Tests 2.039 4.858**** 3.311*** 
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Table 6.11: Two-factorial ANCOVA Results for Tendency to Change Partner  
 F P-Value 
Control Variable:   
First Contribution .137 .712 
Independent Variables:   
- Task Name 2.826 .063 
- Fairness 4.143 .018 
- Task Name* Fairness .359 .837 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
There was no interaction, but the main effect of fairness significantly predicted the 
tendency to change partners, and the main effect of task name was marginally significant. 
I also generated Figure 6.3 below which shows the marginal means of the tendency to 
change partners across differently named tasks and different levels of fairness evaluations. 
 
Figure 6.3: Estimated Marginal Means of Tendency to Change Partner12 
                                                          
12 Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: first contribution= 5.755. 
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As can be seen from the figure, participants in the Wall Street task were more 
willing to change partners than other groups without regarding their fairness evaluations, 
which is consistent with the framing effect analysis above.  More interestingly, the figure 
specifies that the community and decision groups made their decision about changing 
partners by taking their fairness evaluations into account. The mean of participants’ 
willingness to change partners in the community group was 5.35 for those who evaluated 
the situation as unfair and 4.43 for those who evaluated the situation as fair. The mean of 
participants’ willingness to change partners in the decision group was 5.38 for those who 
evaluated the situation as unfair and 4.40 for those who evaluated the situation as fair. This 
implies that participants in the community and decision tasks who did express strong 
feelings of injustice consistently showed more interest in changing their unfair partners.  
However, people in the Wall Street group who evaluated the situation as either just 
or unjust did not show different tendencies to change partners. The participants’ preference 
to change partners in the Wall Street group was 5.69 for those who evaluated the situation 
as unfair and 5.38 for those who evaluated the situation as fair. 
 Partitioned Data Analysis. In addition to the overall analyses, I also partitioned my 
data by study name. I found that only in the community group did participants who 
evaluated the situation as unfair want to change their partner more than participants who 
evaluated the situation as fair or unsure. The result from a linear regression analysis for the 
partitioned data was significant for the community group [t= -2.457, p = .018].  However, 
justice evaluation was less important in deciding to change partner within the decision [t = 
-1.825, p = .074] and Wall Street [t = -1.903, p = .063] groups.  
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Results from the partitioned data were slightly inconsistent with the ANOVA test 
and marginal means results. Although the estimated marginal means outcome shows that 
both the decision and community groups were sensitive to their justice evaluations in 
making their decisions about changing their partners, the partitioned data show only the 
community group relied on their fairness evaluation and the decision and Wall Street 
groups only slightly used their fairness evaluation in making their decisions.  
Overall, the results from the complete and partitioned data analyses do not support 
hypotheses 4.b or 4.c, but still show that the participant’s interest in changing partners 
relies on their fairness evaluation and the specific task they are assigned in. Since the results 
were not consistent with the partitioned data, I only conclude that the Wall Street group 
was more willing to change their partner than the other groups and that fairness evaluation 
was not a strong indicator in the Wall Street group when deciding to change partners.  
6.6 DISCUSSION 
The vignette results fully support hypotheses 3.a and 4.a, but other hypotheses are 
not supported by the data. Some results indicate that behaviors were actually the opposite 
of what I had predicted in some conditions. For instance, my hypotheses assumed that the 
community group would decrease their second contribution and change their partner more 
than the decision group, and that the decision group would decrease their second 
contribution and change their partner more than the Wall Street group. However, the results 
show that the Wall Street group decreased their second contribution and changed their 
partner more than the community group. I visualize my findings in Figure 6.4 below. 
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Figure 6.4: Vignette Study Findings (Note: Indirect relationships illustrated with 
dotted arrows. Mixed colors refer to interactions.) 
The unpredictable results suggest that either that the relationship was more 
complicated than predicted or that the manipulations did not work the way I assumed they 
would. 
First Contribution. People in differently named groups did not contribute 
significantly different amounts to the group account. Despite some previous studies 
suggesting the reverse (e.g., Ellingsen et al. 2012; Liberman et al. 2004), the results from 
the vignette show that first contributions, i.e. unconditional contributions, to the group 
account did not vary across different social frames (Bernold et al. 2014; Brandts and 
Schwieren 2009; Dufwenberg, Gächter, and Hennig-Schmidt 2011). This means that the 
title frames did not lead participants to contribute certain contribution amounts (e.g. high, 
low). This also implies that different titles did not create different expectations for 
contribution. In other words, the community, Wall Street, and decision task titles did not 
create high, low, and equal contribution expectations respectively.  
79 
One possible explanation for this could be that the Wall Street title may have 
induced members to contribute to the group account to be able to gain more points for their 
personal account, while the community title may have encouraged them to contribute to 
the group account for collective gain. This may explain why both groups’ members 
contributed similar amounts and expected similar contributions. Even though different 
titles may rely on different motivations for contribution, the first contributions were similar 
across the three different groups. 
Although framing was a not significant predictor, I found that SVO was a very 
strong predictor in analyzing first contributions (e.g., Balliet et al. 2009; De Dreu and Van 
Lange 1995; Van Lange and Kuhlman 1994; Van Lange and Liebrand 1991). The results 
for SVO in this study confirm the previous findings as well. Therefore, I conclude that 
SVO predicted the variation in the first contribution. Prosocial participants were likely to 
give more money to the group account than individualistic participants.  
Fairness Evaluation. I predicted that because of expectations for high 
contributions, the community group participants would express stronger feelings of 
injustice than the decision and Wall Street group participants. Since I did not observe any 
differentiation in first contributions across differently named conditions, I cannot claim that 
different frames created different expectations for contribution. This means that the 
community title did not create a high contribution expectation, the Wall Street title did not 
create a low contribution expectation, and the decision title did not create a neutral 
contribution expectation, and thus participants were disappointed very similarly across 
groups. As a result, their fairness evaluation cannot vary either. 
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However, their reasoning may be different. For instance, the community group may 
have expected everyone to contribute to the group account because it was a collective 
responsibility, while the Wall Street group may have expected everyone to contribute to the 
group account because it was the best strategy to gain points. The community group may 
have been upset because the other person did not contribute to the group account, and 
believed this was very irresponsible to their community, while the Wall Street group was 
upset because they believed the other person exploited him/her. Consequently, though they 
may have had different reasons, participants in the differently named groups expressed 
similar feelings of injustice.  
In addition to the framing effect, the participant’s fairness evaluation did not vary 
across different levels of the first contribution or different SVOs. However, the interaction 
of the first contribution and framing was statistically significant in predicting the 
participants’ fairness evaluation.  
Consequently, these analyses display that frames did not create low, high or neutral 
expectations for contribution as I assumed in this study, but the Wall Street frame led 
participants in the Wall Street group to care about how much money they gave to the group 
account in the first round and made their fairness evaluations accordingly. Participants in 
the Wall Street task evaluated the situation as very unfair if they gave a lot to the group 
account, while participants who gave a lot or little to the group account in the community 
and decision tasks evaluated the situation very similarly in terms of fairness. The 
significant interaction terms also confirm that the participants’ fairness evaluations varied 
across different levels of giving in the Wall Street tasks. In other words, the Wall Street 
group evaluated fairness according to how much they gave to the group account.  
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Changes in the Second Contribution. I predicted that those who experienced 
stronger injustice would contribute less than others. Therefore, I assumed that fairness 
evaluation could predict changes in the second contribution. However, when I looked at 
other variables’ effects, I found more variables affecting changes in the second contribution 
outside of fairness evaluation. For instance, SVO had an indirect effect (through the first 
contribution), and framing, the first contribution, and fairness evaluations had direct effects 
on changes in the second contribution. This indicates that those who were in the Wall Street 
task, those who gave more in the first round, and those who evaluated the situation as more 
unfair decreased their second contribution more than others. 
I also analyzed the data partitioned by task name. I conclude that experiencing 
injustice led the Wall Street group to decrease their second contribution, but not participants 
in the decision and community groups. This indicates that fairness evaluation was a strong 
factor for the Wall Street group in predicting the difference between the first and second 
contributions to the group account. Consequently, though the Wall Street frame did not 
lead people to evaluate the situation as more unfair, the feelings of injustice in the Wall 
Street task led people to decrease their second contribution more than other groups. Since 
those who gave a lot to the group account in the Wall Street group evaluated the situation 
as more unfair, it is expected for them to decrease their second contribution more than 
others.  
Tendency to Change Partner. I predicted that those who experience stronger 
injustice would be more interested in changing partners for future rounds. Also, I found 
that framing and fairness evaluation significantly predicted the participant’s preference to 
change their partner. However, the data do not support the hypothesized directions of the 
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relationship. I assumed that the community group would be more willing to quit their 
relationship with their partners than those in the decision group, and that the decision group 
would be more willing to quit their relationship with their partners than those in the Wall 
Street group. The results from a multi-factor model reveal that participants in the Wall 
Street group were more willing to quit their relationship with their partners than 
participants in the decision and the community groups.  
Additionally, the partitioned (by task name) data analyses show that those in the 
Wall Street group were more likely to change their partner, regardless of their fairness 
evaluations. However, those in the community and decision groups were more likely to 
decide whether or not to change their partner in accordance with their fairness evaluations.  
Conclusion. Overall, fairness evaluation and subsequent behaviors are very 
complicated phenomena. The data from the vignette study show that framing did not lead 
participants to give more or less in the first round, but high-givers in the Wall Street frame 
were more sensitive and more responsive to injustice than other groups. That is, the Wall 
Street frame made participants focus on how much money they gave to the group account. 
Individuals in the Wall Street task evaluated the situation as very unfair if they gave a lot 
to the group account. Similarly, the community and decision frames encouraged 
participants to not focus on how much money they gave to the group account. 
Consequently, those giving a lot evaluated the situation very unfair in the Wall Street task 
while those giving a lot or too little in the community and decision tasks evaluated the 
situation very similarly in terms of fairness.  
Although participants in differently named conditions expressed their fairness 
evaluation very similarly in general, their responses to injustice or justice were different 
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and they used different strategies to restore justice. Participants in the Wall Street task 
decreased their second contribution in response to their injustice evaluations, but their 
tendency to change partners was not a response to injustice evaluations. They wanted to 
change their partners regardless of their fairness evaluations. This indicates either they did 
not express their justice evaluations properly, or they did not think changing partner is a 
strong strategy to restore justice.  
Similarly, people in the decision and community tasks were likely to change their 
partners to maintain justice. Those who evaluated the situation as more unfair in the 
community and decision groups were more willing to change partners than those who 
evaluated the situation as fair or unsure. However, they did not change their second 
contribution in response to injustice or justice. In this sense, fairness evaluation is not a 
very good indicator in predicting the tendency to change partners in the Wall Street group 
or predicting changes in the second contribution in the community and decision groups. 
Subsequently, I conclude that framing may have led participants to use different ways to 
maintain justice. That is, the Wall Street frame led participants to reduce their second 
contribution significantly, the decision and community frames led participants to quit the 
relationship with their partners. 
In closing, the data from the vignette study support some of my hypotheses, but 
also disproved some of them. One possible explanation for unsupportive outcomes could 
be that the situation was hypothetical in the vignette study. When people know that 
situation is not real, their judgments for the imaginary situation diverge from their 
judgments for a real experience. Also, people may not have recognized the title framing 
when they were invited to complete a survey. Therefore, I ran a laboratory experiment 
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which reduces these problems significantly. Additionally, I refined my questionnaire and 
frames, separated the SVO survey from the experimental study in order to reduce a possible 
priming effect of SVO, and changed my study design.
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CHAPTER 7  
LABORATORY EXPERIMENT: METHODS 
In this chapter, I present the experimental methods used in testing basic components 
of the theory presented in this dissertation. As explained below, the experiment aims to 
isolate the effects of framing, SVO, and the interaction partner’s contribution level on 
predicting justice evaluations and subsequent behaviors. All methodological components 
for the laboratory experiment are detailed in this chapter.  
Laboratory experiments allow us to create an abstract, simple, and artificial public 
good-based situation that tests simple theoretical mechanisms. It may be impossible to 
study very complicated real-world phenomena scientifically, because it is hard to eliminate 
conditions which we cannot measure that may impact the results. However, in the 
laboratory, we can eliminate these unwanted conditions and make salient the conditions 
we intend to measure to understand their causal effects in the hypothesized phenomena. 
Although the aim of the experimental test is not to replicate real-world situations but to test 
a theory, a testable theory-driven argument can be useful for understanding real-world 
situations (Thye 2007; Webster Jr. and Kervin 1971; Zelditch Jr. 1969).  
A theory is only applicable in its scope domain. Thus, it is not possible to generalize 
experimental results in any science. However, more careful empirical work can support the 
theory and broaden its scope conditions. If a theory is supported by an experimental test, 
then it is very reasonable to use other methodologies to gain accuracy and generalizability.
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The experiment in this dissertation is a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design including two 
levels of comparisons for contribution (own to a high-standard, own to a low-standard), 
two different SVO characteristics (individualistic, prosocial) crossed by the interaction 
partner’s contribution level (low, high). As detailed below, the experimental study 
examines the effects of these factors and their interaction effects on the participants’ justice 
evaluations, changes in their second contribution, tendency to change their partner for 
future rounds, and willingness to share a group bonus with their partner.  
7.1 VARIABLES 
In this section, variables are introduced and how they are operationalized and 
measured empirically are explained in details. As explained below, the experiment inspects 
these variables in a public good situation created in a laboratory setting.    
Independent Variables and Manipulations 
As shown in Table 7.1 below, this design includes two social frames created 
through different titles (The Stock Market Study, The Community Study) crossed by SVO 
(individualistic, prosocial) and the interaction partner’s contribution level (high, low). 
Table 7.1: Experimental Design 
CONDITION 
(# of Participants) 
NAME OF STUDY SVO 
PARTNER 
CONTRIBUTES… 
1   (33) Stock Market Individualistic Low 
2   (23) Stock Market Individualistic High 
3   (33) Stock Market Prosocial Low 
4   (23) Stock Market Prosocial High 
5   (33) Community Individualistic Low 
6   (23) Community Individualistic High 
7   (33) Community Prosocial Low 
8   (23) Community Prosocial High 
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The framing variable in this study was operationalized through different titles for 
the same experimental procedure. As discussed before, previous research shows a 
significant effect based merely on the study’s title, such as “The Community Game” vs. 
“The Stock Market Game”  (Batson and Moran 1999; Bernold et al. 2014; Eiser and 
Bhavnani 1974; Ellingsen et al. 2012; Kay and Ross 2003; Liberman et al. 2004). I used 
the community frame in order to create a high standard of contribution and the stock market 
frame for a low standard of contribution. 
Although I used title framing to operationalize the framing variable in the vignette 
study, some changes were made in the experimental study. Most of the contrast tests in the 
vignette study were significant for the comparison between the community group and the 
Wall Street group but not the decision group. Building on the vignette study outcomes, I 
omitted the decision group from my design and used the community and stock market titles 
for the experimental study. Also, the Wall Street name was changed to the stock market 
due to Wall Street’s notoriety resulting from the recent activities against Wall Street in the 
USA.  
The second variable was SVO in this study. Participants were required to complete 
a standardized SVO scale right after they signed up for the study13. Since the 1960’s, a 
standard SVO inventory has been developed to classify each participant as a prosocial or 
individualistic (Balliet et al. 2009; Van Lange 1999; Messick and McClintock 1968; 
Simpson 2004; Simpson and Willer 2008). The measure of SVO presented participants 
with a series of nine decomposed games. Each game included three different distributions 
of points for self and another unknown person. The results were classified as prosocial 
                                                          
13 The complete scale and instructions are provided in Appendix C.  
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(who maximizes the outcomes for both self and others) or as individualistic (who 
maximizes the outcomes for only self). Based on previous studies, I classified participants 
as prosocial or individualistic only if they made at least six out of nine choices consistent 
with a given SVO. Otherwise, they were classified as undetermined (Van Lange 1999; 
Simpson and Willer 2008). 
 The third variable was the interaction partner’s contribution level. Participants in 
each differently framed condition were divided equally and assigned to interact with either 
a high or low contributing partner. In order to demonstrate differentiations in high and low 
situations, the simulated partner contributed less or more than participants. To create low 
situations (Condition 1, 3, 5, and 7 in Table 7.1), the simulated partner contributed 10 
points less than the participant; to create high situations (Condition 2, 4, 6, and 8 in Table 
7.1), the simulated partner contributed 10 points more than the participant. For instance, if 
a participant contributed 10 points, the simulated partner contributed 0 points (10-10=0) in 
low conditions and 20 points (10+10=20) in high conditions. Additionally, if a participant 
in the low condition contributed the minimum (0 points) or a participant in the high 
condition contributed the maximum (20 points), then the simulated partner contributed 0 
and 20 points (i.e. the same amount with the participant) respectively, and these conditions 
became equal conditions for this study.   
Dependent Variables 
The first dependent variable in this study was the participants’ initial contributions 
to the group account. Each participant was requested to contribute any amount of points 
(from 0 to 20) from their personal account to the group account. This item measured 
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whether framing and/or SVO affected participants’ unconditional cooperation (i.e. first 
contribution) to the group account.  
The second dependent variable was the participants’ justice evaluations. After 
learning how much their partner (i.e. Other) gave to the group account and sharing the 
group points evenly with their partner, participants answered 4 questions measuring their 
fairness judgments. The first item measured participants’ evaluations for their own 
contribution to the group account. The second item measured participants’ evaluations for 
their partner’s contribution. For both items, participants expressed their evaluations 
through a 7-point Likert scale. Both participants’ own contribution and their partner’s 
contribution items were scaled as 1= much too low, 2= too low, 3= somewhat too low, 4= 
about right, 5= somewhat too high, 6= too high, and 7= much too high. The third item 
measured the participants’ fairness evaluation for their own contribution, while the fourth 
item measured their fairness evaluation for their partner’s contribution. Both items were 
scaled as 1= very unfair, 2= unfair, 3= somewhat unfair, and 4= fair.  
Third, I measured three means to restore justice: changing the subsequent 
contribution, sharing the group bonus with the partner, and switching partners for future 
rounds. To measure the first justice-restoring attempt, I measured how participants altered 
their subsequent contribution in the second round. Participants were asked to decide how 
much of their 20 points they would like to give to the group account for the second round 
(0 to 20 points). In essence, I took the difference between the first contribution and the 
second contribution. Next, I measured how many points out of 10 points (i.e., group bonus) 
participants shared with their partners. Each participant was told that s/he had been selected 
to distribute a group bonus. S/he was free to share any amount with his/her partner or keep 
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all points for his/her personal account. Finally, I measured the participants’ preference to 
change their partners. Participants were asked their preference to work with a different 
partner for future rounds (7-point Likert scale). Their preference was scaled from 1= no 
preference, 4= moderate preference, and 7= strong preference for switching partner.   
 In addition to these primary dependent variables, I tested the participants’ 
motivation to contribute to the group account (i.e. givers), motivations to keep resources 
for their personal account (i.e. keepers), and the first round’s influence on the second 
contribution. Right after they submitted their first contribution, they were asked about their 
motivations to contribute as much as they could to the group account and motivations to 
keep as much as possible in their personal account. Both items were scaled from 1= not at 
all motivated, 4= moderately motivated, and 7= very motivated. Finally, participants were 
given a 7-point Likert scale to express their judgments about how influential their first-
round experience on their second contribution was. The scale was ranged from 1= not at 
all influential, 4= moderately influential, and 7= strongly influential.  
Control Variables 
Previous research has shown that age, race (Young 1991),  gender (Cook and 
Hegtvedt 1983; Major, Bylsma, and Cozzarelli 1989), and education level (Scarpello and 
Jones 1996) may influence perceptions of justice. In this experiment, participants’ age, sex, 
race, education level, and major were recorded to test for effects of demographic variables. 
7.2 EXPERIMENT 
General Conditions 
 The current study was conducted in the University of South Carolina’s Laboratory 
for Sociological Research, which is located in the Sloan College Sociology Department. 
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The lab includes 16 computer-equipped private rooms for individual subjects and a web-
based subject pool management system (SONA) providing randomly selected participants 
for each of the eight conditions.  
The hypotheses were tested by using a computer program generated in 
Macromedia’s Authorware to simulate my hypothesized conditions. The interactions took 
place over a network and the program provided instructions for participants. Participants 
knew that the experiment was computer mediated, and that they were not going to not see 
their partners during the study or meet their partners after the study. Although participants 
were led to believe that they interacted with another person, the partner was a computer-
simulated person whose behaviors were determined by the computer program in 
accordance with the theoretical conditions.  
In each condition, the rules and payoff structures of public good settings were the 
same, but the title of the study was altered to create a subtle framing manipulation. 
Additionally, I also created different headings with visuals illustrating a stock market or 
community (See Figure 7.1 and 7.2 below) to reinforce the framing manipulation. 
 




Figure 7.2: Heading Displayed for the Community Study 
In general, participants in social dilemma settings are expected to make 
comparisons of their own contributions to the other members’ contributions. When more 
information is created through framing processes (e.g. socially constructed titles), then 
group members are expected to use this information in making social comparisons as well. 
If the same public good interaction is called the community study, collectiveness would be 
emphasized; therefore, the standard for contribution would be high for this condition. If it 
is called the stock market study, personal profiting would be emphasized; thus, the standard 
for contribution would be low for this condition. 
Each testing session was identical in terms of rules and protocols. Each session took 
approximately 25 minutes, and participants were granted course credit and paid through 
raffle tickets for their participation.  
Experimental Procedure14 and Manipulations 
In the SONA system this study was introduced as a “Survey Study” consisting of 
two parts: a brief online survey (SVO survey) and the actual laboratory study. Participants 
were required to complete a social value orientation scale (part one) to be able to sign up 
                                                          
14 All protocols and supplements for the experiment are provided in Appendix section. 
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for the actual laboratory study (part two). They were told that after they completed both 
parts, they would be given an opportunity to win a $50 Amazon.com gift card and 2 extra 
credits in applicable courses for participation. 
After completing part one, participants were classified as prosocial, individualistic, 
or undetermined. Then, prosocial and individualistic participants were invited to participate 
in the part two of the study. They were evenly distributed across conditions, and half were 
told that they were assigned to participate in a community study, while the other half were 
told that they were assigned to participate in a stock market study. Participants were told 
that they should remember and tell the research assistant in the lab which study they were 
going to participate in order to make sure they recognized the name of the study.  
Upon arrival at the lab, the researcher asked each participant which study s/he was 
participating in and checked if it was correct. Each participant was escorted by the 
researcher to a small room with a desk, keyboard, and computer monitor. Before initiating 
the program, each participant was asked to read and sign an informed consent form (See 
Appendix D). After collecting participants’ paperwork, the researcher gave them a brief 
explanation of the rules and started the program on the participant’s computer15 (See 
Appendix E). First, participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire revealing 
their demographic characteristics (age, race, gender, educational information, and major). 
Second, the computer administered a brief introduction to the study and informed 
participants about the rules and conditions for completing a joint decision-making task. 
Some examples were provided to illustrate how the public goods game and pay-off 
structure worked. Upon completion, participants were asked to complete a series of 
                                                          
15 The complete program script for experiment is provided in Appendix E.  
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questions to check their understanding of the study’s instructions. The correct answers were 
provided as feedback (i.e. correct answer) on the screen, which were displayed each time 
the participant gave a wrong answer. Each question was repeated until the participant 
answered it correctly. Instructions were the same for each of the eight experimental 
conditions. 
Participants were informed that they would interact with randomly chosen partners, 
and they would be asked questions to evaluate their experiences. Even though participants 
were led to believe that they may have worked with multiple participants and many rounds, 
in reality, participants made only two decision-makings and interacted with a computer-
simulated partner whose behaviors were predetermined in accordance with the 
experimental conditions.   
In the instructions, participants were told that each group member would be given 
a personal fund consisting of 20 points, which could be contributed to the group account 
or kept for their personal account. Each point contributed to the group account was 
multiplied by 1.5 and would be shared equally between participants and their partner. 
Participants were told that compensation for the study was based on the amount of points 
they would have in their account at the end of the study. Those who gained more points 
would be given more raffle tickets and thus more chances to win a $50 Amazon.com gift 
card. To increase their chances of winning a prize, it was thus wise for them to win as many 
raffle tickets as possible (for a similar procedure, see Van Vugt et al. 2004; Van Vugt and 
De Cremer 1999).  
This structure satisfies public goods dilemma situations because participants know 
that contributing to the group account is costly and risky, but necessary to gain more points. 
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Also, not contributing to the group account, but sharing the group account with the partner 
who is the one contributing to the group pool is the most beneficial choice. In other words, 
if a participant chooses to keep her/his initial endowment (20 points) and his/her partner 
contributes all of his/her endowment, which will be multiplied (20*1.5=30 points) and 
shared equally, then the participant can earn 35 points (20 form initial endowment, and 15 
from the group account) while his/her partner only receives 15 points (0 from initial 
endowment and 15 from group account) as total.  
At the beginning of the first contribution round, participants were asked how much 
s/he wanted to contribute to the group account. Participants were led to believe that the 
partner was making his/her decision at the same time. When participants were waiting for 
the other person’s decision, they answered some questions measuring their motivations in 
making the first contribution. Then, s/he was told how much the partner contributed. The 
partner’s behaviors were predetermined through a computer program. If a participant 
assigned in a low condition (condition 1, 3, 5, or 7), s/he was told that the partner 
contributed 10 points less than what the participant contributed to the group account. For 
instance, if a participant contributed 12 points, s/he was told the partner contributed 2 
points, and the total contributed points were 14. After multiplying by 1.5, it became 21 and 
each group member received 11 points from the group account, which made the 
participant’s total 19 points and the partner’s total 29 points. If a participant was assigned 
in a high condition (condition 2, 4, 6, or 8), s/he was told that the partner contributed 10 
more points than his/her contribution. For instance, if a participant contributed 5 points, 
s/he was told the partner contributed 15 points, and the total contributed points were 20. 
After multiplying by 1.5, it became 30 and each group member received 15 points from 
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the group account, which made the participant’s total 30 points and the partner’s total 20 
points. 
Additionally, if participants gave less than 10, e.g. 5 points, and the condition was 
a low condition, the partner’s contribution was adjusted to “0” instead of -5. Also, if 
participants gave more than 10, e.g. 15 points, and the condition was a high condition, the 
partner’s contribution was adjusted to “20” instead of 25 points. If participants gave “0” in 
a low condition or “20” in a high condition, the partner gave the same amount as the 
participant instead of -10 or 30 points. I treated those situations as equal conditions.  
After equally sharing the group points, participants were asked some questions 
measuring their fairness evaluation for their interaction. Then, they started the second 
round and decided how much of their personal endowment they would like to contribute. 
While waiting for their partner’s decision, they were asked some more questions measuring 
their attempts to restore justice. First, participants were asked how much they were 
influenced by their first round experience. Second, their preference to change their partner 
for future rounds was asked as an indicator for quitting the relationship. Participants were 
also told that s/he was randomly chosen to distribute an additional 10 points as a group 
bonus, and s/he was free to keep the bonus for his/her personal account or share any amount 
(from 0 to 10 points) with the partner. S/he was also told that the partner would be informed 
about the bonus, if s/he decided to share only some of the bonus with the partner.  
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked a series of questions in order 
to check suspicions with respect to the deceptions and the manipulations (e.g. whether or 
not they perceived their partner’s behaviors as intended, they believed that their partner 
and the study were real). On the final screen, participants were told that they would be 
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emailed a debriefing form explaining the details and real goals of the study after the 
experimental sessions were completed. They were also requested to not discuss the study 
with those who had not yet participated. Each participant was thanked and escorted from 
the lab. 
Debriefing and Compensation 
After the experimental sessions were completed, each participant was sent a 
debriefing email explaining the study’s real goals and preliminary results (See Appendix 
F). Also, any further questions about the study were replied via email.  
Compensation for this study was an opportunity to win a $50.00 Amazon.com gift 
card and extra credit. After completing the experimental session, each participant was 
given 2 course credits for their participation regardless of their performance during the 
study. Also, participants were told that their effort (i.e. the points they gained) during the 
experiment could not be paid out directly, but rather the points would be converted into 
raffle tickets for an attractive monetary prize ($50 Amazon.com gift card) that would be 
held after the experimental sessions were completed. Participants were told that those who 
got more points during the experiment would have more chance to gain the prize, but in 
reality, the winners were chosen randomly among participants and each participant was 
given the same chance to win the prize. Those who were randomly chosen as gift card 
winners were invited to the Sociology Department Main Office to receive their prize.  
7.3 HYPOTHESES 
I operationalized my theoretical arguments through testable hypotheses. These 
hypotheses were tested through the data collected from a laboratory experiment, which was 
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explained in detail in the previous sections.  In this section, I list each dependent variable 
as a subsection and list related hypotheses.  
First Contribution 
My theory predicts that the community title creates higher expectation (e.g. 15 
points) while the stock market title creates lower expectation (e.g. 5 points) for contribution 
to the group account. The personal fund was 20 points, and participants were free to 
contribute any amount from 0 to 20 to the group account. Since expectation for contribution 
is higher in the community study, I assume that the first contribution amount will be higher 
in the community study compared to the stock market study. Therefore, I propose the 
following hypothesis. 
H.1.1: Participants in the community study will give more points to the group account 
than participants in the stock market study. 
Relying on previous research, I also predict that SVO will have effects on first 
contribution. Since prosocial participants are more likely to expect cooperation from others 
(De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; Van Lange 1992), they will give more points than 
individualistic participants. Thus,  
H.1.2: Prosocial participants will give more points to the group account than 
individualistic participants. 
In addition to the main effects of framing and SVO, I also expect to find interaction 
effects. I assume that prosocial participants in the community study will be the most 
cooperative while individualistic participants in the stock market will be the least 
cooperative in giving personal points to the group account. Therefore, I formalize the 
following hypotheses. 
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H.1.3.a: Prosocial participants in the community study will give the highest points to 
the group account. 
H.1.3.b: Individualistic participants in the stock market study will give the lowest points 
to the group account. 
Fairness Evaluation 
The second dependent variable in this study is the participants’ fairness evaluation. 
First, I assume that participants who interact with a low contributor will be likely to 
evaluate the situation as more unjust compared to participants who interact with a high or 
equal contributor. Thus,  
H.2.1: Participants will evaluate their interaction with a low-contributor partner as 
more unjust compared to a high- or an equal-contributor partner. 
Second, I assume that the community title creates a higher expectation (e.g. 15 
points) and the stock market title creates a lower expectation (e.g. 5 points) for contribution 
to the group account. Thus, I assume that fairness evaluations will differ across groups. I 
expect that participants who have a high expectation for contribution (e.g. community 
group) will be more disappointed with others’ low contribution. Similarly, I expect that 
participants who have a high expectation for contribution (e.g. the community group) will 
evaluate others’ high contribution as more fair. In other words, participants in the 
community group (relative to the stock market group) are likely to experience stronger 
injustice when encounter with a low-contributor, but justify a high contribution due to a 
high expectation for contribution to the group account. Thus,  
H.2.2.a: Participants in the community study will evaluate their interaction with a low-
contributor partner as more unjust compared to participants in the stock market study. 
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H.2.2.b: Participants in the community study will evaluate their interaction with a high-
contributor partner as more just compared to participants in the stock market study. 
Since SVO has effects on first contribution, I also predict that SVO has effects on 
fairness evaluation as well. Since prosocial participants are more likely to expect 
cooperation from others, they will be more disappointed with others’ low contribution. 
Similarly, I expect that prosocial participants will evaluate others’ high contribution as 
more fair. Thus,  
H.2.3. a: Prosocial participants will evaluate their interaction with a low-contributor 
partner as more unjust compared to individualistic participants. 
H.2.3. b: Prosocial participants will evaluate their interaction with a high-contributor 
partner as more just compared to individualistic participants. 
Changes in the Second Contribution 
The third dependent variable I analyzed is the changes in the second contribution 
relative to the first contribution. When participants experience justice or injustice, I assume 
that their second contribution will be a response to their justice or injustice experience. My 
theory claims that fairness evaluation can predict justice-restoring attempts such as 
difference in the second contribution. Therefore,  
H.3.1.a: Participants who experience negative injustice will give fewer points in the 
second round compared to those who experience positive injustice and justice. 
H.3.1.b: Participants who experience positive injustice will give more points in the 
second round compared to those who experience negative injustice and justice. 
I also expected that the community group experience stronger injustice than the 
stock market group when interacting with a low-contributor partner. Accordingly, they will 
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decrease their second contribution more than the stock market group. Thus, in a low 
condition: 
H.3.2.a: The community group will reduce points given in the second round more as 
compared to the stock market group. 
Similarly, in a high condition, I expect that the community group will experience 
less guilt (i.e. positive injustice) than the stock market group when interacting with a high-
contributor partner. Consequently, they will increase their second contribution less than the 
stock market group. Therefore, in a high condition:  
H.3.2.b: The community group will increase points given in the second round less as 
compared to the stock market group. 
Relying on previous research, I also predict that SVO has effects on the decrease 
amount in the second round. Since prosocial participants expect high contributions from 
others, they will be angrier to a low-contributor partner and less guilty for a high-
contributor partner. However, prosocial participants are more forgiving of an unfair 
partner. This may indicate that prosocial participants may be more willing to forgive their 
unfair partner and re-initiate cooperative behaviors (Balliet et al. 2009; Smeesters et al. 
2003). Thus, in a low condition, 
H.3.3.a: Individualistic participants will reduce points given in the second round more 
as compared to prosocial participants.  
Previous research shows that individualistic participants are more likely to exploit 
cooperative partners than prosocial participants (Smeesters et al. 2003).  Therefore, in a 
high condition, 
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H.3.3.b: Individualistic participants will increase points given in the second round less 
as compared to prosocial participants.  
 Tendency to Change Partner 
The fourth dependent variable is another means to restore justice: the participants’ 
tendency to change their partners for future rounds. First, I assume that willingness to 
change partner is another response to fairness evaluation. Therefore, I formalize the 
following hypotheses: 
H.4.1.a: Participants who experience negative injustice will be more willing to change 
their partner compared to those who experience positive injustice and justice. 
H.4.1.b: Participants who experience positive injustice will be less willing to change 
their partner compared to those who experience negative injustice and justice. 
I also expect the community group will experience stronger injustice than the stock 
market group in a negatively unjust situation. Consequently, they will be more willing to 
work with another partner for future rounds than the stock market group. Thus, in a low 
condition: 
H.4.2.a: The tendency to change a low-contributor partner will be greater in the 
community group compared to the stock market group. 
Similarly, in a high condition: 
H.4.2.b: The tendency to change a high-contributor partner will be lower in the 
community group compared to the stock market group. 
Additionally, I also predict that SVO will have effects on the tendency for changing 
partner. Thus, in a low condition: 
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H.4.3.a: The tendency to change a low-contributor partner will be greater for 
individualistic participants compared to prosocial participants. 
However, in a high contribution situation: 
H.4.3.b: The tendency to change a high-contributor partner will be lower for 
individualistic participants compared to prosocial participants. 
Willingness to Share Group Bonus 
The fifth dependent variable is another means to restore justice: how much of the 
group bonus participants shared with their partner. First, I assume that giving more or less 
bonus points to the partner is another response to the fairness evaluation. Therefore, I 
formalize the following hypotheses: 
H.5.1.a: Participants who experience negative injustice will give fewer points to the 
partner compared to those who experience positive injustice and justice. 
H.5.1.b: Participants who experience positive injustice will give more points to the 
partner compared to those who experience negative injustice and justice. 
I also expect the community group experience stronger injustice than the stock 
market group in negatively unjust situations. Consequently, they will give fewer points to 
the partner. Thus, in a low condition: 
H.5.2.a: Participants in the community group will share fewer points with a low-
contributor partner than participants in the stock market group. 
Similarly, I expect the community group experience less positive injustice due high 
expectation. Therefore, the community group will give fewer points to the partner and in a 
high condition: 
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H.5.2.b: Participants in the community group will share fewer points with a high-
contributor partner than participants in the stock market group. 
Additionally, I also predict that SVO will have effects on the sharing bonus points 
with the partner. Thus, in a low condition, 
H.5.3.a: Individualistic participants will share fewer points with a low-contributor 
partner than prosocial participants. 
Similarly, in a high condition,  
H.5.3.b: Individualistic participants will share fewer points with a high-contributor 
partner than prosocial participants.  
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CHAPTER 8  
LABORATORY EXPERIMENT: ANALYSES 
To organize my analyses for the experimental data, I created a section for each 
dependent variable and a subsection for each independent variable, interaction term, and 
additional analyses.  In each section, I provide information about my data and report my 
findings. Finally, I discuss my findings in the last section.  
8.1. DATA AND PARTICIPANTS 
Undergraduates at the University of South Carolina were asked to participate in this 
study for raffle tickets to gain a $50 Amazon.com gift card and to earn extra credit in 
applicable courses. I contacted volunteers through a web-based SONA system to schedule 
experimental sessions in the lab. To control for age and cohort effects, only traditional 
undergraduate students were contacted.  
Of these cases, 161 of 224 participants were female (approximately 70%) while 63 
were male. I code female as “1” and male as “0”. Of these cases, 175 of 224 participants 
are white. In the experiment, participants were asked about different categories of race. 
White participants made up about 80% of the total; therefore, I recode them as white (coded 
as “1”) and non-white (coded as “0”). Also, all the participants are undergraduate students, 
and 96% of 224 participants are between the ages of 18-23.
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Before completing the experiment, I equalized the number of prosocial and 
individualistic participants between the stock market study and community study. In the 
primary experiment, I separated the simulated other’s contribution as high or low and 
assigned 33 participants to each low condition (Conditions 1, 3, 5, and 7 in Table 7-1 in 
the previous chapter) and 23 participants to each high condition (Conditions 2, 4, 6, and 8 
in Table 7-1 in the previous chapter) in order to obtain sufficient statistical power16. 
Although controlling the sample group in this way partially violates the random assignment 
principle, it decreases within-condition measurement errors and increases between-
condition differences. Thus, statistical power can be increased (Webster Jr. and Kervin 
1971). The distribution of participants in accordance with task name and SVO variables is 
introduced in Table 7-1 in the previous chapter.  
A total of 249 participants were recruited for this study, but 224 cases were used in 
the analysis. 13 participants were excluded from the study due to suspicions about the 
experimental deceptions. 10 participants whose SVO is classified as undetermined were 
also excluded from the study. Additionally, the last two participants were excluded from 
the data to keep the number of participants equal across conditions. The exclusion rate was 
about 10% of the cases.  
I randomly assigned 132 (33 participant x 4 conditions = 132) participants to low 
conditions, but 10 participants contributed the lowest possible amount, “0” points, and thus 
were considered as equal conditions. I randomly assigned 92 (23 participants x 4 conditions 
= 92) participants to high conditions, but 28 participants contributed the highest possible 
                                                          
16 Although our program randomly assigned each participant to either low and high conditions, one of the 
low condition cells had a very larger number of people (33) while all other cells were around 20. Therefore, 
I adjusted the number of participants accordingly. 
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amount, “20” points, and thus were considered as equal conditions. This means that 122 
participants (about 55%) interacted with a low-contributor partner, 64 participants (about 
29%) interacted with a high-contributor partner, and 38 participants (about 16%) interacted 
with an equal-contributor partner in the experiment.  
The collected data for each dependent variable were analyzed in SPSS. Before 
conducting statistical tests, I checked if the data maintained the required assumptions of 
normality, homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity for linear regression, ANOVA, and 
ANCOVA tests.  
8.2 FIRST CONTRIBUTION 
First, I measured how many points (out of their 20 points) participants contributed 
to the group account. The overall average first contribution to the group account was 11.85 
(SD= 6.21, N=224).  
Data 
According to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests, the data are 
slightly non-normal. However, the skewness is = -.42 and kurtosis is = -2.97. Therefore, I 
conclude that my data display no skewness but some kurtosis issues. This means the 
distribution is symmetric but slightly flat (i.e. platycurtic).  The data also satisfied the 
assumption of homoscedasticity in both the Breusch-Pagan [LM= 1.037, p = .596] and 
Konker [LM= 1.806, p= .405] tests. Finally, the data do not violate the assumption of 
multicollinearity. Therefore, I conducted parametric tests to analyze my data.  
Findings 
Framing Effect. The mean contributed points in the first round was 11.60 (SD = 
6.36) for the stock market group and 12.10 (SD = 6.07) for the community group.  I 
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conducted a one-way between-subject ANOVA to compare the effect of study name (stock 
market study, community study coded as “0” and “1” respectively) on the first contribution 
variable. There was not a significant effect for study name [F (1, 222) = .362, p = .548].  
The findings do not support hypothesis 1.1: “Participants in the community study will give 
more points to the group account than participants in the stock market study.” 
SVO Effect. I ran a one-way between-subject ANOVA to check whether or not SVO 
(individualistic, prosocial coded as “0 and “1” respectively) had an effect on the first 
contribution. The test result was highly significant [F (1, 222) = 9.997, p = .002]. This 
means that SVO had a significant association with the first contribution. The mean 
contributed points was 10.56 (SD = 5.83) for individualistic participants and 13.13 (SD = 
6.33) for prosocial participants. These findings clearly support hypothesis 1.2: “Prosocial 
participants will give more points to the group account than individualistic participants.” 
This indicates that prosocial participants contributed more than individualistic participants 
in the first round. 
Framing-SVO Interaction Effect. I checked if there is an interaction effect between 
framing and SVO when predicting the first contribution variable. I could not find any 
interaction effect for study name and SVO. The two-factorial ANOVA test results are 
summarized in Table 8-1 below. 
Table 8.1: Two-Factorial ANOVA Test Results for the First Contribution 
 F P-value 
Independent Variables:  
Study Name .375 .541 
SVO 9.924 .002 
Study Name*SVO .000 .983 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
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Prosocial participants in the community study gave the highest points (M = 13.39, 
SD = 6.21) and individualistic participants in the stock market gave the lowest points (M 
= 10.32, SD = 6.00). However, a model including main effects of the SVO and study name 
variables and their interaction (See Table 8-1) shows that only the main effect of SVO can 
predict the first contribution. Since the interaction was not significant, I conclude that the 
data do not support hypothesis 1.3.a: “Prosocial participants in the community study will 
give the highest points to the group account” and hypothesis 1.3.b: “Individualistic 
participants in the stock market study will give the lowest points to the group account.” 
  I also generated Figure 8-1 to visualize the estimated marginal means of the first 
contribution by the SVO and framing variables.  The figure clarifies the SVO’s main effect 
on the first contribution as well. 
 
Figure 8.1: Estimated Marginal Means of the First Contribution 
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Partitioned Data analysis. I also partitioned the data by study names, and I checked 
if the effect of SVO was different across differently named studies. I found that SVO was 
a statistically significant factor in predicting the first contribution in the stock market [F (1, 
110) = 4.664, p = .033] and in the community [F (1, 110) = 5.292, p = .023] groups. This 
means that prosocial participants were likely to give more points to the group account than 
individualistic participants in both studies. Overall results indicate that framing was not 
effective, but SVO was a strong factor in predicting the first contribution.  
Motivation Effect. After completing the first round, participants were asked whether 
they were motivated to give as many of their personal points as they could to the group 
account or keep their points in their personal account (both items were 7-point Likert 
scales). I reverse-coded the item measuring the participants’ motivation to keep the points 
in their personal account. Then, I standardized the items and combined them into a scale 
measure of level of motivation. A linear regression analysis was highly significant [t = 
22.475, p < .001], showing that participants who reported themselves as highly motivated 
to contribute to the group account contributed more points than others in the first round. 
Then, I cheeked if the motivation variable could be predicted by the study name or 
SVO variables. In other words, I examined if participants assigned to the community study 
were likely to be motivated to give more points compared to the stock market study, and if 
prosocial participants were likely to be motivated to give more points compared to 
individualistic participants. A linear regression test for study name was insignificant [t = 
.238, p = .812], but highly significant for SVO [t = 4.683, p < .001]. The results imply that 
prosocial participants were more likely to claim that they were motivated to give more 
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points to the group account than individualistic participants, which is consistent with their 
first contribution behaviors as well.  
As can be recognized from the previous analyses, the SVO and motivation variables 
had significant effects on the first contribution separately. Also, SVO had effects on the 
motivation variable as well. When I modeled SVO and motivation as my predictors in a 
multiple regression model, the effect of SVO on the first contribution disappeared. This 
indicates a clear mediation model, i.e. indirect effect (Baron and Kenny 1986). Therefore, 
I ran a mediation analysis and found that SVO has an indirect effect (through the 
motivation) on the first contribution (See Figure 8-2 below for a detailed model).  
 
Figure 8.2: Mediating Effect of Motivation on SVO in Predicting the First 
Contribution 
Mediation analysis shows that when the motivation was accounted for in the model, 
SVO lost its effect on the first contribution. The indirect effect size was 3.15 with a 95% 
CI between 1.86 and 4.46. CI which does not include “0” indicates that an indirect effect 
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exists and is different from “0”. Also, the Sobel test shows that the indirect effect was 
significant (B= 4.59, p <.001)17. 
All analyses show that the relationship between SVO and the first contribution is 
complicated. In the experiment, SVO was mediated by the motivation variable; thus, 
SVO’s effect on the first contribution was indirect. Overall, the SVO and motivation 
variables were strong factors in predicting the first contribution to the group account, but 
not the framing variable.   
8.3 FAIRNESS EVALUATION 
The second dependent variable is the participant’s fairness evaluation. I used 4 
items to measure fairness evaluation. I checked if these items measuring fairness were 
reliable, and Cronbach’s Alpha was .731. I found that fairness evaluation for self was not 
significantly correlated with other items and when I omitted this item, the reliability results 
increased (Cronbach’s Alpha= .806). Therefore, I used these three items’ average as a new 
fairness variable18.  
Data 
The data were checked to see if the data upheld the required assumptions. The data 
are slightly non-normal in accordance with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk 
tests. However, the skewness is = -.52 and kurtosis is = -4.02. Therefore, I conclude that 
my data display no skewness, but some kurtosis issues. This means that the distribution is 
almost symmetric, but flat (i.e., playtykurtic). Also, the data do not show any 
                                                          
17 Although in this mediation analysis the sequence is SVO to Motivation and then to first contribution, in 
the experiment, I measured SVO first, then first contribution and finally motivation.  
18 If people were asked to evaluate their own behavior in terms of fairness when they overly benefitted from 
an interaction, they tended to avoid to judge themselves as unfair.  Instead, they said “I was fair, but the other 
person gave unfairly (i.e.  too much) to the group account.” It is possible that self-serving bias led people to 
judge their own fairness unreliably.  
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multicollinearity issue. The data satisfied the homoscedasticity assumption in the Konker 
[LM= 9.042, p= .107] test, but violated the homoscedasticity assumption in the Breusch-
Pagan [LM= 12.263, p= .031] test. Consequently, I conducted parametric tests to analyze 
my data.  
Findings 
Partner’s Contribution Effect. I classified the interaction partner as a high-, low-, 
or equal-contributor partner in accordance with the partner’s contribution level and 
dummy-coded the partner’s contribution situations. I ran a linear regression analysis to test 
the partner’s contribution effects on fairness evaluation when statistically controlling for 
the participant’s first contribution. The results from the linear regression were highly 
significant for the equal- and high-contributor partner conditions when the low-contributor 
partner was the reference category [t (high) = 25.509 and t (equal)= 13.273, at the p < .001 
level].  
I also controlled for the participants’ initial contribution (i.e., the first contribution) 
and conducted an ANCOVA test [F (2, 221) = 352.551, p < .001] which was highly 
significant as well. The ANCOVA test result indicates that participants evaluated a low-
contributor partner as more unjust compared to a high- or an equal-contributor partner 
when their own initial contribution was held constant. When perfect fairness equals “4”, 
the means of fairness evaluation were 2.18 (SD= .78) for a low-contributor partner, 3.79 
(SD= .44) for an equal-contributor partner, and 4.53 (SD= .45) for a high-contributor 
partner. The Bonferroni and LSD post-hoc tests were highly significant at the p < .001 level 
for all comparisons. This means that hypothesis 2.1: “Participants will evaluate their 
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interaction with a low-contributor partner as more unjust compared to a high- or an equal-
contributor partner” is strongly supported by the data.  
Framing Effect. I checked whether framing predicted fairness evaluation when 
statistically controlling for the participants’ own and their partner’s contributions. A one-
way ANCOVA test was marginally significant for study name when the participants’ and 
their partner’s initial contributions were statistically controlled [F (1, 222) = 3.812, p = 
.052]. Participants in the community study evaluated the situation as more unfair than 
participants in the stock market study when the participants’ own and their partner’s 
contributions were held constant.  
SVO Effect. I checked whether SVO predicted fairness evaluation when statistically 
controlling for the participants’ own and their partner’s contributions. A one-way 
ANCOVA test was insignificant for SVO when the participants’ and their partner’s first 
contribution variables were statistically controlled [F (1, 222) = .016, p = .901]. 
Individualistic participants did not evaluate the situation as more unfair than prosocial 
participants when the participants’ own and their partner’s contributions were held 
constant.  
First Contribution Effect. From the two ANCOVA tests above (for SVO and 
framing), I found that the participants’ and their partner’s first contribution variables were 
highly significant. Therefore, I investigated whether or not the participants’ own 
contribution predicted fairness evaluation when the partner’s contribution was held 
constant. In other words, I wondered if people giving a lot to the group account were angrier 
than the low-givers. The result from a linear regression analysis reveals that the 
participants’ first contribution was highly significant when their partner’s first contribution 
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was held constant [t = -10.920, p < .001]. This means that the participants’ fairness 
judgment relied on how much they contributed to the group account if their partner’s 
contribution was statistically controlled.  
I also grouped participants as low-givers if they contributed less than 10 points (out 
of 20 points), as moderate-givers if they contributed 10 points, and as high-givers if they 
contributed more than 10 points to the group account in the first round. I used these groups 
for further analyses below.  
Motivation Effect. I also investigated whether or not the participants’ motivation to 
contribute influenced their fairness evaluation. The result from a linear regression analysis 
reveals that the motivation variable was insignificant when the participants’ and their 
partner’s first contribution variables were statistically controlled [t = .204, p=.839]. This 
means that the participants’ fairness judgments did not rely on how much they were 
motivated to contribute to the group account when the participants’ own and their partner’s 
contributions were statistically controlled.  
As can be recalled from the previous section, the motivation predicted the first 
contribution; therefore, I did a mediation analysis, and I found that the motivation variable 
was mediated by the first contribution variable when holding the partner’s contribution 
statistically constant. The indirect effect size was significant (.1042) with a 95% CI 
between .0256 and .1814.  
The conclusion from the previous section highlights, the higher the motivation to 
contribute, the higher the contribution in the first round. Therefore, it is expected that 
participants who were motivated to give to the group account contributed more in the first 
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round. Thus, the effect of motivation was actually indirect and its indirect effects on 
fairness evaluation should be considered. 
First Contribution, Partner’s Contribution Level, Framing and SVO Main Effects 
and Partner’s Contribution Level-Framing Interaction Effect. I conducted a hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis and incorporated multiple predictors. The models are 
summarized in Table 8-2 below.  





 B (SE) 
Intercept 1.780 (.111) **** 1.768 (.118) **** 
Independent Variables:   
- First Contribution .040 (.007) **** .039 (.007) **** 
- High-Contributor Partner 1 2.485 (.097) **** 2.563 (.138) **** 
- Equal-Contributor Partner 1 1.494 (.114) **** 1.464 (.150) **** 
- Community2 -.181 (.081) **  -.151 (.110)  
- Prosocial3 -.002 (.083)  .004 (.083)  
- Community* High-C Partner  -.151 (.188) 
- Community* Equal-C Partner  .086 (.230) 
Omnibus F Tests 143.992**** 102.543****  
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
1 The low-contributor partner situation is the reference category. 
2 The stock market group is the reference category.  
3 The individualistic group is the reference category. 
As can be seen from Model 2 in the previous table, when the interaction between 
framing and the partner’s contribution level was taken into account, the framing effect 
disappeared. However, the interaction was not statistically significant. Therefore, I 
interpret Model 1, and conclude that the participants’ own contribution, their partner’s 
contribution, and framing were important factors in predicting fairness evaluation. This 
means that those who interacted with a low-contributor partner, those who were assigned 
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to the community study, and those who contributed fewer points to the group account 
evaluated the situation as more unfair than others. Although the statement “those who 
contributed fewer points to the group account evaluated the situation as more unfair” does 
not seem accurate, I explain the logic behind this specific situation in the following section 
below. I clarify why those who contributed more evaluated the situation as less unfair than 
those who contributed less to the group account.  
Partitioned Data Analysis. My hypotheses specifically focus on the evaluation of a 
low-contributor vs. a high-contributor partner. Therefore, I partitioned the data by the 
partner’s contribution level (low, high, equal) and did my analyses separately.  
(Framing Effect). When participants interacted with a low-contributor partner, the 
mean fairness value was 2.24 (SD= .77) for the stock market group and 2.13 (SD= .79) for 
the community group. A one-way between-subject ANCOVA result was insignificant for 
differently named conditions when the participants’ initial contribution was held constant 
[F (1, 120) =1.925, p = .168]. The result did not support hypothesis 2.2.a: “Participants in 
the community study will evaluate their interaction with a low-contributor partner as more 
unjust compared to participants in the stock market study.” This indicates that participants 
in the community and stock market studies did feel similar emotional distress when 
interacting with a low-contributor partner.  
When participants interacted with a high-contributor partner, the mean fairness 
value was 4.69 (SD= .35) for the stock market group and 4.38 (SD= .48) for the community 
group. The difference was statistically significant for differently named conditions when 
the participants’ initial contribution was held constant [F (1,62) = 9.096, p = .004]. This 
indicates that participants in the community study did feel less guilty than participants in 
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the stock market study when their partner contributed a lot to the group account. The result 
supports hypothesis 2.2.b: “Participants in the community study will evaluate their 
interaction with a high-contributor partner as more just compared to participants in the 
stock market study.” 
(SVO Effect). Next, I checked the SVO effect on fairness evaluation when the data 
were partitioned by the partner’s contribution level (low, high, equal). When participants 
interacted with a low-contributor partner, the mean fairness value was 2.09 (SD= .81) for 
individualistic participants and 2.27 (SD= .75) for prosocial participants. I hypothesized 
that individualistic participants would be angrier with a low-contributor partner than 
prosocial participants. The mean result shows that individualistic participants were likely 
to be angrier towards low-contributors, but the result from an ANOVA test was not 
statistically significant when the participants’ initial contribution was held constant [F (1, 
120) = .257, p = .613]. The data fail to support hypothesis 2.3.a: “Prosocial participants 
will evaluate their interaction with a low-contributor partner as more unjust compared to 
individualistic participants.” 
When participants interacted with a high-contributor partner, the mean fairness 
value was 4.52 (SD= .42) for individualistic participants and 4.53 (SD= .49) for prosocial 
participants. The result was not significant for SVO when the participants’ initial 
contribution was held constant [F (1, 62) = .405, p = .527]. This means that prosocial 
participants and individualistic participants evaluated the situation very similarly in terms 
of fairness. The data fail to support hypothesis 2.3.b: “Prosocial participants will evaluate 
their interaction with a high-contributor partner as more just compared to individualistic 
participants.” 
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(First Contribution Effect). In addition to the tests of my hypotheses, I checked 
whether or not a participants’ own contribution played an important role in making justice 
judgments, when the data were partitioned by the partner’s contribution level (low, high, 
equal). I used the categorical first contribution variable (i.e. participants categorized as low-
givers, moderate-givers, or high-givers).  
When participants interacted with a high-contributor partner, the mean fairness was 
4.67 (SD= .39) for the low-giver group (who gave less than 10 points), 4.55 (SD= .36) for 
the moderate-giver group (who gave 10 points), and 4.22 (SD= .61) for the high-giver 
group (who gave more than 10 points). A one-way between-subject ANOVA test was 
significant across different levels of givers [F (2, 61) = 4.233), p = .019]. The Tukey HSD 
post-hoc test was highly significant for comparison between the high-giver and the low-
giver groups [ p = .015] and moderately significant between the high-giver and moderate-
giver groups [ p =.071]. This indicates that participants did care how much they gave to the 
group account when their partner gave more than what the participants gave to the group 
account. This means that participants who gave fewer points felt more guilt than others 
when their partner gave more to the group account.  
Likewise, when participants interacted with a low-contributor partner, the mean 
fairness was 2.04 (SD= .64) for the low-giver group, 1.74 (SD= .57) for the moderate-giver 
group, and 2.67 (SD= .75) for the high-giver group. A one-way between-subject ANOVA 
test was highly significant across different levels of givers [F (2, 119) = 24.247), p < .001]. 
The Tukey HSD post-hoc test was highly significant for comparisons between the high-
giver and the low-giver groups [ p < .001] and between the high-giver and moderate-giver 
groups [ p < .001]. This indicates that participants did care how much they gave to the 
120 
group account when their partner gave less than what the participants gave to the group 
account.  
A visualization of the means of the participants’ fairness evaluation across different 
levels of givers is presented in Figure 8-3 below. Two different figures help to compare the 
participants’ fairness evaluations when interacting with a high-contributor partner (the first 
figure) and a low-contributor partner (the second figure).  
 
Figure 8.3: Comparison of Mean Fairness Evaluations When Partner Contributed 
More and Less than Participants 
As can be seen in the first figure, when their partner contributed more than what 
the participants gave to the group account, the lower a participant’s first contribution, the 
higher his/her feelings of guilt. As can be seen from the second figure, when their partner 
contributed less than what the participants gave to the group account, the relationship was 
more complicated. The participants giving a lot were not the angriest ones; actually, their 
justice evaluation was the closest to a fair evaluation (i.e. closest to 4.00 in the scale). 
Participants who gave 10 points (moderate-givers) were the angriest ones to a low-
contributor partner. An explanation for this complicated relationship can also clarify why 
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participants who contributed more evaluated the situation as less unfair than participants 
who contributed less to the group account.  
In the experiment, the program automatically adjusted the partner’s (who was a 
computer-simulated person) points in accordance with what the participant gave to the 
group account minus 10 points and created a low-contributor partner condition. Thus, 
moderate-giver participants and low-giver participants in the low-contributor partner 
conditions always learned that their partner gave “0” to the group account. For instance, if 
a participant gave 10 points to the group account, his/her (low-contributor) partner gave 
“0” and if a participant gave 4 points to the group account, his/her (low-contributor) partner 
gave “0” to the group account. Thus, the bigger the difference between what a participant 
and his/her partner gave to the group account, the stronger the feelings of injustice.  
Consequentially, the high-givers (who gave more than 10 points) were less angry 
than moderate-givers and low-givers. This indicates that having a partner gives “0” was 
perceived as worse than having a partner gives less than what you gave even the differences 
were the same (e.g. 10 points). For instance, if a participant gave 10 points to the group 
account, a low-contributor partner gave “0” and if a participant gave 14 points to the group 
account, a low-contributor partner gave “4” to the group account. The participant who 
interacted with a “0”-contributor partner expressed stronger feelings of injustice than the 
participants who interacted with a low-contributor (i.e. 4 points) partner. Therefore, I 
conclude that interacting with a “0”-contributor partner had significant effects on fairness 
evaluation. Although the difference was the same for previous example, participants 
expressed stronger emotional distress to a “0”-contributor than a low-contributor.  This was 
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why those who gave more than 10 points evaluated the situation as less unfair than those 
who gave 10 points or less than 10 points.  
Overall, the partitioned data and regression analyses strongly support that the 
partner’s contribution level and participant’s own contribution were strong factors in 
predicting the participants’ justice evaluation. Model 1 in Table 8-2 shows that framing 
significantly predicted justice evaluation as well. This implies that the participant’s anger 
to a low contributor partner and guilt for a high contributor partner varied across differently 
named studies when the first contribution variable was statistically controlled. Although 
Model 1 supports both hypotheses 2.2.a and 2.2.b, the partitioned data do not support 
hypothesis 2.2.a, but do support 2.2.b. Additionally, the participant’s motivation was 
another important factor in predicting fairness evaluation, but its indirect effect though first 
contribution should be considered.  
I also claimed that individualistic participants tend to be angrier towards a low-
contributor, and less guilty about a high-contributor. However, these hypotheses are not 
supported by the data. Finally, I found that participants who gave 10 points and less to the 
group account evaluated their partner’s low (i.e. “0” point) contribution as highly unjust 
compared to participants who gave more than 10 points in the first round.  
8.4 CHANGES IN THE SECOND CONTRIBUTION 
In this section, I analyzed one of the subsequent behaviors: changes in the second 
contribution. After reporting their justice or injustice experience, participants were given 
another 20 points whether to keep it for their own personal account or to contribute it to 
the group. I took the difference between their first contribution and second contribution 
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amounts. I assume that a change (which can be an increment, a decrease, or no change) in 
their second contribution will be a response to their justice or injustice experience.  
Data 
The data are slightly non-normal in accordance with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests but, the skewness is = .28 and kurtosis is = 2.95 which indicates that 
the data display no skewness, but some kurtosis issue (i.e. platykurtic). Also, the data 
satisfied the assumption of homoscedasticity in both the Breusch-Pagan [LM= 7.241, p = 
.124] and Konker [LM= 4.774, p = .311] tests. Also, the data do not violate the assumption 
of multicollinearity. Consequently, I conducted parametric tests to analyze the data.  
Findings 
Fairness Evaluation Effect. I checked if fairness evaluation can predict the 
difference between the first and second contributions. I ran a hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis to determine the relationship between changes in the second 
contribution and fairness evaluation when statistically controlling for the participants’ and 
their partner’s first contributions. The results reveal that fairness evaluation significantly 
predicted changes in the second contribution [t= 3.738, p < .001].  
Additionally, I ran a one-way between-subject ANCOVA test by using a 
categorical fairness when statistically controlling for the participants’ initial contribution. 
In the experiment, participants answered four items and three of them were used to create 
a continues fairness variable. In the scale, “4” equals to fairness, values less than “4” refer 
to negatively unfair evaluations, and the values more than “4” refer to positively unfair 
evaluations. To create a categorical fairness variable, I recoded those as the negatively 
unfair group if the continuous fairness variable was less than 4, as the fair group if the 
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continuous fairness variable was 4, as the positively unfair group if the continuous fairness 
variable was more than 4.  
The ANCOVA result was statistically significant for the categorical fairness 
variable when the participants’ initial contribution was held constant [F (2, 221) = 66.371, 
p < 001]. The mean decreased points were -4.48 (SD= 5.81) for those who evaluated the 
situation negatively unjust, 4.58 (SD= 3.84) for those who evaluated the situation 
positively unjust, and .46 (SD= 4.37) for those who evaluated the situation just. A planned 
contrast test shows that comparisons between the negatively unfair and fair groups and 
between the negatively unfair and positively unfair groups were significantly whereas 
between the fair and positively unfair groups was not significantly associated.   
 From the ANCOVA test, I also generated Figure 8-4 below showing the estimated 
marginal means for changes in the second contribution by different fairness evaluations.  
 
Figure 8.4: Estimated Marginal Means for Changes in the Second Contribution19 
                                                          
19 Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: first contribution = 11.85. 
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All these test results show that participants who experienced stronger negative 
injustice decreased their second contribution while participants who experienced positive 
injustice increased their second contribution compared to participants who experienced 
justice. Thus, the data support hypothesis 3.1.a: “Participants who experience negative 
injustice will give fewer points in the second round compared to those who experience 
positive injustice and justice” and hypothesis 3.1.b: “Participants who experience positive 
injustice will give more points in the second round compared to those who experience 
negative injustice and justice.” 
Framing Effect. I ran a one-way between-subject ANCOVA test by controlling the 
participants’ and their partner’s first contributions and the result was insignificant across 
differently named conditions [F (1, 222) = .441, p = .507].  
SVO Effect. I ran a one-way between-subject ANCOVA test by controlling the 
participants’ and their partner’s first contributions and the result was highly significant for 
SVO [F (1, 222) = 8.601, p = .004]. The mean decreased points were -1.84 for 
individualistic participants and -1.04 for prosocial participants. This indicates that 
individualistic participants decreased their second contribution more than prosocial 
participants when statistically controlling for the participants’ and their partner’s initial 
contributions.  
Framing-SVO Interaction Effect. I also checked whether SVO and framing had an 
interaction effect on changes in the second contribution when the participant’s and their 
partner’s first contributions were held constant. I ran a two-way ANCOVA test and found 
a significant interaction effect. I summarized the ANCOVA test results in Table 8-3 below. 
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Table 8.3: Two-factorial ANCOVA Results for Changes in the Second Contribution 
 F P-Value 
Control Variables:   
- Participant’s First Contribution 153.736 <. 0001 
- Partner’s First Contribution 177.770 <. 0001 
Independent Variables:   
- Study Name .430 .186 
- SVO  8.684 .004 
- Study Name*SVO 4.533 .034 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
I also generated a graph to visualize the estimated marginal means of changes in 
the second contribution by study name and SVO (See Figure 8-5 below). 
 
Figure 8.5: Estimated Marginal Means of Changes in the Second Contribution20 
                                                          
20 Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: participant’s first contribution = 
11.85, partner’s first contribution = 9.53. 
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When the participants’ and their partner’s contributions were held constant, the 
interaction of SVO and framing was significant. This indicates the main effects cannot be 
trusted to reach a valid result; the interaction should be interpreted. As can be seen from 
Figure 8-5 and Table 8-3, the interaction effect implies that prosocial and individualistic 
participants in the stock market study were more likely to decrease their second 
contribution similarly.  
However, in the community study individualistic participants were likely to 
decrease their second contribution more than prosocial participants in the community 
study. This means for some reasons, SVO was not effective in the stock market study while 
very effective in the community study in predicting changes in the second contribution. In 
the community study, prosocial participants were more likely to forgive their partner and 
decreased their second contribution very little while individualistic participants were likely 
to punish their partner by decreasing their second contribution a lot. Unlike the community 
study, the results show that in the stock market individualistic and prosocial participants 
changed their second contribution very similarly.  
First Contribution, Partner’s Contribution Level, Framing, SVO Main Effects and 
SVO-Framing Interaction Effect. Next, I created models to analyze changes in the second 
contribution. I ran a hierarchical multiple regression analysis and incorporated multiple 












 B (SE) 
Intercept -2.637 (.830) *** -1.925 (.883) ** 
Independent Variables:   
- First Contribution -.261 (.052) **** -.264 (.052) **** 
- High-Contributor Partner 1 8.933 (.720) **** 8.850 (.715) **** 
- Equal-Contributor Partner 1 6.472 (.853) **** 6.539 (.846) **** 
- Community2 -.405 (.608)  -1.731(.847) **  
- Prosocial3 1.695 (.619) **  .353 (.860)   
- Prosocial*Community   2.671 (1.199) ** 
Omnibus F Tests 47.096**** 40.786**** 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
1 The low-contributor partner situation is the reference category. 
2 The stock market group is the reference category.  
3 The individualistic group is the reference category. 
As can be seen from Model 2, there was a clear interaction between framing and 
SVO. Consistent with the ANCOVA analysis (See Table 8-3 and Figure 8-5 above), Model 
2 indicates that those individualistic participants who were assigned in the community 
study changed their second contribution more than others. Also, Model 2 specifies that 
those who contributed little in the first round and those who interacted with a high- or 
equal-contributor partners were likely to change their second contribution more than 
others.  
First Contributions, Fairness Evaluation, Framing, SVO Main Effects and SVO-
Framing Interaction Effect. In addition to the analysis above, I ran a hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis and incorporated multiple predictors and summarized my models in 










 B (SE) 
Intercept -4.241 (1.558) **  -3.508 (1.590) ** 
Independent Variables:   
- Participant’s First Contribution -.533 (.066) **** -.535 (.065) **** 
- Partner’s First Contribution  .258 (.080) *** .262 (.080) ****  
- Fairness  1.860 (.501) **** 1.809 (.498) ****  
- Community1 -.105 (.591) -1.279 (.830) 
- Prosocial2 1.784 (.599) *** .619 (.833)  
- Community*Prosocial  2.331 (1.166) ** 
Omnibus F Tests 52.712**** 445.197**** 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
1 The stock market group is the reference category.  
2 The individualistic group is the reference category. 
As can be seen from model 2, there was a clear moderating effect. The interaction 
between framing and SVO variables was significant which means that interaction should 
be interpreted. Model 2 also indicates that those who contributed less in the first round, 
those whose partners contributed more in the first round, and those who evaluated the 
situation as fair or positively unfair changed their second contribution more than others. 
These findings are also consistent with the previous multiple regression analysis findings 
as well (See Table 8-4). 
Partitioned Data Analysis. In order to specify the changes in the second 
contribution, I partitioned the data in terms of the partner’s contribution level (low, equal, 
high).  
(Framing Effect). The results for the framing variable were insignificant for the low 
[F (1, 120) = .384, p= .537], equal [F (1, 36) =1.498, p = .229] and high [F (1, 62) = .001, 
p = .981] conditions. This indicates hypothesis 3.2.a: “The community group will reduce 
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points given in the second round more as compared to the stock market group” (when 
participants interacted with a low-contributor partner) and the hypothesis 3.2.b: “The 
community group will increase points given in the second round less as compared to the 
stock market group” (when participants interacted with a high-contributor partner) are not 
supported by the data. The result indicates that participants in the community and stock 
market groups changed their second contribution very similarly as response to their 
interaction with a high-, low-, or equal-contributor partner.  
Although the results were not statistically significant, when participants interact 
with a low contributor, the community group decreased their second contribution slightly 
more than the stock market group (M= -5.54 points, SD= 4.91 vs. M= -4.95, SD= 5.578). 
This result implies consistency with the hypothesis 3.2.a, but the difference was not 
statistically significant. Hypothesis 3.2.b was not supported at all. When interacting with a 
high-contributor partner, the mean increased points was 4.47 (SD= 3.441) for stock market 
group and 4.44 (SD= 4.925) for the community group. This indicates that the increment in 
the second contribution was very similar between the community and stock market groups.   
(SVO Effect). Next, I checked if SVO was significant across different groups (low, 
high, equal). SVO was a strong predictor only in the low contribution situation in analyzing 
the changes in the second contribution. Individualistic participants decreased their points 
(M=-6.36, SD= 5.37) more than prosocial participants (M= 4.15 SD= 4.91) when 
interacting with a low-contributor partner. The difference was statistically significant. [F 
(1, 120) = 5.638, p= .019]. The result shows that hypothesis 3.3.a: “Individualistic 
participants will reduce points given in the second round more as compared to prosocial 
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participants” (when participants interacted with a low-contributor partner) is supported 
by the data.  
When interacting with a high-contributor partner, the mean increased points was 
4.14 (SD= 4.36) for individualistic and 4.89 (SD= 4.16) for prosocial participants, but the 
difference was not statistically significant [F (1, 62) = .484, p = .489]. This indicates that 
hypothesis 3.3.b: “Individualistic participants will increase point given in the second round 
less as compared to prosocial participants” (when participants interacted with a high-
contributor partner) was not supported by the data.  
(First Contribution). In addition to the analyses testing hypotheses, I also checked 
whether the participants’ first contribution level affected their changes in the second round 
when the data portioned by their partner’s contribution level. The results from a linear 
regression analysis for first contribution were significant for the low [t= -2.586, p= .011], 
equal [t= -3.999, p < .001] and high [t= -1.956, p= .055] conditions. The result reveals that 
when interacting with a low-contributor partner, participants who gave a lot to the group 
account in the first round decreased their second contribution more than participants who 
gave little to the group account in the first round (M = -6.06, SD= 6.27 vs. M= -2.50, SD= 
3.36 respectively). When interacting with a high-contributor partner, participants who gave 
a lot to the group account in the first round increased their second contribution less than 
participants who gave little to the group account in the first round (M = 2.08, SD= 2.39 vs. 
M= 5.29, SD= 5.31 respectively).  
Overall, the results show that the best predictors for a decrease or an increment in 
the second contribution were the participants’ and their partner’s first contributions, 
fairness evaluations, and the interaction of SVO and framing variables.  
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8.5 TENDENCY TO CHANGE PARTNER 
Second justice-restoring attempt measure is the participants’ tendency to change 
partners for future rounds. After submitting their second contribution, participants were 
asked to what extent they would prefer to switch their partners and work with a different 
person for future rounds. Participants ranked their preference to end the relationship with 
their unjust partners (7-point Likert scale). The scale ranged from 1= no preference to 
switch partner, 4= moderate preference to switch partner, and 7= strong preference to 
switch partner.  
 Data 
The data are slightly non-normal in accordance with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests. However, the skewness is = .79 and kurtosis is = - 4.00 which indicates 
that the data have no skewness, but some kurtosis issues (i.e. paltykurtic). The data satisfied 
the assumptions of homoscedasticity in both the Breusch-Pagan [LM= 3.623, p = .605] and 
Konker [LM= 4.290, p= .508] tests. The data also satisfy the assumption of 
multicollinearity. Consequently, I conducted parametric tests to analyze my data.  
Findings 
Fairness Evaluation Effect. I ran a hierarchical multiple regression analysis to 
determine the relationship between the tendency to change partners and fairness evaluation 
when statistically controlling for the participants’ and their partner’s first contributions. 
The results reveal that fairness evaluation significantly predicted the participant’s 
willingness to switch partner [t =-5.092, p < .001].  
I also ran an ANCOVA test by using the categorical fairness variable when 
controlling for the participants’ and their partner’s initial contribution. The ANCOVA 
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results were significant [F (2, 221) = 5.929, p = .003]. The mean tendency to change 
partners was 4.50 (SD= 1.81) for those who evaluated the situation negatively unjust, 2.35 
(SD= 1.54) for those who evaluated the situation positively unjust, and 1.86 (SD= 1.16) 
for those who evaluated the situation just. The LSD post-hoc test was significant for 
comparisons between the negatively unjust and just groups [ p = 001] and between the 
negatively unjust and positively unjust [ p = .045] groups. This means that participants who 
experienced stronger negative injustice were more willing to quit relationship than others.  
From the ANCOVA test, I also generated Figure 8-6 for a visual below showing 
that the estimated marginal means for the tendency to change partner by different justice 
evaluation categories.  
 
Figure 8.6: Estimated Marginal Means for Tendency to Change Partner21 
                                                          
21 Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: partner’s first contribution= 9.53, 
participant’s first contribution = 11.85. 
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From these analyses, I conclude that the data support hypothesis 4.1.a: 
“Participants who experience negative injustice will be more willing to change partner 
compared to those who experience positive injustice and justice.” However, the result 
partially supports hypothesis 4.1.b: “Participants who experience positive injustice will be 
less willing to change partner compared to those who experience negative injustice and 
justice.”  
Unlike my prediction, those who experienced positive injustice were more willing 
to change their partners compared to participants who experienced justice. However, the 
difference was insignificant. Consequently, the data clearly support that who experienced 
negative injustice were more willing to change partners than those who experienced 
positive injustice.  
Framing Effect. To analyze the framing effect on the tendency to change partners, 
I ran a one-way between-subject ANCOVA test by controlling the participants’ and their 
partner’s first contributions. The result was insignificant across differently named 
conditions [F (1, 222) = .036, p = .851].  
SVO Effect. To analyze the SVO effect on the tendency to change partners, I ran a 
one-way between-subject ANCOVA test by controlling the participants’ and their partner’s 
first contributions. The result was insignificant for SVO [F (1, 222) = .007, p = .934].  
Partner’s Contribution Level Effect. I ran a hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis in order to determine whether or not their partner’s contribution level predicted 
the participants’ tendency to change partners for future rounds. The results for both the 
high-contribution [t high = -9.850, p < .05] and equal-contribution [t equal = -6.305, p < 05] 
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situations22 were significant when the participants’ first contribution was statistically 
controlled. This indicates that those who interacted with a low-contributor partner were 
more willing to change their partners than those who interacted with a high- or an equal-
contributor partner.  
Partitioned Data Analysis. Since my hypotheses specifically focus on high- and 
low-contributor partner situations, I also partitioned the data in terms of the partner’s 
contribution levels (low, high, equal).  
(Framing Effect). A one-way between-subject ANOVA test results for framing 
were insignificant for the low [F (1, 120) = .348, p = .557], high [F (1, 62) = .040, p = .842], 
and equal [F (1, 36) = 1.762, p = .193] conditions. The result from the partitioned data and 
the previous ANCOVA tests do not support hypothesis 4.2.a: “The tendency to change a 
low-contributor partner will be greater in the community group compared to the stock 
market group” and hypothesis 4.2.b: “The tendency to change a high-contributor partner 
will be lower in the community group compared to the stock market group.” The 
participants’ tendency to change partners was not predicted by the framing variable.  
(SVO Effect). I also checked whether or not SVO has any effect when the data 
partitioned by the partner’s contribution level (low, high, equal). A one-way between-
subject ANOVA test results were insignificant for the low [F (1, 120) = .088, p = .767], 
high [F (1, 62) = 1.066, p = .306], and equal [F (1, 36) = 2.130, p = .153] conditions. The 
result from the partitioned data and the previous ANCOVA tests do not support hypothesis 
4.3.a: “The tendency to change a low-contributor partner will be greater for individualistic 
participants compared to prosocial participants” and hypothesis 4.3.b: “The tendency to 
                                                          
22 The low contribution situation is the reference group. 
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change a high-contributor partner will be lower for individualistic participants compared 
to prosocial participants.” The participants’ tendency to change partners was not predicted 
by the SVO variable.  
First Contribution, Partner’s Contribution Level, Framing, SVO, Fairness Main 
Effects and SVO-Fairness Interaction Effect. I ran a hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis incorporating multiple predictors and summarized the models in Table 8-6 below. 






 B (SE) 
Model 3 
 B (SE) 
Intercept 5.709 (.298) ****  7.146 (.420) **** 6.570 (.467) **** 
Independent Variables:    
- First Contribution  -.097 (.019) **** -.065 (.019) **** -.057 (.019) *** 
- High-Cont. Partner 1 -2.535 (.259) **** -.529 (.497) -.381 (.493)  
- Equal-Cont. Partner 1 -1.906 (.306) **** -.700 (.391) * -.632 (.386)   
- Community2 .039 (.218)  -.107(.211)  -.077 (.208)  
- Prosocial3 .015 (.222)  .014 (.212)  -.305 (.241)   
- Fairness  -.807 (.173) **** -.672 (.178) **** 
- Prosocial*Fairness   -.539 (.202) *** 
Omnibus F Tests 25.434 **** 26.824**** 24.658**** 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
1 The low-contributor partner situation is the reference category. 
2 The stock market group is the reference category.  
3 The individualistic group is the reference category. 
As can be seen from Model 2 and Model 3, when fairness evaluation was taken into 
account, the partner’s contribution level variable became insignificant. This indicates that 
fairness evaluation played a mediator role in this model. As can be recalled from the 
previous analyses, the partner’s contribution level variable significantly predicted the 
participants’ fairness evaluation and also tendency to change their partner. Fairness also 
predicted the participants’ tendency to change partner. Therefore, I conclude that the 
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partner’s contribution had indirect effect on the tendency to change partner. The indirect 
effect size was -1.1576 with a 95% CI between -1.4031 and -.9121.  
Model 3 shows that there was an interaction between SVO and fairness evaluation. 
This specifies that prosocial participants who evaluated the situation as fair or positively 
unfair were less willing to change their partners than others. Model 3 also demonstrates 
that participants who contributed less in the first round and participants who evaluated the 
situation as negatively unfair were more likely to change their partners for future rounds.  
Partitioned Data Analysis. To analyze the interaction between fairness evaluation 
and SVO, I partitioned the data by (categorical) fairness evaluation and checked the SVO 
effect on the tendency to change partners. However, the results were insignificant for those 
who evaluated the situation negatively unjust [F (1, 130) = .002, p = .962] and for those 
who evaluated the situation positively unjust [F (1, 53) = 1.113, p = .296]. The partitioned 
data did not provide enough support for the interaction of SVO and fairness evaluation.  
Overall, the data shows that the first contribution, fairness evaluation, and the 
interaction of SVO and fairness were important factors in predicting the tendency to change 
partners. Those who evaluated the situation as unfair were more likely to change their 
partners compared to those who evaluated the situation as fair or positively unfair. This 
means that hypotheses 4.1.a fully and 4.1.b (partially) are supported by the data. However, 
hypotheses 4.2.a and 4.2.b are not supported by the data. This indicates that participants in 
the community group were not more willing to change their partners compared to the stock 
market group. Finally, hypotheses 4.3.a and 4.3.b were not supported by the data. This 
indicates that individualistic participants were not more willing to change their partners 
than prosocial participants. The result also shows that the first contribution and fairness 
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were highly significant predictors, and there was a significant interaction between SVO 
and fairness which should be taken into consideration. The interaction indicates that 
prosocial participants who evaluated the situation as positively unfair and as fair were less 
likely to change their partners for future rounds compared to others. Finally, the partner’s 
contribution had indirect effect on the tendency to change partners. 
8.6 WILLINGNESS TO SHARE GROUP BONUS 
The third justice-restoring attempt measure is the shared bonus points with partner. 
Participants were told that they were selected to distribute a group bonus (10 points) and 
they were free to send any amount of them to their partner or keep all of them for 
themselves. They sent any amount of 10 points (i.e. group bonus) to their partner and the 
rest automatically added to their personal account. In essence, I took how many points (out 
of 10 bonus points) participants shared with their partner to measure their willingness to 
share group bonus with their partner.     
 Data 
The data are slightly non-normal in accordance with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests, but the skewness is = 4.80 and kurtosis is = .41. This indicates that the 
data display some skewness, but no kurtosis issues. The data violate the assumptions of 
homoscedasticity, but satisfy the assumption of multicollinearity. Consequently, I ran 
parametric tests to analyze my data. 
Findings 
Fairness Evaluation Effect. I checked if fairness evaluation can predict the shared 
bonus points. I ran a hierarchical multiple regression analysis in order to determine the 
relationship between the shared points and fairness evaluation when statistically 
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controlling for the participants’ and their partner’s first contributions. The results reveal 
that fairness evaluation was significantly associated with the participant’s decision to share 
group bonus with partner [t =2.839, p = .005].  
Additionally, I ran a one-way between-subject ANOVA test by using the 
categorical fairness variable. and the result was significant [F (2, 221) = 14.482, p < 001]. 
The mean shared points were 2.07 (SD= 2.58) for those who evaluated the situation 
negatively unjust, 4.22 (SD= 3.08) for those who evaluated the situation positively unjust, 
and 4.08 (SD= 3.48) for those who evaluated the situation just. The Tukey HSD test was 
significant for comparisons between the negatively unjust and just groups [p = .001] and 
between the negatively unjust and positively unjust [ p < .001] groups.  
From the ANOVA test, I also generated Figure 8-7 below showing the means of 
shared bonus points with partner by different justice evaluation categories. 
 
Figure 8.7: Means Plot for Shared Bonus with Partner 
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These results demonstrate that participants who experienced stronger negative 
injustice shared fewer points and participants who experienced positive injustice shared 
more points with their partners compared to participants who experienced justice. This 
indicates that the data support hypothesis 5.1.a: “Participants who experience negative 
injustice will give fewer points to partner compared to those who experience positive 
injustice and justice” and partially support hypothesis 5.1.b: “Participants who experience 
positive injustice will give more points to partner compared to those who experience 
negative injustice and justice.” 
From the analyses, I completed so far, I claim that participants who experienced 
positive injustice shared more points with their partners as compared to participants who 
experienced negative injustice. The difference between justice and positive injustice was 
not statically significant to support hypothesis 5.1.b fully.  
Framing Effect. I ran a one-way between-subject ANCOVA test to determine the 
relationship between the framing and sharing bonus with partner variables. The result was 
insignificant for differently named conditions when statistically controlling for the 
participants’ and their partner’s first contributions [F (1, 222) = .300, p = .584].  
SVO Effect. I ran a one-way between-subject ANCOVA test to determine the 
relationship between SVO and sharing bonus with partner when the participants’ and their 
partner’s first contributions were held constant. The result was highly significant for SVO 
when statistically controlling for the participants’ and their partner’s first contributions [F 
(1, 222) = 9.575, p = .002]. The mean shared points were 2.25 (SD= 2.74) for individualistic 
participants and 3.61 (SD= 3.18) for prosocial participants. This indicates that prosocial 
participants were more likely to share more points with their partner than individualistic 
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participants when statistically controlling for the participants’ and their partner’s first 
contributions.  
Framing-SVO Interaction Effect. I also checked if SVO and framing had an 
interaction effect when controlling for the participants’ and their partner’s first 
contributions. I ran a two-way ANCOVA test and summarized the models in Table 8-7 
below.   
Table 8.7: Two-factorial ANCOVA Results for Shared Bonus with Partner 
 F P-Value 
Control Variables:   
- Participant’s First Contribution .019 .891 
- Partner’s First Contribution 35.233 <. 0001 
Independent Variables:   
- Study Name .293 .589 
- SVO  9.828 .002 
- Study Name*SVO 8.148 .005 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
As can be seen from Table 8-7, the interaction of SVO and framing was significant 
when the participants’ and their partner’s first contributions were held constant. Thus, the 
interaction should be interpreted. Also, the SVO variable was still significant in predicting 
the shared bonus points.  
 I also generated a graph (See Figure 8-8 below) in order to visualize the estimated 




Figure 8.8: Estimated Marginal Means of Shared Bonus with Partner23 
Figure 8-8 demonstrates that the interaction effect implies that prosocial 
participants and individualistic participants in the stock market study were more likely to 
share similar points with their partners. However, in the community study, individualistic 
participants were likely to give fewer points to their partners than prosocial participants. 
This means for some reasons, SVO was not effective in the stock market study while very 
effective in the community study in predicting the shared bonus with partner. 
                                                          
23 Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: participant’s first contribution = 
11.85, partner’s first contribution = 9.53. 
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First Contribution, Partner’s Contribution Level, Framing, SVO Main Effects and 
SVO-Framing Interaction Effect. Next, I ran a hierarchical multiple regression analysis and 
summarized my models in Table 8-8 below. 





 B (SE) 
Intercept .009 (.499)  .551 (.526) 
Independent Variables:   
- First Contribution .124 (.0310) **** .122 (.031) **** 
- High-Contributor Partner 1 2.643 (.433) **** 2.579 (.426) **** 
- Equal-Contributor Partner 1 1.398 (.513) *** 1.449 (.505) *** 
- Community2 -.235 (.365)  -1.247(.505) **  
- Prosocial3 1.149 (.372) ***  .126 (.513)   
- Prosocial*Community   2.037 (.715) *** 
Omnibus F Tests 12.302**** 11.938**** 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
1 The low-contributor partner situation is the reference category. 
2 The stock market group is the reference category.  
3 The individualistic group is the reference category. 
As can be seen from Model 2, there was a clear interaction between the framing 
and SVO variables. This indicates that those prosocial participants who were assigned in 
the community study shared more points with their partner than others. Also, Model 2 
specifies that those who contributed a lot in the first round and those who interacted with 
a high- or equal-contributor partners were likely share more bonus points with their partner 
than others.  
Partitioned Data Analysis. In order to analyze the participants’ willingness to share 
the bonus points, I partitioned the data by the partner’s contribution level (low, equal, high).  
(Framing Effect). The results for the framing variable were insignificant for the low 
[F (1, 120) = .227, p= .635], equal [F (1, 36) =.432, p = .515] and high [F (1, 62) = .239, p 
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= .627] conditions. This indicates that the data do not support hypothesis 5.2.a: 
“Participants in the community group will share fewer points with a low-contributor 
partner than participants in the stock market group” and hypothesis 5.2.b: “Participants 
in the community group will share fewer points with a high-contributor partner than 
participants in the stock market group.” The result indicates that participants in the 
community and stock market groups shared similar bonus points with their partner.  
(SVO Effect). Next, I checked if SVO was significant across different groups (low, 
high, equal). SVO was a strong factor in the low- and high-contribution conditions in 
predicting the participants’ willingness to share bonus points with partner. Individualistic 
participants shared 1.28 points (SD= 1.90) and prosocial participants 2.74 (SD= 2.74) when 
interacting with a low-contributor partner. The difference was statistically significant [F 
(1, 120) = 11.697, p= .001]. The result shows that hypothesis 5.3.a: “Individualistic 
participants will share fewer points with a low-contributor partner than prosocial 
participants” is supported by the data. Similarly, in a high-contribution condition, 
individualistic participants shared 3.19 points (SD= 2.81) and prosocial participants 5.41 
(SD= 3.27) when interacting with a high-contributor partner. The difference was 
statistically significant [F (1, 62) = 8.470, p= .005]. The result shows that hypothesis 5.3.b: 
“Individualistic participants will share fewer points with a high-contributor partner than 
prosocial participants” is supported by the data.  
First Contributions, Fairness Evaluation, Framing, SVO Main Effects and SVO-
Framing Interaction Effect. Additionally, I ran a hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
and incorporated multiple predictors and summarized my models in Table 8-9 below.  
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 B (SE) 
Intercept 1.072 (.447)  -1.313 (.955)  -.700 (.966)  
Independent Variables:    
- Participant’s FirstCont .003 (.033) .069 (.040) * .068 (.040) * 
- Partner’s FirstCont  .141 (.024) ****  .019 (.049)  .022 (.049)  
- Community1 -.194 (.365) -.061 (.362) -1.043 (.505) ** 
- Prosocial2 1.149 (.373) *** 1.142 (.367) *** .167 (.506)  
- Fairness  .864 (.307) *** .821 (.303) ***  
- Community*Prosocial   1.951 (.708) *** 
Omnibus F Tests 14.400**** 13.470**** 12.828**** 
* = p ≤ .10, ** = p ≤ .05, *** = p ≤ .01, **** = p ≤ .001. 
1 The stock market group is the reference category.  
2 The individualistic group is the reference category. 
As can be seen from Model 2, there was a clear moderating effect. The interaction 
between framing and SVO was significant which means that interaction should be 
interpreted to reach a valid result. The interaction indicates that those prosocial participants 
who were assigned to the community study were likely to share more points with their 
partners. Model 2 also indicates that those who evaluated the situation as fair or positively 
unfair shared more points with their partners than those who evaluated the situation as 
negatively unfair. It is expected that when participants feel a situation was fair or they 
benefitted unfairly from the situation, they compensate their partners by sharing the group 
points with their partners.  
Overall, the results show that the best factors in analyzing the participants’ 
willingness to share group points with partner were the participants’ first contribution, their 
partner’s contribution level, fairness evaluation, and the interaction of SVO and framing 
variables. I conclude that my hypothesis claiming that community group would give less 
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bonus points to partner is not supported by the data. Actually, prosocial participants located 
in the community study gave more bonus points to their partners.  
8.7 DISCUSSION 
The experimental data support hypotheses 1.2, 2.1, 2.2b, 3.1a, 3.1b, 3.3a, 4.1a, 4.1b, 
5.1a, 5.1b, 5.3a, and 5.3b. The remaining hypotheses are not supported by the data. Some 
results show that behaviors were actually the opposite of what I had predicted in some 
conditions. Inconsistent results either showing that the relationship was more complicated 
than predicted or showing that the manipulations did not work the way I assumed they 
would. I summarize my findings from the experimental data analyses through a diagram in 
Figure 8-9 below. 
 
Figure 8.9: Experiment Findings (Note: Indirect relationships illustrated with 
dotted arrows. Mixed colors refer to interactions.) 
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First Contribution. The results from the experimental study for the first 
contribution variable are consistent with the vignette study. Despite the findings of some 
previous studies (e.g., Ellingsen et al. 2012; Liberman et al. 2004), the results show that 
unconditional contributions, i.e. first contributions, to the group account did not vary across 
different social frames (for similar examples, see Bernold, Gsottbauer, Ackermann, et al. 
2014; Brandts and Schwieren 2009; Dufwenberg et al. 2011). As consistent with the 
vignette findings, the experiment results show that different titles did not lead participants 
to contribute certain contribution amounts (e.g. high, low) in the first round. This also 
suggests that different titles did not create different expectations for contribution in an 
experimental setting as well as a hypothetical vignette setting. In conclusion, the 
community study and the stock market study titles did not create a high and low 
contribution expectation respectively.  
From both the experiment and vignette studies, I conclude that the stock market (in 
the experiment) or the Wall Street (in the vignette) title may have induced members to 
contribute to the group account to gain more points and may have encouraged them to not 
be generous but strategic to gain the most points. On the other hand, the community title 
may have encouraged them to contribute to the group account for collective gain and may 
have encouraged them to be not strategic but generous to gain most points. Although their 
motives to contribute (e.g. strategic vs. generous) were different, both groups’ members 
contributed similar amounts in the first round and thus expected similar contributions from 
their partner.  
Although framing was a not significant predictor, I found that SVO was a very 
strong predictor in analyzing the first contribution in both vignette and experimental 
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studies. The results for SVO confirm the previous findings as well (e.g., Balliet et al. 2009; 
De Dreu and Van Lange 1995; Van Lange and Kuhlman 1994; Van Lange and Liebrand 
1991). Therefore, I conclude that only SVO predicted the variation in the first contribution 
variable. Prosocial participants were likely to give more money to the group account than 
individualistic participants in both the vignette and experiment.  
In the experiment, I checked whether motivation to contribute to the group account 
had any effect on first contribution. The motivation variable mediated the SVO variable in 
predicting the first contribution. The mediation analysis provides a more detailed 
explanation for the relationship between SVO and the first contribution. The mediation 
analysis shows that SVO had direct and indirect effects on the first contribution. 
Consequently, prosocial participants were more likely to be motivated to contribute to the 
group account and they did contribute more than individualistic participants.  
Fairness Evaluation. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Jasso 1980; Sweeney 
1990), participants experienced stronger emotional distress when they interacted with a 
low-contributor partner compared to an equal- or a high-contributor partner. The data 
support all my justice hypotheses. Additionally, this dissertation adds the framing and SVO 
effects on fairness evaluation 
I predicted that the community frame would create a high contribution expectation; 
thus, those in the community group would be angrier for their partner’s low contribution, 
but would not express strong guilt for their partner’s high contribution. Meanwhile, the 
stock market frame would create a low contribution expectation; thus, those in the stock 
market group would feel less anger for their partner’s low contribution, but would express 
strong guilt for their partner’s high contribution. This means that because of a high 
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contribution expectation, the community group would express stronger negative injustice 
than the stock market group, and the stock market group would express stronger positive 
injustice than the community group. 
A model combined with the participants’ first contribution, their partner’s first 
contribution, SVO, and framing variables shows that all these factors, except SVO, 
predicted the participants’ fairness evaluation. Although SVO was very effective on the 
first contribution, it was insignificant in the model predicting fairness evaluation. The result 
for SVO is consistent with the vignette result as well. Overall, the results imply that those 
who interacted with a low-contributor partner, those who contributed fewer points to the 
group account, and those who were assigned to the community study evaluated the 
situation as more unfair than others. In this model, the result supports my predictions for 
framing. 
 Since framing was a significant predictor in the model incorporated multiple 
factors, I partitioned the data by the participants’ contribution level to test the specific 
hypotheses for negative and positive injustice experiences. As supported by the partitioned 
data analysis, participants in the community study did feel less guilty than participants in 
the stock market study when their partner contributed a lot to the group account. However, 
the partitioned data analysis does not support that participants in the community study did 
feel stronger emotional distress than participants in the stock market when interacting with 
a low-contributor partner. Additionally, the results from the vignette also show that 
participants in different conditions evaluated their partner’s low contributions similarly.  
Overall, the experimental results imply that the participant’s anger to a low-
contributor partner did not vary across different groups but, the participants’ guilt for a 
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high-contributor partner varied across differently named studies when the data partitioned. 
Specifically, participants in the stock market study expressed stronger positive injustice 
towards their positively unjust partners than participants in the community study. 
Consequently, from the experimental results, I conclude that the predictive power of the 
framing variable is significant in positively unjust situations, but not in negatively unjust 
situations. 
As can remembered from the vignette study, fairness evaluation was predicted by 
only the interaction of the framing and participants’ first contribution variables. 
Specifically, participants in the Wall Street group evaluated fairness according to how 
much they gave to the group account. However, this interaction was not confirmed by the 
experimental data. Participants in the experimental setting did care how much they gave to 
the group account, how much their partner gave to the group account, and which study 
(stock market or community) they were assigned to. However, the relationship between 
framing and fairness evaluation is complex; therefore, in addition to the framing variable, 
the participants’ own and their partner’s contributions should be considered in a prediction 
model. 
Changes in the Second Contribution. I predicted in my hypotheses, that those who 
experienced negative injustice would contribute less than others, and those who 
experienced positive injustice would contribute more than others in the second round. The 
results show that the fairness evaluation significantly predicts the second contribution 
behaviors. However, when I created a model and incorporated multiple predictors, I found 
that the participants’ own and their partner’s contributions, fairness evaluation, and the 
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interaction between framing and SVO variables are significant factors in predicting the 
changes in the second contribution.  
It is expected that when participants do not know their partner, they may contribute 
generously to the group fund in the first round (for similar examples, see Bernold, 
Gsottbauer, Ackermann, et al. 2014; Brandts and Schwieren 2009; Dufwenberg et al. 2011). 
However, after learning their partner’s contribution, the participants’ subsequent 
contribution, the second contribution to the group account may change as response to their 
experience. The model combined with multiple predictors supports this idea. The model 
shows that the participants’ own and their partner’s contributions, and fairness evaluation 
predict the second contribution behaviors. Additionally, the model specifies that framing 
moderates the SVO effect on changes in the second contribution. This means that SVO was 
effective only in the community study, but not in the stock market study. 
To be able see the changes in the second contribution as results of negative and 
positive injustice experiences, I partitioned the data by the partner’s contribution levels. 
The result for framing indicates that participants in the community and stock market groups 
changed their second contribution similarly as response to their interaction with a high-, 
low-, or equal-contributor partner. I predicted that when interacting with a low-contributor 
partner, the community group would reduce their second contribution more than the stock 
market group and when interacting with a high-contributor partner, the community group 
would increase their second contribution less than the stock market group. The results do 
not support my predictions, and framing did not influence their second contribution at all.  
The result from the partitioned data for SVO indicates that individualistic 
participants reduced their second contribution more than prosocial participants because of 
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their interaction with a low-contributor partner, but prosocial participants did not increase 
their second contribution more than individualistic participants because of their interaction 
with a high-contributor partner. Additionally, the interaction of SVO and framing was still 
significant across different groups. This indicates that SVO was a significant factor in the 
community group in predicting the changes in the second contribution, but not in the stock 
market group. Individualistic participants in the community study did change their second 
contribution more than prosocial participants. The difference between individualistic and 
prosocial participants disappeared in the stock market study. This result also confirms 
Bernold et al.’s research. Bernold et al (Bernold et al. 2014)’s research shows that SVO is 
not a significant indicator in the Wall Street group (for a one-shot public goods dilemma 
game).24  
From the previous vignette study, the fairness, first contribution, and framing 
variables were important factors in predicting the changes in the second contribution as 
well as the experiment. The SVO effect was indirect (through first contribution) in the 
vignette, and the SVO effect was moderated by framing in the experimental study. The 
vignette results show that though the Wall Street frame did not lead participants to evaluate 
the situation as more unfair, the feelings of injustice in the Wall Street task led participants 
to decrease their second contribution more than other groups. This effect disappeared in 
the experiment, and framing influences changes in the second contribution as a moderator 
(through SVO). This indicates that in the experiment, only the community group 
                                                          
24 The results from the vignette contradict with my experimental findings as well as Bernold et al findings. 




individualistic participants decrease their second contribution more than prosocial 
participants. The experiment shows that the relationships between changes in the second 
contribution and SVO and framing is complex; therefore, their interaction effect should be 
considered for a better prediction model.  
Overall, from the experimental results, I conclude that those who contributed less 
in the first round, those whose partners contributed more in the first round, those who 
evaluated the situation as fair or positively unfair, and those who were classified as 
individualistic participants in the community study changed their second contribution more 
than others.  
Tendency to Change Partner. I predicted that those who experienced negative 
injustice would show more interests to change their partner than others, and those who 
experienced positive injustice would show less interests to change partner than others. The 
results show that the fairness evaluation significantly predicts the preference to change 
partner for future rounds. However, when I created a model and incorporated multiple 
predictors, I found that the participants’ own contribution, fairness evaluation, and the 
interaction of SVO and fairness were important factors in predicting tendency to change 
partner. Additionally, I found that the partner’s contributions indirectly (through fairness 
evaluation) predicted tendency to changes partner.  
To be able see the variation in tendency to change partner as results of negative and 
positive injustice experiences, I partitioned the data by the partner’s contribution levels. 
However, the result did not provide support for the multi-predictor model.  
 As can be remembered from the vignette, the fairness and framing variables were 
important factors in predicting the tendency to change partner. The vignette results show 
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that though the community and decision frame did not lead participants to evaluate the 
situation as more unfair, the feelings of injustice in the community and decision frame led 
participants to change their partners more than the Wall Street group. Framing influences 
willingness to change partners as a main factor in the experiment. I did not observe any 
interaction between framing and fairness in the experiment, but SVO interacts with fairness 
evaluation. The interaction indicates that prosocial participants who evaluated the situation 
as positively unfair and as fair were less likely to change their partners for future rounds.   
Overall, the experimental data show that those who contributed more to the group 
account, those who evaluated the situation as fair or positively unfair, those how were 
classified as prosocial and evaluated the situation as fair or positively unfair were less likely 
to change their partners than others. The data do not support the predictions of that 
participants in the community group will be not more willing to change their partners 
compared to the stock market group and that individualistic participants will be not more 
willing to change their partners than prosocial participants. Additionally, the partner’s 
contribution was indirectly (thorough fairness evaluation) associated with the participant’s 
preference to change partners for future rounds.   
Willingness to Share Group Bonus. I predicted that those who experienced negative 
injustice would share fewer bonus points with their partners than others, and those who 
experienced positive injustice would share more bonus points with their partners than 
others. The results show that the fairness evaluation significantly predicts the shared bonus 
points. However, when I created a model and incorporated multiple predictors, I found that 
the participants’ own contribution, fairness evaluation, and the interaction of SVO and 
framing were important factors in predicting the participants’ willingness to share bonus 
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points with partner.  Additionally, I found that the partner’s contributions indirectly 
(through fairness evaluation) predicted the shared bonus points.  
To be able see variations in the shared bonus points as results of negative and 
positive injustice experiences, I partitioned the data by the partner’s contribution levels. 
The result for framing indicates that participants in the community and stock market groups 
shared group bonus with their partners similarly as response to their interaction with a high-
, low-, or equal-contributor partner. I predicted that when interacting with a low-contributor 
partner, the community group would give fewer points to the partner than the stock market 
group and when interacting with a high-contributor partner, the community group would 
give fewer points to the partner than the stock market group. The results do not support my 
predictions; framing did not influence the participants’ decisions about sharing bonus 
points with their partner.  
The result from the partitioned data for SVO indicates that when interacting with a 
low-contributor partner, individualistic participants shared fewer bonus points with their 
partners than prosocial participants, and when interacting with a high-contributor partner, 
individualistic participants shared fewer bonus points with their partners than prosocial 
participants. These results support my predictions for the SVO effect on the participants’ 
willingness to share group bonus points with their partners.  
In addition to my predictions, I also found that the interaction of SVO and framing 
was significant in the multi-predictor model. This indicates that SVO was a significant 
factor in the community group in predicting the shared bonus points with partners, but not 
in the stock market group. Individualistic participants in the community study did share 
fewer bonus points with their partners than prosocial participants in the community study. 
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The difference between individualistic and prosocial participants disappeared in the stock 
market study.  
Overall, the data show that those who contributed more to the group account, those 
who evaluated the situation as fair or positively unfair, those how were classified as 
prosocial in the community group were likely to share more bonus points with their 
partners than others. The data do not support the prediction of that participants in the stock 
market group will share more bonus points than the community group. However, the data 
support the prediction of that prosocial participants will share more bonus points with their 
partners than individualistic participants.   
Conclusion. Overall, fairness evaluation and subsequent behaviors are complex 
phenomena. For instance, the data from the experiment and vignette show that framing did 
not lead participants to give more or less in the first round, but what they gave to the group 
account in the first round influenced their fairness evaluations. When relying on a multiple-
factor model in the experiment, framing was a significant predictor for fairness evaluation 
and led participants in the community group to justify their partner’s high contribution, but 
did not lead participants in the stock market group to justify their partner’s low 
contribution.  
Participants in differently named conditions relied on different factors when restoring 
justice through different means. When changing partner, the stock market group did care 
about how much they contributed and their partner contributed to the group account, while 
the community group did only care about how much their partner contributed to the group 
account. Decision to increase or decrease second contribution was determined by the 
participants’ own contribution, their partner’s contribution, and the participants’ SVO 
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classification in the community study. In the stock market study, the SVO classification did 
not make any difference; only the participants’ own contribution and their partner’s 
contribution were important factors in predicting changes in the second contribution. 
Decision to share bonus points was determined by the participants’ SVO and the partner’s 
contribution to the group account in the community study. In the stock market study, the 
SVO classification did not make any difference; only the partner’s contribution to the group 
account determined the participants’ decisions.
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CHAPTER 9  
CONCLUSION 
I examined how title framing, SVO and interaction partner’s contribution level alter 
perceptions of justice and related behaviors. Specifically, I manipulated the partner’s 
contribution level and study (or task) name which affected participants’ justice standards. 
I conducted two different empirical tests: vignette and experiment and used public goods 
settings in both studies. The necessary data were collected through a standardized 
questionnaire which conducted during the experiments and vignette surveys. Participants’ 
self-reported justice evaluations for their interaction with their partner, changes in 
participants’ second contributions, participants’ allocation preferences for bonus money, 
and participants’ preference to change their partner for future rounds were measured to test 
the theoretical arguments empirically. 
The findings indicate that the participants’ fairness evaluation influenced their 
subsequent behaviors. However, the title framing did not completely work the way I 
predicted and the results for SVO were mixed. Similar to farming analysis, some of my 
predictions about SVO are not supported by the data. In opposition to my predictions, title 
framing did not modify justice evaluations for negatively unjust conditions. The results 
show that the community and the stock market (or Wall Street) frames did not create 
different contribution expectations and thus did not alter justice evaluations.  
One potential confound in this study was may have been the way participation was 
compensated. Previous studies show that introducing monetary consequences may lead 
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participants to apply a competitive frame to the decision (Biel and Thøgersen 2007; 
Ellingsen et al. 2012; Liberman et al. 2004; Tversky and Kahneman 1986). Although 
different framing encouraged participants to focus on personal or collective benefits, a 
strong monetary incentive (e.g. $50 Amazon.com gift card) may have eliminated framing 
effects in the experiment.  
Different groups may have interpreted the situation differently, but the outcomes 
could still be the same. For instance, participants in the community group may have 
expected everyone to contribute a lot to the group account because it was a collective 
responsibility, while participants in the stock market group may have expected everyone to 
contribute to the group account because it was the best strategy to gain points personally.  
Additionally, participants in differently named conditions may have focused on 
different social comparisons as predicted by my theory and different frames may have 
created different contribution expectations, but their perceptual and behavioral results 
could still be the same. For instance, if we assume that a participant contributed 10 points 
and his/her partner contributed 0 points to the group account, the participant in the 
community group may have experienced negative injustice due to his/her partner’s low 
contribution. In other words, the partner’s low contribution cannot be justified in the 
community group. If the same situation occurred in the stock market (or Wall Street) group, 
the participant may have experienced the same degree of negative injustice due to his/her 
own high contribution to the group account. In other words, the partner’s low contribution 
can be justified, but his/her own high contribution cannot be justified in the stock market 
group. With either reason, participants in the differently named studies did not express 
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different feelings of injustice, but their reasoning and comparisons could still be very 
different from each other. 
In closing, the data from the vignette and experiment supported some of my 
hypotheses, but also disproved some of them. One possible explanation for unsupportive 
outcomes can be that title framing was not very strong in the public good settings to create 
expected interactions. Another possible explanation for unexpected results can be that 
theoretical framework could not predict complex relationships. Therefore, the results 
suggest that future work should use different manipulations to test the hypotheses and 
revise theoretical framework by utilizing this research’s findings.  
9.1 FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS  
In conclusion, this dissertation contributes to existing knowledge in several ways. 
First, I tested the effects of framing, SVO and interaction partner’s contribution variables 
and added the effects of participants’ own contribution and motivation variables, and 
several moderating and mediating factors into my analyses. By presenting more 
complicated analyses, this dissertation provided better prediction patterns of perceptions 
of justice and related behaviors in public goods settings.  
Second, this study elaborates research on distributive justice, and explains 
conditions underlying various judgments about contribution and reward behaviors in terms 
of socially constructed frames and SVO factors. Thus, this research shows that determining 
a distribution of contribution and/or reward as just or unjust depends on social context 
which may be created through social frames as well as individual’s characteristics. At the 
same time, this study takes into account interactions between social context and 
individualistic propensity in making justice judgments.  
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Third, this research extends distributive justice theory to the realm of social 
dilemmas by refining ideas from previous theories and research in more abstract ways. This 
refinement also allows our theory to be applied to various exchange, collective action and 
game settings where theoretical scope conditions are met.  
Fourth, the results from the vignette and experiment show that title framing may 
work differently than some previous work’s suggestions (e.g., Ellingsen et al. 2012; 
Liberman et al. 2004). For instance, title framing may not encourage high contributions for 
the first round, but may influence the participants’ fairness evaluation and related 
behaviors. Title framing may not have a main effect; but a moderator effect (e.g. through 
SVO, contribution levels, etc.) on contribution or other related behaviors. 
In addition to its intellectual contributions, this research has implications beyond 
scientific theory. Contribution and reward behaviors can be seen in many aspects of human 
interactions. For instance, research in this area can help practitioners, such as managers 
and policy makers, better assess and organize contribution and reward behaviors in small 
groups (e.g. workgroups, classrooms, charities, etc.). A better understanding of how 
framing can influence perceptions of justice and subsequent behaviors may provide those 
practitioners effective strategies to deal with conflicts resulting from unfair contribution 
and reward distributions in groups and an inexpensive way to improve cooperative 
behaviors. Moreover, the theory can be utilized to develop hypotheses in other social 
science areas. For instance, contribution can be operationalized as work performance or 
productivity in organizational justice research, or as money in economics. Similarly, 
rewards can take the form of promotions or commercial goods.  
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9.2 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The findings from this dissertation and limitations suggest several ideas for future 
research. One extension would be using different manipulations to test the theory. 
Although I have partial supports for title framing in the experimental study, I did not find 
strong results supporting that framing created different expectations for contribution. 
Subsequent work may try different frames emphasizing different social comparisons.  
 Different measurements encouraging participants to answer reliably may also be 
beneficial. For instance, I found one of my items measuring participants’ own fairness 
evaluation was highly unreliable (which was omitted from the scale used in the analyses).  
When I look at my data closer, I found that some participants were satisfied with their 
favorable outcome and evaluated the situation as fair and some participants’ answers were 
inconsistent each other. I conclude that differently designed measurements may force 
participants to evaluate their own behaviors reliably, and revising measurements may 
provide stronger results for future research.   
Finally, I only tested my theory in hypothetical and experimental public goods 
settings, the more real world testing may provide more support for the theory.  Also, the 
theory developed in this dissertation can be applicable to broader context; therefore, more 
tests in different settings (e.g. resource management dilemma) are required.
163 
REFERENCES 
Adams, J.Stacy. 1963. “Toward an Understanding of Inequity.” Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology 67(5):422–36. 
Adams, J.Stacy. 1965. “Inequity in Social Exchange.” Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology 2:267–99. 
Alexander, Cheryl S. and Henry J. Becker. 1978. “The Use of Vignettes in Survey 
Research.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 42(1):93–104. 
Allison, Scott T., Lorraine R. McQueen, and Lynn M. Schaerfl. 1992. “Social Decision 
Making Processes and the Equal Partitionment of Shared Resources.” Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 28(1):23–42. 
Allison, Scott T. and David M. Messick. 1990. “Social Decision Heuristics in the Use of 
Shared Resources.” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 3(3):195–204. 
Anderson, William D. and Miles L. Patterson. 2008. “Effects of Social Value 
Orientations on Fairness Judgments.” The Journal of Social Psychology 148(2):223–
45. Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18512420). 
Atzmüller, Christiane and Peter M. Steiner. 2010. “Experimental Vignette Studies N 
Survey Research.” Methodology 6(3):128–38. 
Austin, William and Elaine Walster. 1974. “Reactions to Confirmations and 
Disconfirmations of Expectancies of Equity and Inequity.” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 30(2):208–16. 
Balliet, Daniel, Craig Parks, and Jeff Joireman. 2009. “Social Value Orientation and 
Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis.” Group Processes & Intergroup 
Relations 12(4):533–47. 
Baron, Reuben M. and David a. Kenny. 1986. “The Moderator-Mediator Variable 
Distinction in Social The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social 
Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations.” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51(6):1173–82. 
Barrett-Howard, Edith and Tom R. Tyler. 1986. “Procedural Justice as a Criterion in 
Allocation Decisions.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50(2):296. 
Batson, C. D. and T. Moran. 1999. “Empathy-Induced Altruism in a Prisoner’ S 
Dilemma.” European Journal of Social Psychology 29:909–24.
164 
Berger, Joseph, M.Hamit Fisek, Robert Z. Norman, and David G. Wagner. 1985. 
“Formation of Reward Expectations in Status Situations.” Pp. 121–53 in Status, 
Power, and Legitimacy, edited by J. Berger and M. J. Zelditch. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Pub. 
Berger, Joseph, M.Hamit Fisek, Robert Z. Norman, and Morris Zelditch. 1972. Status 
Characteristics and Social Interaction: An Expectations States Approach. New 
York, NY: Elsevier Inc. 
Berger, Joseph, Cecilia L. Ridgeway, M.Hamit Fisek, and Robert Z. Norman. 1998. “The 
Legitimation and Delegitimation of Power and Prestige Orders.” American 
Sociological Review 63(3):379. 
Berger, Joseph, Cecilia L. Ridgeway, and Morris Zelditch. 2002. “Construction of Status 
and Referential Structures.” Sociological Theory 20(2):157–79. 
Berger, Joseph, David G. Wagner, and Murray Webster Jr. 2014. “Expectation States 
Theory: Growth, Opportunities and Challanges.” Advances in Group Processes 
31:19–55. 
Berger, Joseph, Murray Webster Jr., Cecilia L. Ridgeway, and Susan Rosenholtz. 1986. 
“Status Cues, Expectations, and Behavior.” Pp. 1–22 in Advances in Group 
Processes, edited by E. J. Lawler. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Berger, Joseph and Morris Zelditch Jr. 1997. “Theoretical Research Programs: A 
Reformulation.” Pp. 29–46 in Status, Network, and Structure: Theory Development 
in Group Processes, edited by J. Szmatka, J. Skvoretz, and J. Berger. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
Berger, Joseph, Morris Zelditch Jr., Bo Anderson, and Bernard P. Cohen. 1972. 
“Structural Aspects of Distributive Justice: A Status-Value Formulation.” Pp. 119–
46 in Sociological Theories in Progress., edited by J. Berger, M. J. Zelditch, and B. 
Anderson. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. 
Bernold, Elizabeth, Elisabeth Gsottbauer, Kurt A. Ackermann, and Ryan O. Murphy. 
2014. “Social Framing and Cooperation : The Roles and Interaction of Preferences 
and Beliefs.” ETH Zurich 1–26. 
Biel, Anders and John Thøgersen. 2007. “Activation of Social Norms in Social 
Dilemmas: A Review of the Evidence and Reflections on the Implications for 
Environmental Behaviour.” Journal of Economic Psychology 28(1):93–112. 
Blakely, Gerald L., Martha C. Andrews, and Robert H. Moorman. 2005. “The 
Moderating Effects of Equity Sensitivity on the Relationship between 
Organizational Justice and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors.” Journal of 
Business and Psychology 20(2):259–73. 
Blau, Peter. 1964. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Brandts, Jordi and Christiane Schwieren. 2009. “Frames and Economic Behavior: An 
165 




Breusch, T. S. and A. R. Pagan. 1979. “A Simple Test for Heteroscedasticity and 
Random Coefficient Variation.” Econometrica 47(5):1287–94. 
Camerer, Colin F. and Ernst Fehr. 2002. “Measuring Social Norms and Preferences 
Using Experimental Games : A Guide for Social Scientists Measuring Social Norms 
and Preferences Using Experimental Games : A Guide for Social Scientists.” 
Research in Economics (97):55–95. 
Clay-Warner, Jody. 2001. “Perceiving Procedural Injustice: The Effects of Group 
Membership and Status.” Social Psychology Quarterly 64(3):224–38. 
Clay-Warner, Jody, Karen A. Hegtvedt, and Paul Roman. 2005. “Procedural Justice, 
Distributive Justice: How Experiences with Downsizing Condition Their Impact on 
Organizational Commitment.” Social Psychology Quarterly 68(1):89–102. 
Clayton, Susan and Susan Opotow. 2003. “Justice and Identity: Changing Perspectives on 
What Is Fair.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 7(4):298–310. 
Cook, Karen S. and Karen A. Hegtvedt. 1983. “Distributive Justice, Equity, and 
Equality.” Annual Review of Sociology 9:217–41. 
Cook, Karen S. and Karen A. Hegtvedt. 1986. “Justice and Power: An Exchange 
Analysis.” Pp. 19–41 in Justice in Social Relations, edited by H. W. Bierhoff, R. L. 
Cohen, and J. Greenberg. New York, NY: Plenum Press. 
De Cremer, David. 2002. “Respect and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: The Importance 
of Feeling Included.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28(10):1335–41. 
De Cremer, David and Eric van Dijk. 2009. “Paying for Sanctions in Social Dilemmas: 
The Effects of Endowment Asymmetry and Accountability.” Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 109(1):45–55. Retrieved 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2009.01.004). 
De Cremer, David and Paul A. M. Van Lange. 2001. “Why Prosocial participants Exhibit 
Greater Cooperation than Proselfs: The Roles of Social Responsibility and 
Reciprocity.” European Journal of Personality 15(1):5–18. Retrieved 
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/per.418/abstract). 
De Cremer, David and Mark Van Vugt. 1999. “Social Identification Effects in Social 
Dilemmas: A Transformation of Motives.” European Journal of Social Psychology 
29:871–93. Retrieved (http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=44041). 
Cropanzano, Russell and Maureen L. Ambrose. 2001. “Procedural and Distributive 
Justice Are More Similar Than You Think: A Monistic Perspective and a Research 
Agenda.” Pp. 119–51 in Advances in Organizational Justice, edited by J. Greenberg 
166 
and R. Cropanzano. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Dawes, Robyn M. 1980. “Social Dilemmas.” Annual Review of Psychology 31(1):169–
93. 
Deutsch, Morton. 1985. Distributive Justice: A Social-Psychological Perspective. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Diekmann, Kristina A., Steven M. Samuels, Lee Ross, and Max H. Bazerman. 1997. 
“Self-Interest and Fairness in Problems of Resource Allocation: Allocators Versus 





Van Dijk, Eric, David De Cremer, and Michel J. J. Handgraaf. 2004. “Social Value 
Orientations and the Strategic Use of Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining.” Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 40(6):697–707. 
Van Dijk, Eric and Riël Vermunt. 2000. “Strategy and Fairness in Social Decision 
Making: Sometimes It Pays to Be Powerless.” Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 36(1):1–25. Retrieved 
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103199913926). 
Van Dijk, Eric and Henk Wilke. 1995. “Coordination Rules in Asymmetric Social 
Dilemmas: A Comparison between Public Good Dilemmas and Resource 
Dilemmas.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 31(1):1–27. 
Van Dijk, Eric, Henk Wilke, Marieke Wilke, and Linda Metman. 1999. “What 
Information Do We Use in Social Dilemmas? Environmental Uncertainty and the 
Employment of Coordination Rules.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
35(2):109–35. Retrieved 
(http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S002210319891366X). 
De Dreu, Carsten K. W. and Paul A. M. Van Lange. 1995. “Impact of Social Values 
Orientations on Negotiator Cognition and Behavior.” Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 21(11):1178–88. 
De Dreu, Carsten K. W. and Christopher McCusker. 1997. “Gain-Loss Frames and 
Cooperation in Two-Person Social Dilemmas: A Transformational Analysis.” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72(5):1093–1106. 
Dufwenberg, Martin, Simon Gächter, and Heike Hennig-Schmidt. 2011. “The Framing of 
Games and the Psychology of Play.” Games and Economic Behavior 73(2):459–78. 
Retrieved (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.003). 
Eiser, Richard J. and Kum-Kum Bhavnani. 1974. “The Effect of Situational Meaning on 
the Behaviour of Subjects in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.” European Journal of 
167 
Social Psychology 4(1):93–97. 
Ellingsen, Tore, Magnus Johannesson, Johanna Mollerstrom, and Sara Munkhammar. 
2012. “Social Framing Effects: Preferences or Beliefs?” Games and Economic 
Behavior 76(1):117–30. Retrieved (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.007). 
Feather, Norman T. 1994. “Human Values and Their Relation to Justice.” Journal of 
Social Issues 50:129–51. 
Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gächter. 2002. “Altruistic Punishment in Humans.” Nature 
415:137–40. 
Festinger, Leon. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
Folger, Robert. 1986. “Rethinking Equity Theory: A Referent Cognitions Model.” Pp. 
145–62 in Justice in Social Relations, edited by H. W. Bierhoff, R. L. Cohen, and J. 
Greenberg. New York, NY: Springer US. 
Ganegoda, Deshani B. and Robert Folger. 2015. “Framing Effects in Justice Perceptions: 
Prospect Theory and Counterfactuals.” Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes 126:27–36. Retrieved 
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749597814000788). 
George, Darren and Paul Mallery. 2003. SPSS for Windows Step by Step: A Simple Guide 
and Reference, 11.0 Update. 4th ed. Allyn and Bacon. Retrieved 
(https://books.google.co.in/books?id=AghHAAAAMAAJ). 
Greenberg, Jerald. 1987. “Reactions to Procedural Injustice in Payment Distributions: Do 
the Means Justify the Ends?” Journal of Applied Psychology 72(1):55–61. 
Hayes, Andrew F. 2013. Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional 
Process Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach. Guilford Publications. Retrieved 
(https://books.google.com/books?id=8YX2QwGgD8AC). 
Hegtvedt, Karen A. 1993. “Approaching Distributive and Procedural Justice: Are 
Separate Routes Necessary?” Advances in Group Processes 10:195–221. 
Hegtvedt, Karen A. 2005. “Doing Justice to the Group: Examining the Roles of the 
Group in Justice Research.” Annual Review of Sociology 31(1):25–45. 
Hegtvedt, Karen A. 2006. “Justice Frameworks.” Pp. 49–69 in Contemporary Social 
Psychological Theories, edited by P. J. Burke. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Hegtvedt, Karen A., Jody Clay-Warner, and Cathryn Johnson. 2003. “The Social Context 
of Responses to Injustice: Considering the Indirect and Direct Effects of Group-
Level Factors.” Social Justice Research 16(4):343–66. 
Hegtvedt, Karen A. and Karen S. Cook. 2002. “Distributive Justice: Recent Theoretical 
168 
Developments and Applications.” Pp. 93–132 in Handbook of Justice Research in 
Law, edited by J. Sanders and L. V. Hamilton. New York, NY: Springer. 
Hegtvedt, Karen A. and Cathryn Johnson. 2000. “Justice Beyond the Individual: A Future 
with Legitimation.” Social Psychology Quarterly 63(4):298–311. 
Hegtvedt, Karen A. and Cathryn Johnson. 2009. “Power and Justice: Toward an 
Understanding of Legitimacy.” American Behavioral Scientist 53(3):376–99. 
Hegtvedt, Karen A. and Barry Markovsky. 1995. “Justice and Injustice.” Pp. 257–80 in 
Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology, edited by K. S. Cook, G. A. Fine, 
and J. S. House. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. 
Hegtvedt, Karen A., Elaine A. Thompson, and Karen S. Cook. 1993. “Power and Equity: 
What Counts in Attributions for Exchange Outcomes?” Social Psychology Quarterly 
56(2):100–119. 
Henrich, Joseph et al. 2001. “In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 
15 Small-Scale Societies.” American Economic Review 91(2):73–78. 
Herrmann, Benedikt, Christian Thöni, and Simon Gächter. 2008. “Antisocial Punishment 
Across Societies.” Science (New York, N.Y.) 319:1362–67. 
Homans, George C. 1961. Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. Oxford: Harcourt, 
Brace, and World Inc. 
Huseman, Richard C., John D. Hatfield, and Edward W. Miles. 1987. “A New 
Perspective on Equity Theory: The Equity Sensitivity Construct.” Academy of 
Management Review 12(2):222–34. 
Irwin, Kyle and Christine Horne. 2013. “A Normative Explanation of Antisocial 
Punishment.” Social Science Research 42(2):562–70. 
Jasso, Guillermina. 1978. “On the Justice of Earnings: A New Specification of the Justice 
Evaluation Function.” American Journal of Sociology 83(6):1398–1419. 
Jasso, Guillermina. 1980. “A New Theory of Distributive Justice.” American 
Sociological Review 45:3–32. 
Jasso, Guillermina. 1983. “Fairness of Individual Rewards and Fairness of the Reward 
Distribution: Specifying the Inconsistency Between the Micro and Macro Principles 
of Justice.” Social Psychology Quarterly 46(3):185–99. 
Joanes, D. N. and C. .. A. .. Gill. 1998. “Comparing Measures of Sample Skewness and 
Kurtosis.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. 47(1):183–89. 
Joireman, Jeffrey A., D.Michael Kuhlman, Paul A. M. Van Lange, Toshiaki Doi, and 
Gregory P. Shelley. 2003. “Perceived Rationality, Morality, and Power of Social 
Choice as a Function of Interdependence Structure and Social Value Orientation.” 
European Journal of Social Psychology 33(3):413–37. 
169 
Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch, and R. Thaler. 1986. “Fairness and the Assumption of 
Economics.” The Journal of Business 59(4):285–300. Retrieved 
(http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=epref&AN=JB.EI.BHE.K
AHNEMAN.FAE). 
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk.” Econometrica 66(3):497–527. 
Kay, Aaron C. and Lee Ross. 2003. “The Perceptual Push: The Interplay of Implicit Cues 
and Explicit Situational Construals on Behavioral Intentions in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39(6):634–43. 
Kerr, Norbert L. 1995. “Norms in Social Dilemmas.” Pp. 31–47 in Social Dilemmas: 
Social Psychological Perspectives, edited by D. A. Schroeder. New York, NY: 
Pergamon. 
Kollock, Peter. 1998. “Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation.” Annual Review 
of Sociology 24(1):183–214. 
Komorita, Samuel S. and Craig D. Parks. 1996. Social Dilemmas. Boulder, CO: 
Westview. 
Konker, Roger and Gilbert Jr. Bassett. 1982. “Robust Tests for Heteroscedasticity Based 
on Regression Quantiles.” Econometrica 50(1):43–61. 
Kuběna, Aleš Antonín, Petr Houdek, Jitka Lindová, Lenka Prǐ́platov́a, and Jaroslav Flegr. 
2014. “Justine Effect: Punishment of the Unduly Self-Sacrificing Cooperative 
Individuals.” Plos One 9(3):1–8. 
De Kwaadsteniet, Erik W., Eric Van Dijk, Arjaan Wit, and David De Cremer. 2010. 
“Anger and Retribution After Collective Overuse: The Role of Blaming and 
Environmental Uncertainty in Social Dilemmas.” Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 36(1):59–70. 
Van Lange, Paul a. M. 1999. “The Pursuit of Joint Outcomes and Equality in Outcomes: 
An Integrative Model of Social Value Orientation.” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 77(2):337–49. 
Van Lange, Paul A. M. 1992. “Confidence in Expectations: A Test of the Triangle 
Hypothesis.” European Journal of Personality 6:371–79. 
Van Lange, Paul A. M., Daniel P. Balliet, Craig D. Parks, and Mark Van Vugt. 2014. 
Social Dilemmas: The Psychology of Human Cooperation. Oxford University Press. 
Van Lange, Paul A. M., Jeff Joireman, Craig D. Parks, and Eric van Dijk. 2013. “The 
Psychology of Social Dilemmas: A Review.” Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes 120(2):125–41. 
Van Lange, Paul A. M. and David Michael Kuhlman. 1994. “Social Value Orientations 
and Impressions of a Partner’s Honesty and Intelligence: A Test of the Might versus 
170 
Morality Effect.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67(1):126–41. 
Van Lange, Paul A. M. and Wim B. G. Liebrand. 1991. “Social Value Orientation and 
Intelligence: A Test of the Goal Prescribes Rationality Principle.” European Journal 
of Social Psychology 21:273–92. 
Van Lange, Paul A. M. and David M. Messick. 1996. “Psychological Processes 
Underlying Cooperation in Social Dilemmas.” Pp. 93–112 in Social Agency: 
Dilemmas and Education Praxiology, edited by W. W. Gasparski, M. K. Mlicki, and 
B. H. Banathy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Pub. 
Leventhal, Gerald S., Jusgis Jr. Karuza, and William R. Fry. 1980. “Beyond Fairness: A 
Theory of Allocation Preferences.” Pp. 167–218 in Justice in Social Interaction, 
edited by G. Mikula. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. 
Liberman, Varda, Steven M. Samuels, and Lee Ross. 2004. “The Name of the Game: 
Predictive Power of Reputations Versus Situational Labels in Determining 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Moves.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
30(9):2004. 
Lind, E.Allan and Tom R. Tyler. 1988. The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice. 
New York, NY: Plenum Pess. 
Lovaglia, Michael J. et al. 1998. “Status Processes and Mental Ability Test Scores.” 
American Journal of Sociology 104(1):195–228. 
Major, Brenda, Wayne H. Bylsma, and Catherine Cozzarelli. 1989. “Gender Differences 
in Distributive Justice Preferences: The Impact of Domain.” Sex Roles 21(7):487–
97. 
Markovsky, Barry. 1985a. “Evaluating Theories of Justice and Equity.” Advances in 
Group Processes 2:197–226. 
Markovsky, Barry. 1985b. “Toward a Multilevel Distributive Justice Theory.” American 
Sociological Review 50(6):822–39. Retrieved 
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095506%5Cnhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2095
506.pdf?acceptTC=true). 
Markovsky, Barry et al. 2008. “Modularization and Integrating Theories of Justice.” 
Advances in Group Processes 25:345–71. 
Markovsky, Barry. 2010. “Modularizing Small Group Theories in Sociology.” Small 
Group Research 41(6):664–87. 
Markovsky, Barry and Nick Berigan. 2012. “Resource Types and Fairness Perceptions in 
Social Dilemmas.” Pp. 199–213 in Handbook of Social Resource Theory: 
Theoretical Extensions, Emprical Insights, and Social Applications., edited by K. 
Tornblom and A. Kazemi. New York, NY: Sage Pub. 
Messick, David M. 1995. “Equality, Fairness, and Social Conflict.” Social Justice 
171 
Research 8(2):153–73. 
Messick, David M., Scott T. Allison, and Charles D. Samuelson. 1988. “Framing and 
Communication Effects on Group Members’ Responses to Environmental and 
Social Uncertainty.” Applied Behavioral Economics 2:677–700. 
Messick, David M. and Marilynn B. Brewer. 1983. “Solving Social Dilemmas: A 
Review.” Review of Personality and Social Psychology 4(1):11–44. 
Messick, David M. and Charles G. McClintock. 1968. “Motivational Basis of Choice in 
Experimental Games.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 4:1–25. 
Olson, Mancur. 2009. The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press. 
Parks, Craig D. and Asako B. Stone. 2010. “The Desire to Expel Unselfish Members 
From the Group.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 99(2):303–10. 
Rabin, Matthew. 1998. “Psychology and Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature 
36(1):11–46. 
Ridgeway, Cecilia L., Kristen Backor, Yan E. Li, Justine E. Tinkler, and Kristan G. 
Erickson. 2009. “How Easily Does a Social Difference Become a Status 
Distinction? Gender Matters.” American Sociological Review 74(1):44–62. 
Ridgeway, Cecilia L. and Joseph Berger. 1986. “Expectations, Legitimation, and 
Dominance Behavior in Task Groups.” American Sociological Review 51(5):603–
17. 
Ridgeway, Cecilia L. and Joseph Berger. 1988. “The Legitimation of Power and Prestige 
Orders in Task Groups.” Pp. 207–31 in Status Generalization: New Theory and 
Research, edited by M. jr. Webster and M. Foschi. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
Ridgeway, Cecilia L., Elizabeth Heger Boyle, Kathy J. Kuipers, and Dawn T. Robinson. 
1998. “How Do Status Beliefs Develop? The Role of Resources and Interactional 
Experience.” American Sociological Review 63(3):331–50. 
Scarpello, Vida and Foard F. Jones. 1996. “Why Justice Matters in Compensation 
Decision Making.” Journal of Organizational Behavior 17(3):285–99. 
Shackelford, Susan, Wendy Wood, and Stephen Worchel. 1996. “Behavioral Styles and 
the Influence of Women in Mixed-Sex Groups.” Social Psychology Quarterly 
59(3):284–93. 
Shinada, Mizuho and Toshio Yamagishi. 2007. “Punishing Free Riders: Direct and 
Indirect Promotion of Cooperation.” Evolution and Human Behavior 28(5):330–39. 
Simonson, Itamar and Amos Tversky. 1992. “Choice in Context : Tradeoff Contrast and 
Extremeness Aversion.” Journal of Marketing Research 29:281–95. 
Simpson, Brent. 2004. “Social Values, Subjective Transformations, and Cooperation in 
172 
Social Dilemmas.” Social Psychology Quarterly 67(4):385–95. Retrieved 
(http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/9772/). 
Simpson, Brent and Robb Willer. 2008. “Altruism and Indirect Reciprocity: The 
Interaction of Person and Situation in Prosocial Behavior.” Social Psychology 
Quarterly 71(1):37–52. 
Simpson, Brent and Robb Willer. 2014. “Beyond Altruism: Sociological Foundations of 
Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior.” Annual Review of Sociology 41(1):43–63. 
Retrieved (http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-
112242). 
Skitka, Linda J. 2003. “Of Different Minds: An Accessible Identity Model of Justice 
Reasoning.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 7(4):286–97. 
Smeesters, Dirk, Luk Warlop, Eddy Van Avermaet, Olivier Corneille, and Vincent 
Yzerbyt. 2003. “Do Not Prime Hawks with Doves: The Interplay of Construct 
Activation and Consistency of Social Value Orientation on Cooperative Behavior.” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84(5):972–87. 
Sonnemans, Joep, Arthur Schram, and Theo Offerman. 1998. “Public Good Provision 
and Public Bad Prevention: The Effect of Framing.” Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization 34(1):143–61. Retrieved 
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268197000425). 
Stouffer, Samuel A., Edward A. Suchman, Leland C. DeVinney, Shirley A. Starr, and 
Robin M.Jr. Williams. 1949. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The 
American Soldier. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Stouten, Jeroen, David De Cremer, and Eric van Dijk. 2009. “Behavioral (In)tolerance of 
Equality Violation in Social Dilemmas: When Trust Affects Contribution Decisions 
after Violations of Equality.” Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 12(4):517–
31. 
Stouten, Jeroen, David De Cremer, and Eric Van Dijk. 2005. “All Is Well That Ends 
Well, at Least for Proselfs: Emotional Reactions to Equality Violation as a Function 
of Social Value Orientation.” European Journal of Social Psychology 35(6):767–83. 
Stouten, Jeroen, David De Cremer, and Eric Van Dijk. 2006. “Violating Equality in 
Social Dilemmas : Emotional and Retributive Reactions as a Function of Trust , 
Attribution , and Honesty.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32(7):894–
906. 
Sweeney, Paul D. 1990. “Distributive Justice and Pay Satisfaction: A Field Test of an 
Equity Theory Prediction.” Journal of Business and Psychology 4(3):329–41. 
Sylwester, Karolina, Benedikt Herrmann, and Joanna J. Bryson. 2013. “Homo Homini 
Lupus? Explaining Antisocial Punishment.” Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, 
and Economics 6(3):167–88. 
173 
Thibaut, John W. and Laurens Walker. 1975. Procedural Justice: A Psychological 
Analysis. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Thye, Shane R. 2000. “A Status Value Theory of Power in Exchange Relations.” 
American Sociological Review 65:407–32. 
Thye, Shane R. 2007. “Logical and Philosophical Foundations of Experiments in the 
Social Sciences.” Pp. 57–86 in Laboratory Experiments in the Social Sciences, 
edited by M. jr. Webster and J. Sell. London: Elsevier Inc. 
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1974. “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases.” Science 185(4157):1124–31. 
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1981. “The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice.” Science 211(4481):453–58. 
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1986. “Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decisions.” The Journal of Business 59(S4):S251. 
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1991. “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice : A 
Reference-Dependent Model.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4):1039–
61. 
Tyler, Tom R. 1989. “The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value 
Model.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57(5):830–38. 
Tyler, Tom R., Robert J. Boeckmann, Heather J. Smith, and Yuen J. Huo. 1997. Social 
Justice in a Diverse Society. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Van Vugt, Mark and David De Cremer. 1999. “Leadership in Social Dilemmas: The 
Effects of Group Identification on Collective Actions to Provide Public Goods.” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76(4):587–99. 
Van Vugt, Mark, Sarah F. Jepson, Claire M. Hart, and David De Cremer. 2004. 
“Autocratic Leadership in Social Dilemmas: A Threat to Group Stability.” Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology 40(1):1–13. 
Wagner, David G. 1988. “Status Violations: Toward an Expectation States Theory of the 
Social Control of Deviance.” Pp. 110–22 in Status Generalizations: New Theory and 
Research, edited by M. jr. Webster and M. Foschi. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
Wagner, David G. and Joseph Berger. 1993. “Status Characteristics Theory: The Growth 
of a Program.” Pp. 23–63 in Theoretical Research Programs: Studies in the Growth 
of Theory, edited by J. Berger and M. J. Zelditch. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Walker, Henry A. and Bernard P. Cohen. 1985. “Scope Statements: Imperatives for 
Evaluating Theory.” American Sociological Review 50(3):288–301. 
174 
Walster, Elaine, Georger Walster, and Ellen Berscheid. 1978. Equity Theory and 
Research. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. 
Webster Jr., Murray and John B. Kervin. 1971. “Artificiality in Experimental Sociology.” 
Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 8:263–72. 
Willer, Robb. 2009. “Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution to the 
Collective Action Problem.” American Sociological Review 74(1):23–43. 
Willinger, Marc and Anthony Ziegelmeyer. 1999. “Framing and Cooperation in Public 
Good Games: An Experiment with an Interior Solution.” Economics Letters 
65(3):323–28. 
Yamagishi, Toshio. 1986. “The Provision of a Sanctioning System as a Public Good.” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51(1):110–16. 
Yamagishi, Toshio. 1995. “Social Dilemmas.” Pp. 311–35 in Sociological Perspectives 
on Social Psychology, edited by K. S. Cook, G. A. Fine, and J. S. House. Boston, 
MA: Allyn & Bacon. 
Young, Robert L. 1991. “Race, Conceptions of Crime and Justice, and Support for the 
Death Penalty.” Social Psychology Quarterly 54(1):67. 
Zelditch Jr., Morris. 1969. “Can You Really Study an Army in the Laboratory.” Pp. 528–




PILOT VIGNETTE STUDY SURVEY 
Thank you for your participation. Please read the following and try to imagine yourself in 
the situation described. A few questions will follow.   
COMMUNITY / WALL STREET/ DECISION-MAKING GAME 
The Community / Wall Street / Decision-Making game consists of several joint decision-making 
tasks that involve decision making by a two-person group. In the Community / Wall Street / 
Decision-Making game, each group member must decide how to spend a pool of money that he 
or she has (in his or her “personal account”).  
 
The basic directions are as follows: each group member will be given $5.00 which can be kept 
in their personal account or contributed to the group account. Any amount that is contributed 
to the group account will be multiplied by 1.5. Then, the group money will be divided equally 
between two group members, regardless of their individual contributions to the group account.  
 
Each group member’s total earning per round will be his/her half of the earnings from the 
group account, plus whatever he or she did not invest (i.e., whatever is left in his or her 
personal account).  
To better understand of how the Community / Wall Street / Decision-Making game works, 
consider the following four examples. 
(1) Imagine one of the group members (Person A) invests $2.00, and the second group member 
(Person B) invests $4.00. Thus, there is $6.00 in the group account which is multiplied with 1.5 
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(2) to give $9.00 in the group account. Then, $9.00 gets divided into two so that A and B each 
get $4.50 from the group account. Person A, who invested $2.00, ends the round with $7.50 
($4.50 from the group account + $3.00 kept in the personal account). Person B, who invested 
$4.00, ends the round with $5.50 ($4.50 from the group account + $1.00 kept in the personal 
account). 
 
(3) Imagine one of the group members (Person A) invests all of his/her $5.00, and the second 
group member (Person B) invests none. Thus, there is $5.00 in the group account which is 
multiplied with 1.5 to give $7.50 in the group account. Then, $7.50 gets divided into two so 
that A and B each get $3.75 from the group account. Person A, who invested $5.00, ends the 
round with $3.75 ($3.75 from the group account + 0 kept in the personal account). Person B, 
who invested none, ends the round with $8.75 ($3.75 from the group account + $5.00 kept in 
the personal account). 
 
(4) Imagine both group members (Person A and Person B) invest all of their $5.00. Thus, there 
is $10.00 in the group account which is multiplied with 1.5 to give $15.00 in the group account. 
Then, $15.00 gets divided into two so that A and B each get $7.50 from the group account. 
Since both group members invested all of their money, both end the round with $7.50 ($7.50 
from the group account + 0 kept in the personal account).  
 
(5) Finally, imagine neither of the two group members invests in the group account. Thus, 
there will be no money to multiply or divide. In this situation, both group members end the 
round with $5.00 (0 from the group account + $5.00 kept in the personal account).  
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Compensation for the Community / Wall Street / Decision-Making game is based on the amount 
of money that each member will have in their personal account at the end of the Community / 
Wall Street / Decision-Making game. 
Imagine that you are one of the group members randomly matched with another 
participant to work together. Please answer the following questions in the order in which 
they appear.  
1.  Please indicate how much of your $5.00 endowment you would contribute to the group 
account. 
____ (anywhere from $0.00 to $5.00) 
2. What do you think most people would do in the Community / Wall Street / Decision-
Making game? 
 
3. Imagine that the other person with whom you were paired contributed half of what you 












much as they can 
to the group 
account 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Everyone will 
tend to keep their 
money in their 
private accounts 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Everyone will try 
to contribute as 
much as they 
expect the other 
group member to 
contribute 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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game. How fair would you consider the other member’s contribution to the group 
account? 
Very     Somewhat      Somewhat                     Very 
Unfair       Unfair   Unfair           Neutral        Fair       Fair           Fair 
1-----------------2----------------3-----------------4------------------5-------------------6-------------------7 
 
4. Then imagine that you were paired with the same other group member for another round 
of the Community / Wall Street / Decision-Making game. Would you change your 
contribution for future rounds? (circle one response) 
A. Yes, I would give less B. No, I would not change      C. Yes, I would give more 
 
5. Now imagine that you had the opportunity to change your group member for another 
round of the Community / Wall Street / Decision-Making game. To what extent would 
you prefer to change group members and work with a different person for future rounds?  
No Preference           Moderate Preference              Strong Preference 
for Switching          for Switching   for Switching  
1-----------------2----------------3-----------------4------------------5-----------------6------------------7 
 
6.  What do you think would explain the other person’s low contributions in the Community 
/ Wall Street / Decision-Making game? 
 











S/he was selfish 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
The Game 
structure led 
her/him to do so 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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APPENDIX B 
VIGNETTE STUDY SURVEY 
Thank you for your participation. Please read the following and try to imagine 
yourself in the situations described. A few questions will follow.   
Imagine that you have been randomly paired with another person, whom we will refer to 
simply as “Other”. Other is someone you do not know and that you will not knowingly 
meet in the future. Both you and Other will be making choices by circling either the letter 
A, B, or C. Your choice will determine points that your and Other will receive. Likewise, 
Other’s choices will determine points for him/her and for you. Points have value, so the 
more points you receive, the better for you, and the more points for Other, the better for 
him/her.  





In the diagram, if you chose A, you would receive 500 points and Other would receive 100 
points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and Other 500; and if you chose C, 
you would receive 550 points and Other 300. So, you see that your choice influences both 
the number of points you receive and the number of points Other receives.
 Choice 
 A B C 
Your Points   500 500 550 
Other’s Points  100 500 300 
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Before you begin making choices, keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers. 
You may choose the option that you prefer most, whatever the reason. Also, remember that 
the more points you accumulate, the better for you. Likewise, the more points Other 
accumulates, the better for him/her. 
For each of the four situations below, please circle A, B or C, depending on which 









Please see the next page… 
 
THE COMMUNITY / WALL STREET / DECISION TASK 
The Community / Wall Street / Decision Task involves a set of Community / Wall Street / 
Decision-making tasks in a two-person group. In the Community / Wall Street / Decision 
Task, you get to decide how to spend $10 which has been placed into your “personal 
account.” You may choose to keep this money in your account, or to contribute some or all 
of it to a “group account.” Any amount you and the Other contribute to the group account 
will be multiplied and then divided equally between the two of you, regardless of your 
① Choice 
 A B C 
Your Points   560 500 500 
Other’s Points  300 500 100 
② Choice 
 A B C 
Your Points   480 540 480 
Other’s Points  80 280 480 
③ Choice 
 A B C 
Your Points   520 520 580 
Other’s Points  520 120 320 
④ Choice 
 A B C 
Your Points   510 560 510 
Other’s Points  510 300 110 
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individual contributions to the group account. Your total earnings per round will be your 
half of the earnings from the group account, plus whatever amount you didn’t contribute 








Money in the 
group account 
Person A earns Person B earns 





(10+10) x 1.5 
$ 15.00 
($15 from group 
account + 0 from 
personal account) 
$15.00 
($15 from group 
account + 0 from 
personal account) 







(10+0) x 1.5 
$7.50 
($7.50 from 




($7.50 from group 
account + $10 from 
personal account) 





(3+6) x 1.5 
$14.75 
($6.75 from 
group account + 
$8 from personal 
account) 
$9.75 
($6.75 from group 
account + $3 from 
personal account) 







(0+0) x 1.5 
$10.00 
(0 from group 




(0 from group 
account + $10 from 
personal account) 
 
Compensation for the Community / Wall Street / Decision Task is based on the 
amount of money that each member has earned at the end of the session.  
Imagine that you are one of the group members randomly matched with 
another participant to work together. Please answer the following questions in the 
order in which they appear.  
1. Please indicate how much of your $10.00 you would contribute to the group account. 
______ (enter an amount between $0.00 -  $10.00) 
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3. Imagine that after you contribute the amount that you indicated in the first question, 
the Other contributes only half of what you contributed to the group account. How 
fair would you consider the other person’s contribution to the group account? 
Very             Unfair  Somewhat Indifferent     Somewhat      Fair   Very 
Unfair      Unfair                 Fair      Fair             
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5----------------6----------------7 
 
4. Now imagine it is the second round of the Community / Wall Street / Decision Task. 
You are again paired with that same Other who contributed half of what you 
contributed. How much of your $10.00 will you contribute to the group account for 









contribute as much of 
their $10 to the group 
as they can  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
keep their $10 in 
their personal 
accounts 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
contribute as much of 
their $10 as they 
expect Other to 
contribute 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
183 
______ (enter an amount from $0.00 - $10.00) 
5. To what extent would the other person’s low contribution in the first round influence 
your contribution to the group account in the second round?  
Not at all    Moderately           Strongly 
Influential    Influential           Influential 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5----------------6-------------7 
 
6. Now imagine that you have the opportunity to work with someone else. To what 
extent would you prefer to switch group members and work with a different person 
for future rounds?  
No Preference   Moderate Preference                   Strong Preference 
for New Partner   for New Partner                            for New Partner 
1---------------2--------------3---------------4---------------5----------------6---------------7 
 
7. Again, imagine that the person with whom you were paired contributed half of what 
you contributed. What do you think would explain the other person’s low 
contribution in the Community / Wall Street / Decision Task?  
 












s/he was selfish o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
the nature of the task 
led her/him to do so o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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APPENDIX C 
SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION TEST 
“In this set of questions, please imagine that you have been randomly paired with another 
person, whom we will refer to simply as the “other.” Other is someone you do not know 
and that you will not knowingly meet in the future. Both you and Other will be making 
choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. Your own choices will produce points for 
yourself and Other. Likewise, Other’s choice will produce points for him/her and for you. 
Every point has value: The more points you receive, the better for you, and the more points 
Other receives, the better for him/her.  
Here’s an example of how this task works.  
 A B C 
You get 500 500 550 
Other gets 100 500 300 
 
In this example, if you chose A) you would receive 500 points and Other would receive 100 
points; if you chose B), you would receive 500 points and Other 500; and if you chose C), 
you would receive 550 points and Other 300. So, you see that your choice influences both 
the number of points you receive and the number of points the other receives. Before you 
begin making choices, keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers – choose the 
option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. Also, remember that the points have 
value: The more of them you accumulate, the better for you. Likewise, from the Other’s 
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point of view, the more points s/he accumulates, the better for him/her. For the following 
questions, please choose as you see fit. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers. 
For each of the nine choice situations below, please click on A, B or C, depending on 
which column you prefer most.” 
(((Next page))) 
1.  
 A B C 
You get 480 540 480 
Other gets 80 280 480 
 
2. 
 A B C 
You get 560 500 500 
Other gets 300 500 100 
 
3. 
 A B C 
You get 520 520 580 
Other gets 520 120 320 
 
4. 
 A B C 
You get 500 560 490 
Other gets 100 300 490 
 
5. 
 A B C 
You get 560 500 490 





 A B C 
You get 500 500 570 
Other gets 500 100 300 
 
7. 
 A B C 
You get 510 560 510 
Other gets 510 300 110 
 
8. 
 A B C 
You get 550 500 500 
Other gets 300 100 500 
 
9. 
 A B C 
You get 480 490 540 




“Decision/Community/ Stock Market Study” 
Investigator: Hatice Atilgan, Ph.D. Candidate 
Introduction and Purpose: 
You are invited to participate in a research study being conducted by a researcher, Hatice 
Atilgan, from Department of Sociology. This study is sponsored by the Department of 
Sociology. The purpose of the study is to investigate how people make decisions in small 
groups. This form explains you what you will be asked to do if you decide to participate in 
this study. Please read it carefully and feel free to ask any questions you like before you 
make a decision about participating.  
Description of Study Procedures: 
During the study, you will interact with other participants using the computer. You and 
other participants will be required to make some decisions, and answer some questions 
about your experience. For each decision, you and other participants will each decide 
whether or not to contribute to a “joint task”. The study will last approximately one hour.  
As explained during the study, the compensation for this study will be based on points 
gained during the study. The points will be converted to raffle tickets for the chance to win 
a $50 Amazon.com gift card. The more points you get, the more raffle tickets you will 
receive. The points you and other participants earn from each joint task will differ based 
on your and others’ decisions to contribute or not to the group account. The compensation 
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you receive will therefore depend on your decisions as well as the decisions of others with 
whom you are paired during the study. You will also earn extra credit in applicable courses.  
The experiment is computer mediated; thus, you will not see other participants who you 
work with at any point during or after study.  
Risk of Participation: 
Your name or other identifying information will not be used in any way in reports of the 
research findings. There are no known risks associated with participating in this research 
except a slight risk of breach of confidentiality, which remains despite steps that will be 
taken to protect your privacy. 
Benefits of Participation: 
As mentioned above, you will get a chance to receive a monetary prize ($50 Amazon.com 
gift card) for participation in today’s study. In addition, participation in this study may 
qualify you for extra credit and/or research participation credit in some sociology courses 
you may be taking. Otherwise, taking part in this study is not likely to benefit you 
personally. However, this research may help us understand how people make decisions in 
group settings. Also, you may gain some insight into how social and behavioral research 
is conducted. 
Cost: 
There is no cost to you for participating in this research (other than your time). 
Payments: 
As noted above, you will be given raffle tickets for your performance at the conclusion of 
today’s experiment. You will therefore have a chance to win a $50 gift card. The number 
of raffle tickets you receive depends on choices made by you and the choices of others with 
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whom you are paired during the study. Additionally, you may be eligible to receive extra 
credit for participating in this study.  
Confidentiality of Records: 
Participation will be confidential. A number will be assigned to each participant at the 
beginning of the project. This number will be used on project records rather than your name 
or any identifying information. Study records/data will be stored in locked filing cabinets 
and protected computer files at the University of South Carolina. The results of the study 
may be published or presented at professional meetings, but your identity will not be 
revealed. 
Contact Persons: 
For more information concerning this research, you should contact Hatice Atilgan at 803 
777-3123 or akca@email.sc.edu. 
Questions about your rights as a research subject are to be directed to, Lisa Marie Johnson, 
IRB Manager, Office of Research Compliance, University of South Carolina, 1600 
Hampton Street, Suite 414D, Columbia, SC 29208, phone: (803) 777-7095 or email: 
LisaJ@mailbox.sc.edu. The Office of Research Compliance is an administrative office that 
supports the University of South Carolina Institutional Review Board (USC IRB). The 
Institutional Review Board consists of representatives from a variety of scientific 
disciplines, non-scientists, and community members for the primary purpose of protecting 
the rights and welfare of human subjects enrolled in research studies. 
Voluntary Participation: 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You are free not to participate or to withdraw at any 
time, for whatever reason, without negative consequences. In the event that you do 
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withdraw from this study, the information you have already provided will be kept in a 
confidential manner. 
Participation is not related to regular course work and participation or withdrawal will have 
no impact on grades. If you are participating with the goal of earning extra credit or 
research credit for a class, and decide you do not wish to participate (or you decide to 
withdraw) your professor will provide alternative means of you satisfying this extra credit 
or research participation requirement.  
Signatures /Dates: 
I have read (or have had read to me) the contents of this consent form and have been 
encouraged to ask questions. I have received answers to my questions. I give my consent 
to participate in this study, although I have been told that I may withdraw at any time 
without negative consequences. I have received a copy of this form for my records and 
future reference. 
Signature: _____________________________________ 
Printed Name: __________________________________ 
Date: ______________________________________ 
Please Note: A copy of this form must be provided to you. 
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APPENDIX E 
PROGRAM SCRIPT FOR LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 
Participant ID  
-- 
Press “Enter” to continue 
((NEXT PAGE))  
Participant SVO 
-- 
Press “Enter” to continue 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
Welcome to the “Community/Stock Market Study"..._ 
Click "Continue" when you are ready_ 
((NEXT PAGE)) 


















What is your age group? 
 Under 18 
 Between 18-23 














What is your Major? 
____ 
Press “Enter” on keyboard when you are done. 
((NEXT PAGE)) 





Your compensation in today's study will partly depend on how well you read and 
understand the instructions. Therefore, please read all instructions and examples 
carefully.  
The basic directions are as follows: The study involves deciding how to spend a personal 
fund (20 points). You will be completing this study with at least one other participant in 
the lab. To maintain anonymity, we will refer to this other participant as Other. You will 
194 
not meet Other at any time, nor will you learn any identifying information about him/her. 
Likewise, s/he will not learn any identifying information about you.  
---Previous---Continue--- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
The study consists of several rounds. At the start of each round, each participant (you and 
Other) will receive a 20-point fund. You can contribute anywhere from 0 to 20 points of 
this found to a "group account." Any points you do not contribute to the group account 
will remain in your "personal account" for you to keep. The same goes for Other. 
Anything that is contributed to the group account by you and/or Other will be multiplied 
by 1.5. Then, the group points will be divided between You and Other equally, regardless 
of the specific amount each of you contributed to the group account.  
Your total gains per round are your share of the points from the group account, plus 
whatever you did not contribute to the group account. The same goes for Other. 
---Previous---Continue--- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
Bonus Rounds: For some rounds, one participant from each group will be randomly 
chosen to distribute a group bonus (10 points). The member who has been selected to 
distribute the bonus will be free to keep the bonus points for his/her personal account or 
send any amount of them to Other. 
---Previous---Continue--- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
Compensation for the study will be based on the total number of points that each member 
has in their personal account at the end of the study (that is, the points that he or she keeps, 
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plus the points that he or she has earned from his/her share of the group accounts). The 
points will be converted to the raffle tickets to win a $50 Amazon.com gift card. More 
points provide more raffle tickets, and more raffle tickets increase your chance of winning 
the gift card.   
Make sure you have carefully read and understand the instructions. If anything is unclear, 
please feel free to quietly open your door and a research assistant will be with you in a 
moment.  
If you understand the instructions, click "Continue" and you will read over a few examples. 
---Previous---Continue--- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
Let's go over an example. 
Imagine that each group member invests all 20 points. Thus, there are now 40 points in the 
group account. Since all investments in the group account are multiplied by 1.5, the total 
points in the group account becomes 60. Then, the group account is divided by two (half 
for each of the members). This results in each group member receiving 30 points. Since 
everyone invested all of their points to the group account, each player finishes the period 
with 30 points (30 earned from the group account + 0 kept in the personal account).  
If you have any questions about this example, please quietly open your door and a research 
assistant will be with you in a moment.  




Here's another example: 
Imagine that each group member invests none of their points. Now, there are zero points 
in the group account. Since there are no points in the group account to multiply, and no 
points to divide between the group members, everyone receives 20 points for this round (0 
from the group account + 20 kept in the personal account).  
If you have any questions, please quietly open your door and a research assistant will be 
with you in a moment.  
If you understand the example, click "Continue."_ 
---Previous---Continue--- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
One more example: 
Imagine that one of the group members invests all 20 points, and the other group member 
invests none. Thus, there are 20 points in the group account which is multiplied by 1.5 to 
become 30 total points. Then, those 30 points are divided by two so that each group member 
receives 15 points. 
The first group members who invested his/her 20 points ends the round with 15 points (15 
from the group account + 0 kept in the personal account). The second group member who 
invested nothing ends the round with 35 points (15 from the group account + 20 kept in the 
personal account). 
If you have any questions, please quietly open your door and a research assistant will be 
with you in a moment.  




Now, we would like to ask you some questions to make sure you understand the 
instructions so far.  
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
If you and Other both contribute all of your personal funds (20 points each), then the group 
account will equal 40 points. After multiplying 40 x 1.5, the group account will equal 60. 




Incorrect! When you and Other both contribute 20 points, the group account will equal 40 
points. After multiplying by 1.5, the points in the group account will be 60 points. Each of 




If you contribute 8 points and Other contributes 12 points, the group account will equal 20. 
After multiplying by 1.5, the group account will be 30. This means that each of you will 
receive 15 points from the group account. Considering how much you and Other kept in 
your personal accounts, who will have a total of 27 points at the end?  
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 You  
 Other 
 
Incorrect! When you contribute 8 points and Other contributes 12 points, then the points in 
group account will be 20. After multiplying by 1.5, the group account will be 30. This 
means that each of you will receive 15 points from the group account. Since you already 
have 12 points in your personal account, you will receive 27 (15 + 12) points at the end. 
Since Other already has 8 points in his/her personal account, s/he will receive 23 (15 + 8) 
points at the end. Please try again. _ 
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
If you and Other each contribute nothing to the group account, there will be no group points 
to share. Who will end this round with 20 points? 
 You  
 Other 
 None of You  
 Both of You 
 
Incorrect! When both of you contribute nothing to the group account, then both of you end 




You have completed the questions successfully. You will now be paired with the Other 




Please decide how much to contribute to the group account and then wait for the Other's 
decision. As mentioned before, each participant is given a 20-point fund.  
Please indicate the exact amount (any number from 0 to 20) you would like to contribute 
to the group account.  
____ 
You have typed an invalid entry. Please enter an INTEGER between 0 and 20. 
Press "Enter" on keyboard to submit. 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
Your contribution has been entered. While you are waiting for Other's decision, we would 
like to ask you some questions. 
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 




Not at all    Moderately     Very 
Motivated    Motivated           Motivated  
    1----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5------------------6-----------------7 
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
To what extent were you motivated to keep as much as possible in your personal account? 
Not at all    Moderately     Very 
Motivated    Motivated           Motivated  
    1----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5------------------6-----------------7 
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
Other’s decision has been entered. Other contributed {X-10} (or {X+10} for high 
conditions) points, which makes the total group points equal {X+(X-10)} (or 
{X+(X+10)}) for high conditions). After multiplying by 1.5, each of you will receive: 
{[X+(X-10)]/2} (or {[X+(X+10)]/2}) for high conditions) from the group account. Here 
is a summary of results and earnings for the first round: 
Since You already have {(20-X)} points in your personal account, your total: {(20-X) + 
{[X+(X-10)]/2} (or {{(20-X) + [X+(X+10)]/2}}) for high conditions)  
Since Other already has {20-(X-10)} (or {20-(X+10)} for high conditions) in his/her 
personal account, his/her total: {[20-(X-10)] + {[X+(X-10)]/2}} (or his/her total: {[20-
(X+10)] + {[X+(X+10)]/2}} for high conditions). 
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
You have completed the first round of the Community/Stock Market Study.  
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Before you continue to the next round, we would like to ask you some more questions 
about your experience up to this point. 
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
We would like to know how you feel about the amount You contributes to the group 
account. Please indicate this based on the following scale. My contribution was___. 
 Much too low 
 Too low 
 Somewhat too low 
 About right 
 Somewhat too high 
 Too high 
 Much too high 
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
We would like to know how you feel about the amount Other contributes to the group 
account. Please indicate this based on the following scale. Other’s contribution was___. 
 Much too low 
 Too low 
 Somewhat too low 
 About right 
 Somewhat too high 
 Too high 




How fair was YOUR contribution to the group account? 
 Very unfair 
 Unfair 




How fair was OTHER’s contribution to the group account? 
 Very unfair 
 Unfair 




Now you and Other have been given another 20 points each to start the second round of 
the Community/Stock Market Study. Please decide how much you would like to 
contribute to the group account. 
____ 
You have typed an invalid entry. Please enter an INTEGER between 0 and 20. 
Press "Enter" on keyboard when you are done4. 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
Thank you for your submission. While you are waiting for Other's decision, we would like 




To what extent did Other's contribution in the first round influence your contribution to the 
group account in the second round? 
Not at all       Moderately                    Strongly 
Influential     Influential                   Influential 
    1----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5------------------6-----------------7 
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
Some participants will have the opportunity to switch his/her partner with a different one 
for future rounds. Please indicate to what extent you would prefer to work with a different 
person for future rounds. 
No Preference                 Moderate Preference           Strong Preference 




Thank you for your responses. Later we will let you know if a new person becomes 
available and you will get to decide whether to switch at that time. For now, you will 




As noted earlier, one participant from each group will be randomly chosen to distribute a 
group bonus for some rounds. You have been selected to distribute the bonus of 10 points 
between you and Other. You are free to keep the bonus for your personal account or share 
any amount (from 0 to 10 points) with Other. Other will only be informed about the bonus 
if you decide to share some of it with him/her. Otherwise, s/he will not be informed of it. 
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
Please indicate the amount (any number from 0 to 10) you would like to give to Other. Any 
points you not give to Other will be automatically placed in your personal account. 
Bonus for Other:___ 
You have typed an invalid entry. Please enter an INTGER between 0 and 10. 
Press "Enter" on your keyboard to submit your decision for Other 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
 Bonus for Other: X 
 Bonus for You: 10-X 
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
While you were answering our questions, Other also finished his/her part. Other 
contributed {X-1} (or {X+1} for high conditions) points, which makes the total group points 
{X + (X-1)} (or ({X + (X+1)} for high conditions). After multiplying by 1.5, each of you 
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will receive {[X+(X-1)]/2} (or {[X+(X+1)]/2} for high conditions) point(s) from the group 
account. Since you already have {20-X} points in your personal account, your total will be 
{{20-X} + {[X+(X-1)]/2}} (or {{20-X} + {[X+(X+1)]/2}} for high conditions). Since Other 
already has {20-(X-1)} in his/her personal account, his/her total will be {[20-(X-1)] + 
{[X+(X-1)]/2}} (or {{20-(X+1)} + {[X+(X+1)]/2}} for high conditions). 
(THEN, TABLE DISPLAY FOR SUMMARY) 
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
You have completed the Community/Stock Market Study. Now we would like to ask 
you some final questions about the study. 
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
Did you find anything about the procedure odd, confusing, or hard to believe? 
 Yes 
 No 
If "yes", have your behaviors been affected?  
 Yes 
 No 
If "yes", please explain how. 
_____ 
Press "Enter" to continue. 
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((NEXT PAGE)) 
Do you think there may have been more to this experiment than meets the eye? 
 Yes 
 No 
If "yes", have your behaviors been affected? 
 Yes 
 No 
If "yes", please explain how. 
_____ 
Press "Enter" to continue. 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
Do you have any questions or comments about the others in the study (e.g., the person with 
whom you were paired)? 
 Yes 
 No 
If "yes", please give us more detail. 
_____ 
Press "Enter" to continue. 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
Were you told about any of the details of this study prior to today (e.g., by other students 




If "yes", have your behaviors been affected? 
 Yes 
 No 
If "yes", please explain how. 
_____ 
Press "Enter" to continue. 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
Was everything about the procedure clear and did all aspects of the procedure make sense? 
 Yes 
 No 
If "No", please explain how. 
_____ 
Press "Enter" to continue. 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
People react to things in different ways and it would be very useful for our research group 
to know about your feelings, thoughts or reactions to the experiment. If anything comes to 
mind that you feel like sharing, please indicate? 
_____ 
Press "Enter" to continue. 
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((NEXT PAGE)) 
When this study has been completed, we plan to send an email to all participants providing 
details about the study purpose and goals. We expect the study to take approximately 3 
months to complete. In the meantime, we would greatly appreciate you not discussing this 
experiment with those students who have not yet participated. The reason for this is that 
students who are informed about the study beforehand enter the study with existing bias 
and preconceived expectations that have a harmful effect on the study results. We 
appreciate your efforts to help us gain the most from this study by keeping your 
participation confidential.  
--continue-- 
((NEXT PAGE)) 
You have successfully completed this study. Thanks again for your participation. Please 




DESCRIPTION OF STUDY (Emailed to participants at conclusion of study) 
Dear Mr./Ms., 
You participated in a study in the sociology laboratory between 10/17/2016 and 
12/2/2016. After you were finished, we promised that we would write to you at the 
conclusion of the study with a fuller description of the study. This is that description.  
We were interested in a number of questions we couldn’t discuss with you in 
advance. We couldn’t discuss these things in advance because it likely would have 
impacted your actions during the study and thus skewed the research findings.  
We conducted the study to answer questions about how different types of social 
frames influence justice evaluations and subsequent behaviors. Thus, we were interested 
in comparing the behaviors of participants who were given different study titles. For 
instance, we wanted to compare whether people were more likely to experience stronger 
injustice when study is called community study versus stock market study. Whether they 
contribute differently across differently named studies.  
There was one deceptive aspect of the study. Specifically, you were told that you 
were interacting with other participants. But, in reality, the other participants were 
simulated. By simulating other participants, we were able to more carefully look at how 
different types of information leads to different behaviors. 
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Although we stated that earnings depended on what you and others did during the 
study, because you were interacting with simulated others, rather than real participants, 
every participant was given the same opportunities to win the monetary prize. The winners 
were chosen through a random selection process and received a notification email.  
The results of the study that you took part in suggest that people are more likely to 
make decision about contributing or not contributing to the group account by relying on 
their fairness experiences and social environment they were in. Calling a study as a 
community study or stock market led people to behave differently. For instance, people in 
the community group were more sensitive their partner’s contribution compared to people 
in the stock market group. 
We hope this clarifies the purpose of the research, and the reason we needed to use 
deception. Again, if you have any questions or would like more details about the study, 
please do not hesitate to contact me. We would be happy to answer any questions you have 
about the study, or to hear any comments, thoughts, or suggestions.  
Finally, we would like to personally thank you for participating in the study. Only 
through conducting studies like this can social scientists better understand what leads to 
people to act morally even when they have no risk of getting caught acting immorally. For 
this reason, your participation was very important. 
Thanks again and please let me know if you have any questions.  
Sincerely,  
Hatice Atilgan 
       PhD Candidate, University of South Carolina 
 
